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ABSTRACT 
In recent years both philosophers and scientists have asked whether or not our current 
kinds of mental disorder—e.g., schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder—are natural 
kinds; and, moreover, whether or not the search for natural kinds of mental disorder is a 
realistic desideratum for psychiatry. In this dissertation I clarify the sense in which a kind 
can be said to be “natural” or “real” and argue that, despite a few notable exceptions, 
kinds of mental disorder cannot be considered natural kinds. Furthermore, I contend that 
psychopathological phenomena do not cluster together into kinds in the way that 
paradigmatic natural kinds (e.g., chemical kinds and species) do; and, in light of this fact, 
I conclude that the normative ideal of natural classification—i.e. classifying real or 
natural kinds—is not appropriate as a general strategy for psychiatry. In the conclusion to 
this dissertation I propose an alternative way forward. Rather than assuming a priori that 
psychopathological phenomena cluster together into kinds, a more tractable and 
theoretically promising approach would be to first explain how particular kinds of 
experiences and behaviours—e.g, hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking, mania, 
low mood, etc.—are produced. 
Keywords: Natural Kinds; Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) Kinds; Mechanistic 
Property Cluster (MPC) Kinds; Mental Disorders; Mental Illnesses; Psychiatric Kinds; 
DSM Categories; Depression; Schizophrenia; Manic-Depressive Illness (Bipolar 
Disorder); Psychiatric Classification; Natural Classification; Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
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SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE 
A problem that scientists, psychiatrists, and philosophers have been wrestling with in 
recent years is how to best classify mental disorders. The primary motivation for this 
discussion is the belief that current psychiatric classifications have done a poor job of 
promoting the development of effective therapeutic interventions for mental illness. 
Although there is widespread agreement amongst scientists and philosophers with respect 
to what psychiatric classification has failed to do, it is not yet clear precisely why it has 
failed and how to go about fixing it. One suggestion that has gained popularity in recent 
years is that the psychiatric classification has failed because its categories do not really 
reflect the way the world is. For example, two people diagnosed with schizophrenia can 
be so different (e.g., one might be suffering from delusions and hallucinations, while 
another might be suffering from speech and motor problems) that it is more likely than 
not that their problems are caused by different things, which strongly suggests that 
providing them with the same treatment will be unhelpful. Nevertheless, there is still a lot 
of disagreement about whether or not categories like schizophrenia do reflect the way the 
world is. Some argue that schizophrenia is real, while others argue that it is a made up.  
 In this dissertation I clarify the sense in which mental disorders can be said to be 
“real” and argue that, despite a few notable exceptions, mental disorders cannot be said to 
be real, and are better understood as hypothetical constructs. Furthermore, I argue that 
hypothetical constructs like schizophrenia and depression are not useful for psychiatry, 
and a better way forward is to focus on trying to explain and treat particular experiences 
and behaviours—e.g, hallucinations, delusions, low mood, etc. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 Classification, or “nosology” in the technical language of the history of medicine, 
has always been the sine qua non of psychiatry. There are good historical reasons for this. 
In the early nineteenth century, when psychiatry was still emerging as a distinct 
discipline, little was understood about the nature of psychopathological phenomena. 
Psychiatrists hoped that, by first classifying psychopathological phenomena into different 
categories (on the basis of similarities in behavioural signs, symptoms, course, and 
outcome), their causal basis could then be investigated, and real kinds of mental disorder 
would eventually be discovered (Cf. Goldstein, 1987; Shorter, 1997, chapter 2 & chapter 
3; and Harrington, 2019, chapter 1). 
 By the time the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM)—DSM-III—rolled around in 1980 the situation was much the same. 
Not enough was known about the causal nature of mental disorders, and so DSM-III 
nosologists settled on predetermined sets of symptom-based inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, which could be used consistently from clinician-to-clinician, country-to-country. 
As both Shorter (1997, 300-301) and Harrington (2019, 134) note, the hope was that the 
new DSM categories would correspond to real kinds of mental disorder, and the belief 
was that biological causes would eventually be discovered for all mental disorders  
 Initially, DSM-III was hailed as a crowing achievement of psychiatry. The first 
two editions of the DSM—DSM-I and DSM-II—were heavily influenced by 
psychoanalytic theory, received very little fanfare, and did not appreciably improve 
diagnostic consistency (Cf. Shorter, 1997, chapter 8). Copies of DSM-III, however, sold 
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out immediately and were on backorder for approximately 6 months. As Andreason 
(2007, 111) puts it: “DSM-III and its successors…became universally and uncritically 
accepted as the ultimate authority on psychopathology and diagnosis”.  
 Fast forward to 2013 and Thomas Insel, former director of the National Institute 
of Mental Health (NIMH), had this to say about the most recent edition of the DSM, 
DSM-5:  
In a few weeks, the American Psychiatric Association will release its new 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5). This volume will tweak several current diagnostic categories, from 
autism spectrum disorders to mood disorders. While many of these changes 
have been contentious, the final product involves mostly modest alterations of 
the previous edition, based on new insights emerging from research since 
1990 when DSM-IV was published. Sometimes this research recommended 
new categories (e.g., mood dysregulation disorder) or that previous categories 
could be dropped (e.g., Asperger’s syndrome). 
The goal of this new manual, as with all previous editions, is to provide a 
common language for describing psychopathology. While DSM has been 
described as a “Bible” for the field, it is, at best, a dictionary, creating a set of 
labels and defining each. The strength of each of the editions of DSM has 
been “reliability” – each edition has ensured that clinicians use the same terms 
in the same ways. The weakness is its lack of validity. Unlike our definitions 
of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based 
on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective 
laboratory measure. In the rest of medicine, this would be equivalent to 
creating diagnostic systems based on the nature of chest pain or the quality of 
fever. Indeed, symptom-based diagnosis, once common in other areas of 
medicine, has been largely replaced in the past half century as we have 
understood that symptoms alone rarely indicate the best choice of treatment. 
Patients with mental disorders deserve better (Insel, 2013). 
In Insel’s mind, the DSM is at best a “dictionary” rather than a proper medical diagnostic 
system. Others have been far less kind. For instance, in his book Madness Explained: 
Psychosis and Human Nature clinical psychologist Richard Bentall draws an analogy 
3
between psychiatric classification and astrology, going so far as to say that current mental 
disorder categories are not much better than star signs, another persistent and widely 
accepted diagnostic system (Bentall, 2005).   1
 Notwithstanding the vitriolic attacks launched on psychiatry in recent years there 
is still widespread disagreement amongst philosophers and scientists with respect to what 
kinds of things current mental disorders are. Although it is true that categories of mental 
disorder have been, and still are, constructed on the basis of clusters of observable signs 
and symptoms, does this imply that they are merely convenient pigeonholes and hence 
not real?  
 Philosophers and scientists alike have offered different and sometimes 
contradictory answers to this question. For instance, in 1961 the Hungarian psychiatrist 
Thomas Szasz published The Myth of Mental Illness, arguing that real medicine deals 
with disease, and there is simply no evidence to suggest that kinds of mental disorder are 
real kinds of disease.  Later, philosopher Christopher Boorse (1975, 1976) put forth a 2
rebuttal, contending that mental illnesses are diseases underwritten by biological 
dysfunctions. According to Boorse, the human body and mind is comprised of various 
subsystems (e.g., organs, the nervous system, different brain modules) which perform 
various functions (e.g., the heart pumps blood, the visual system receives, transduces, and 
codes visual information), and a “biological dysfunction” is simply a subsystem which is 
 See also: Bentall (2006, 223). 1
 By “disease” Szasz meant a medical problem which arises from an observable anatomical abnormality, 2
such as a brain lesion. 
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no longer working properly.   3
 More recently, debates concerning the ontological status of psychiatric kinds have 
moved away from narrow accounts of “disease” and toward a broader discussion of 
“natural kinds”. In particular, philosophers have asked whether or not our current kinds of 
mental disorder are “real” or “natural” (irrespective of whether or not they are diseases); 
and, moreover, whether or not the search for natural kinds of mental disorder is a realistic 
desideratum for psychiatry. 
 As with previous discussions concerning the disease-status of mental disorders, 
the answers have been varied and contradictory. Some philosophers argue that at least 
some kinds of mental disorder are natural or real and that psychiatric classification ought 
generally to be developed in terms of a natural kind approach, since it would be an 
improvement on current psychiatric classification (Cooper, 2005, 2007; Kender, Zachar & 
Craver, 2011; Tsou, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2016). Others contend that current mental 
disorders are not natural kinds at all, and that the natural kind approach to psychiatric 
classification may not even be possible or desirable (Hacking, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1999, 
2007c; Hyman, 2010; McGuinn, 1991; Zachar, 2002, 2014a, 2014b). 
 The view that psychiatric kinds are, or ought to reflect, natural kinds will be the 
main point of contention throughout this dissertation. Recent work in the philosophy of 
psychiatry highlights just how important the concept of ‘natural kind’ is thought to be for 
psychiatric classification. Cooper (2005, 2007), for instance, contends that identifying 
 Wakefield (1992a, 1992b, 1999) provides a similar account, but conceives of the natural function of a sub-3
systems in an evolutionary sense—namely, a “natural function” is that which has been selected over the 
course of evolutionary history.   
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natural kinds of mental disorder is important for ensuring that psychiatric categories 
support generalizations by picking out more-or-less homogenous kinds. Others argue that 
identifying natural kinds is necessary for moving from a symptom-based to a causally-
based classification system, which would be in line with much of the rest of medicine (Cf. 
Kendler, Zachar & Craver, 2011; Tsou, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2016). In short, many 
philosophers and scientists believe that the solution to the current crisis of psychiatric 
classification is to revise our categories in such a way as to reflect natural kinds.  
 Be that as it may, the phrase ‘natural kind’ is very much a philosophical term of 
art. Although philosophers often draw a contrast between kinds that exist in nature and 
kinds that are constructed for our own convenience, beyond this intuitive contrast there 
has been considerable debate in philosophy about what constitutes a natural kind. In 
chapter 1 I clarify the terms of this debate. In the end, I argue that the central idea running 
through the history of natural kind theorizing is that natural kinds are, at bottom, 
collections of individuals who are alike in important respects—i.e. individuals are 
members of a natural kind in virtue of having in common important properties. Moreover, 
“important properties” are properties which cluster or “hang together” in virtue of being 
produced by certain causal mechanisms. In short, natural kinds are clusters of properties 
which cluster together because they have a common causal structure. 
 In chapter 2 I contend that, despite a few notable exceptions, there is no reason to 
think that psychiatric categories or kind-concepts are natural kinds. In particular, I argue 
that, while nothing in principle prevents mental disorders from being natural kinds, 
paradigm examples of kinds of mental disorder, such as schizophrenia and depression, are 
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individuated by superficial rather than important similarities, and so cannot be said to be 
natural kinds in the sense outlined in chapter 1. More specifically, psychiatric kinds are 
not natural kinds since we cannot even explain causally how it is that the signs and 
symptoms that are characteristic of putatively distinct kinds of mental disorder are 
produced. Without knowing the true causal structure of a particular kind of mental 
disorder, it is impossible to know whether the properties definitive of a psychiatric kind 
do indeed cluster together, or whether these groupings are merely a reflection of our 
predilections to group certain properties together. 
 In chapter 3 I address philosophical arguments claiming that kinds of mental 
disorder are natural kinds. Although psychiatric kinds are not natural kinds in the sense 
outlined in chapter 1, in recent years some philosophers have maintained that there is a 
sense in which at least some kinds of mental disorder can be considered “natural” or 
“real”. In particular, philosophers of psychiatry have defended the Homeostatic Property 
Cluster (HPC) view of natural kinds as a way of conceptualizing mental disorders. In 
addition to maintaining that some psychiatric kinds are natural kinds in accordance with 
the HPC theory, some philosophers have advanced the further claim that psychiatric 
categories which do not at present reflect HPC kinds ought to be revised until they do.  
 In this chapter I contend that philosophers of psychiatry who claim that mental 
disorders are HPC kinds, and that the HPC theory is a useful model for psychiatric 
classification, often equivocate between two very different versions of the HPC theory of 
natural kinds. In particular, I suggest that there is both a strong and weak reading of the 
HPC theory, and that mental disorders are only HPC kinds in the weak sense. The upshot 
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of this, I argue, is that philosophers cannot consistently hold both that psychiatric kinds 
are HPC kinds, and that HPC kinds are useful models for psychiatric classification. I 
conclude this chapter by clarifying the sense in which I think kinds of mental disorder can 
be said to be “natural” or “real”. 
 In chapter 4 I ask whether or not it is plausible to expect that current psychiatric 
categories will come to reflect natural kinds. When philosophers suggest that psychiatric 
categories ought to reflect natural kinds they presuppose a picture of the world in which 
diverse psychopathological phenomena cluster together in the way that other 
paradigmatic natural kinds do. They also presuppose that by consulting our best theories 
about the world we can know which clusters are real and which are bogus. In this chapter 
I argue that the idea that our best theories about the world are a reliable guide to which 
psychiatric kinds exist and which don’t is historically false. Furthermore, I present 
evidence for the conclusion that psychopathological phenomena do not cluster together in 
ways that would be useful for psychiatric classification.  
 In light of the above considerations I conclude that the normative ideal of natural 
classification—i.e. classifying real or natural kinds in the sense described in chapter 1—is 
not appropriate as a general strategy for psychiatry. In the conclusion to this dissertation I 
propose an alternative way forward. Rather than assuming a priori that 
psychopathological phenomena cluster together into kinds, a more tractable and 
theoretically promising approach would be to first explain how particular kinds of 
experiences and behaviours—e.g, hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking, mania, 
low mood, etc.—are produced. 
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A Few Notes On Methodology  
 In addressing the two questions that motivate this dissertation—namely, “Are 
mental disorders natural kinds?” and “Should psychiatric categories reflect natural 
kinds”—I decided to proceed from a general conception of natural kinds. The principal 
reason for this is that, when we ask whether or not a kind is “natural” or “real”, what we 
really want to know, I think, is whether the properties definitive of a kind really do cluster 
together in nature, or whether human beings grouped them together as a matter of 
convenience. As we will see in chapter 1, there are many different theories of natural 
kinds on the philosophical market. Some theories are so inclusive that almost any kind 
can be considered natural. Others are so restrictive that only kinds of physical particles 
and chemical elements can be plausibly considered natural. Simply adopting one theory 
of natural kinds to the exclusion of others, or claiming that there is some fast-and-loose 
sense in which some kind is “natural”, runs the risk of turning natural kind theorizing into 
a game of rhetoric, as Hacking (2007a) has convincingly argued.      
 Throughout this dissertation I principally use depression and schizophrenia as 
paradigmatic examples of psychiatric kinds (though I briefly touch other kinds of mental 
disorder as well). There are three reasons for this. First, the most recent version of the 
DSM, DSM-5, has grown to 947 pages, and includes a total of 541 diagnostic categories, 
151 of which are defined by predetermined inclusion-exclusion criteria. In an essay of 
this scope I simply cannot address each and every one of these categories, nor can I 
accord proper justice to even several of them. Second, when philosophers claim that 
mental disorders are natural kinds, they almost exclusively use depression and 
9
schizophrenia as paradigmatic examples of natural kinds of mental disorder, and are often 
skeptical of other kinds of mental disorder such as hysteria, neurasthenia, dissociative 
fugue, multiple personality disorder (dissociative identity disorder), cluster B personality 
disorders (including antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic types), and 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In addressing depression and 
schizophrenia I avoid setting up a “straw man” and make it much more likely that my 
conclusions generalize to other (more controversial) psychiatric kinds. Finally, along with 
bipolar disorder, depression and schizophrenia are two of the oldest surviving categories 
in psychiatry today. As we will see in due course, a central assumption of natural kind 
realism is that our best theories of the world are our best guides as to which kinds are real 
and which are bogus. Given that depression and schizophrenia have been the focus of 
more than two centuries of scientific theorizing, we should expect them to be amongst the 
most scientifically mature kinds in psychiatry.  
 My approach to assessing depression and schizophrenia is three-pronged: 
philosophical, empirical, and historical. In chapter 2 and chapter 3 I discuss the most up-
to-date empirical literature on depression and schizophrenia and utilize the philosophical 
account of natural kinds developed in chapter 1 in favour of the conclusion that 
depression and schizophrenia are not natural kinds. In the first half of chapter 4 I analyze 
the concept of ‘schizophrenia’ from a historical perspective for the purpose of arguing 
that our best theories about the world are not necessarily reliable guides to which 
psychiatric kinds are real and which aren’t. In the second half of the chapter I present 
empirical evidence for the conclusion that psychopathological phenomena do not cluster 
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together in the way that paradigmatic natural kinds do.  
  Notwithstanding the fact that I consider depression and schizophrenia to be 
paradigmatic kinds of mental disorder, what I have to say about depression and 
schizophrenia in what follows should not be taken to apply necessarily to each and every 
category listed in the DSM. While I do believe that my conclusions generalize to most 
kinds of mental disorder—or so I will argue—there are no doubt exceptions, some of 
which I point out in various places. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Natural Kinds and Natural Classification  
[T]here are in nature distinctions of Kind…Kinds are Classes between which there is an 
impassible barrier…The problem is, to find a few definite characters…[or]…marks 
whereby we may determine on which side of the barrier an object takes its place. 
— John Stuart Mill, in A System of Logic, IV vii § 4. 
 1.1 Introduction
 There is widespread disagreement amongst philosophers and scientists with 
respect to whether or not our current psychiatric categories are natural kinds, and, 
moreover, whether or not the search for natural kinds is a realistic desideratum for 
psychiatry. But what is a natural kind? Philosophers often draw a contrast between kinds 
that exist in nature and kinds that are constructed for our own convenience. But beyond 
this intuitive contrast there has been considerable debate in philosophy about what 
constitutes a natural kind. The proliferation of theories of natural kinds has even 
prompted philosopher Ian Hacking to write: “there are so many radically incompatible 
theories of natural kinds now in circulation that the concept itself has self-destructed…
[and we should] acknowledge that the concept of a natural kind, which began in a 
promising way and has taught us many things, is now obsolete” (Hacking, 2007a, 205). 
And so he concludes: “Some classifications are more natural than others, but there is no 
such thing as a natural kind” (ibid., 203; emphasis in original).  1
 According to Hacking, there are two possible ways of responding to the murkiness 
 More precisely, Hacking argues that there is no such thing as a natural kind insofar as there is no “definite, 1
human-independent, class of natural kinds” (ibid., 207). He allows that the expression ‘natural kind’ might 
be used more moderately to describe those classifications “that strike us as natural, as opposed to those that 
strike us as conventional” (ibid., 208), without there being one well-defined class of natural kinds.
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of the natural kind concept and its idiosyncratic usage amongst philosophers. The first is 
to abandon the concept altogether. Hacking, for instance, prefers instead Goodman’s 
(1978) alternative phrase ‘relevant kind’. According to Goodman, we recognize a kind or 
category because of the role it plays in some theoretical or practical enterprise, not 
because it corresponds with what he considers to be some nebulous and unknowable 
“kind in nature”.  Another possible response, Hacking suggests, is to embrace pluralism 2
about natural kinds, or what John Dupré has formerly called “promiscuous realism”. 
According to Dupré (1981, 1993, 2001, 2002), the idea of a natural kind is grounded in 
judgements of similarity (or “sameness relations”).  Given that individual members of a 3
putative kind are similar in many respects (Dupré’s “realism”), there are many similarities 
(none of which are privileged and all of which may or may not be relevant to various 
concerns) that can serve to distinguish kinds of things (Dupré’s “promiscuity”), and so 
there may be many cross-cutting categories that merit the label “natural kind”.  4
 The problem with both skepticism and pluralism about natural kinds, however, is 
that they merely substitute one problem for another—namely, ambiguity for vagueness. 
Even if we grant that there is a sense in which all of our categories are relevant kinds, or a 
broad sense in which many of our categories are natural kinds, surely not all of these 
categories are ontologically on a par. Chemical elements, chemical compounds, and 
species are types of naturally occurring objects, whereas postal codes and telephone area 
 See, especially, Goodman (1978, chapter 1). 2
 Quine (1969, chapter 5), too, argues that the notion of ‘natural kind’ is grounded in judgements of 3
similarity. The difference, however, is that Quine thinks that intuitive or innate judgements of similarity 
will, as a matter of course, be replaced by (but not wholly superseded by) scientifically sophisticated ones, 
such that the concept of natural kind will be dispensed with altogether.  
 Cf. Dupré (1981, 82). 4
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codes are not. Presumably race and class, too, are not kinds of naturally occurring objects, 
even if there is a sense in which both are “more natural” or “more real” than postal codes 
and telephone area codes (Cf. Root, 2000). But loosening our definition of ‘natural kind’, 
or attaching the equally vague adjective ‘relevant’ to ‘kind’ only serves to obscure these 
differences.  
 Rather than assenting to pluralism or skepticism about natural kinds, in this 
chapter I give a rough-and-ready characterization of natural kinds that grants to the 
skeptic that there is no well-defined class of natural kinds, but also denies that natural 
kinds are merely collections of individuals who are similar in some respects. In my mind, 
the central idea running through the history of natural kind theorizing is that natural kinds 
are, at bottom, collections of individuals who are alike in important respects—i.e. 
individuals are members of a natural kind in virtue of having in common important 
properties. And we know that a kind is “natural” or “real” when we discover, rather than 
stipulate, what these important properties are. 
 But what is an “important property”? As Putnam (1975a, 239) has pointed out, 
‘importance’ is an interest-relative notion, and the appeal to important properties would 
seem to concede to skeptics and pluralists that our categories are formulated relative to 
particular human interests, not the world. In the end, believers in natural kinds agree that 
“important properties” are properties which cluster or “hang together” in virtue of being 
produced by certain causal mechanisms. In short, natural kinds are clusters of properties 
which cluster together because they have a common causal structure. 
 Furthermore, natural kind theorists maintain that we can know which clusters are 
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real and which are bogus by consulting our best theories about the world. In this sense, 
the natural kind realist does not, and need not, deny that natural kind categories are 
“relevant” or “conventional” in the trivial sense in which all categories are constructed 
relative to certain human interests. She simply maintains that, relative to our theoretical 
interests (e.g., identifying unique species or a chemically pure substance), we are able to 
recognize what the important properties of a natural kind are.  
 The foregoing conception of natural kinds has its roots in eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century debates about scientific classification. Since John Stuart Mill was the 
first to translate these debates into natural kind talk, I begin by describing the context in 
which Mill was working. Next, I outline Mill’s account of natural kinds. And, finally, I 
compare Mill’s account to contemporary alternatives. Although I say very little about 
psychiatric kinds in this chapter, in the next chapter I argue that psychiatric kinds are not 
natural kinds in the sense outlined here.   
1.2 The Origin of Natural Kinds 
1.2.1 The Assumption of Essences 
 The terms ‘kind’, ‘natural kind, and ‘real kind’ were not introduced into the 
philosophical lexicon until the nineteenth century, though the basic contrast between 
kinds existing in nature and kinds invented by us has deep roots in the history of 
philosophy and science. Aristotle, for instance, posited that the fundamental objects of 
science are substances, that is, things with universal natures or essences. The task of 
scientific classification, for Aristotle, was to construct “real definitions” of things in 
nature by identifying what it is that makes an individual substance distinct from other 
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individual substances—its essence. The candidate essence for the species human being, 
for example, was rationality. While human beings were subsumed under the genus animal 
insofar as they possess the powers of sensation and self-movement, rationality was 
considered to be the “difference” that separates human beings from other animals, thereby 
giving rise to characteristic human properties such as language, laughter, and so on. On 
this basis all things in nature could be classified in an absolute hierarchy according to the 
method of genus and difference, such that each thing had its proper place in nature.  5
“Pseudo-definitions”, on the other hand, could be invented ad nauseam either by 
predicating of individuals something which is not unique to them (e.g., the definition ‘a 
father is a male animal with offspring’ makes it such that the category ‘father’ cross-cuts 
all of the different species of animal, rather than identifying each species uniquely), or by 
predicating of individuals something which is unique to them but which fails to pick out 
their principal attribute or essence (e.g., Plato’s famous conjecture that a human being is 
‘a featherless biped with flat nails’).  6
 A category, then, can be said to be “real” or “natural”, in the Aristotelean sense, 
just in case it collects together individuals who do indeed share an essence, such that this 
essence is jointly necessary and sufficient for determining membership in a particular 
kind (or “species”, to use the parlance of the time). Moreover, a properly natural 
 This is Aristotle’s scala naturae (“ladder of being”). For Aristotle, all of life could be organized in an 5
absolute hierarchy such that living things and non-living things are species of substance; animals and 
vegetables are species of living things; and human beings are species of animal, and so on. See Ayer (1981). 
In the medieval and early modern period the ladder of being, or “Great Chain of Being”, was seen as a God-
given ordering, with God positioned at the apex followed by angels, demons (i.e. fallen angels), human 
beings, animals, plants, and minerals. Most importantly, as we will see, objects in the hierarchy were 
conceptualized as having fixed essences (and consequently, a fixed moral status), such that an individual 
thing could not, as it were, move up or down the ladder. See Lovejoy (1936/2010).     
 Aristotle also termed the latter kind of definition a “nominal definition”. See Ayers (1981) for an overview 6
of Aristotle’s approach to scientific classification and explanation. 
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classification system—and indeed, a complete science—both “cuts nature at its joints” (to 
use an old Platonic phrase) by providing a comprehensive set of real definitions and 
reflects the true order of nature by organizing each and every species of thing into an 
absolute hierarchy according to both their species essence and their genus essence (see 
note 5 for further discussion).          
 With the new mechanistic philosophy of the seventeenth century—the view, 
roughly, that all material objects are explicable mechanically in terms of their 
fundamental material (as opposed to formal or functional) structure and the common laws 
of mechanics and motion that govern them—Aristotle’s doctrine of universal natures or 
substantial forms was in the process of being overturned. What was not lost, however, 
was the view that the true objects of science are essences. For instance, Descartes and 
Boyle maintained that they knew the essence of matter, whether it be extension in the case 
of Descartes, or corpusularianism (solid particles clashing in a void) in the case of Boyle. 
Locke objected, arguing in Book III of his Essay that, even if things did have a material 
essence, this essence could not be known, and so essences are of no help in classifying 
things into kinds. As we will see in due course, it is the idea of a material essence—and 
the presumption that we can know a posteriori what these essences are—that now forms 
the backbone of “New Essentialist” theories of natural kinds.     
1.2.2 The Problem of Natural Groups 
 Essentialism was the predominant assumption in eighteenth century biological 
classification, even if there was no clear consensus on what the essence of a plant or 
animal consisted of. Linnaeus, for instance, held that the point of natural classification 
17
was to abstract away from the messiness of nature so as to reveal the perfect orderliness 
of God’s creation—to recover, as it were, the perfect Adamic language given to Adam by 
God to enable Adam to correctly name the animals. Linnaeus’ prescription for a proper 
natural classification was premised on two things. First, metaphysically speaking, species 
and genera were considered by Linnaeus to be eternally fixed, and any observed intra-
specific differences or variations were seen as mere imperfections of God’s orderly 
creation, rather than observations to be accounted for.  Second, epistemologically 7
speaking, for Linnaeus nature itself reveals what the true genera and species are, not the 
naturalist. Darwin himself would later summarize Linnaeus’ view succinctly: “the 
characters do not make the genus, but…the genus gives the characters” (Darwin, 
1859/2003, 432). In other words, according to Linnaeus each and every plant and animal 
reveals its own essential properties and thereby “speaks” its own name.  
 In addition to essence, eighteenth century taxonomists carried over from Aristotle 
(or at least the Christianized version of Aristotle from medieval scholasticism ) the 8
assumption that living things ought to be classified in an absolute hierarchy. For instance, 
Linnaeus classified living things according to the method of genus and difference. 
Following this method, animal would be a genus of mammal, but a species for living 
 As he puts it: “all genera are natural, and have been such since the beginning of time” (Linnaeus, 1751, 7
100).      
 There is some debate about whether or not Aristotle was actually interested in developing an absolute 8
hierarchy of species, but I gloss over these interpretive difficulties here. See Lloyd (1961) and Pellegrin 
(1986) for further discussion. What is clear is that the “great chain of being” conception of nature 
dominated thought well into the nineteenth century in spite of emerging evidence from palaeontology and 
geology pointing away from the fixity of species and toward organic evolution (or “the transmutation of 
species”). See Larson (2006).     
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thing; feline would be a species of mammal but a genus of tiger, and so on.  Thus a whole 9
nested hierarchy becomes possible. Species are grouped into genera, genera into families, 
families into classes, classes into orders, and so forth.  
 This is when a series of problems emerged. Suppose a taxonomist is attempting to 
arrange individual things into groups. First, two descriptive questions arise: (1) in which 
ways do the individuals in question resemble each other? and (2) which method of sorting 
best represents the ways in which these individuals resemble each other? Linnaeus (1735, 
1753), for instance, introduced the “sexual system” of classification for the purpose of 
sorting plants. Following this system, plants were classified according to the number of 
stamens and pistils (the male and female sexual organs of a plant, respectively) in the 
flowers of plant. The number and arrangement of stamens gave rise to 24 classes; within 
each class a plant was then assigned an order based on the number of its pistils.   
 Linnaeus’ system was generally recognized as ingenious and expedient. Yet, a 
further, ontological, question emerged in response to Linnaeus’ classification of both 
plants and animals: (3) are Linnaean genera and species “natural” or “artificial”? Or, to 
put it in contemporary terms, are Linnaean kinds real or are they convenient fictions? 
Why, for instance, suppose that the sexual organs of a plant are the resemblances or 
similarities that, as nature would have it, determine whether an individual belongs to one 
species and not another? 
 To rephrase the latter question more generally: (4) which resemblances or 
 For instance, Linnaeus (1758) gave tiger the name felis tigris, felis being the generic name followed by the 9
specific epithet tigris to distinguish tigers from other felines or felidae. This came to be known as binomial 
nomenclature. Prior to Linnaeus plants and animals were typically classified using unwieldy phrases such 
as ‘annual, much-branched Physalis, with strongly-angled, glabrous branches and leaves with sawtoothed 
edges’ The Linnaean binomial equivalent for the same plant is Physalis angulata.
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similarities are the ones that, as nature would have it, determine whether an individual 
belongs to one species or kind and not another? That is, which resemblances matter and 
which don’t? In Linnaeus’ case the inability to answer this latter question led many of his 
contemporaries to dub his system of classification artificial as opposed to natural. With 
respect to plants, they thought the singling out of one feature, sexual organs, as an 
organizing feature of classification an arbitrary choice. Michel Adanson (1763), for 
instance, identified that there are upwards of 65 different ways that plants resemble each 
other, and a proper natural classification scheme would take as many of these 
resemblances as possible into account. By “artificial” these authors did not mean that 
species and genera were arbitrary in the way that the motley collection of things on my 
desk might be. Sameness of sexual organs is a natural similarity. The point, however, was 
that plants resemble each other in many ways, and the privileging of one similarity to the 
exclusion of others is an arbitrary choice. Artificial classes, then, were seen as useful 
classes invented by botanists, as opposed to classes which accurately represented the 
natural order of things.     
1.2.3 Beyond Resemblances and Essences: Postulating Historical Groups 
 In spite of his critics, Linnaeus was resolute in maintaining that beyond our 
imperfect classificatory schemes are real genera and species. This view was shared by 
Darwin. Nevertheless, while Darwin retains the hierarchical ordering of living things, he 
revolutionized biological taxonomy by proposing a way in which biological classification 
can move beyond mere resemblances in the absence of stipulative essences. As is well 
known, this solution came almost a century after Linnaeus when Darwin postulated: 
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[The] difficulties in classification may be explained, if I do not greatly 
deceive myself, on the view that the Natural System is founded on descent 
with modification;—that the characters which naturalists consider as showing 
true affinity between any two or more species, are those which have been 
inherited from a common parent, all true classification being genealogical;—
that community of descent is the hidden bond which naturalists have been 
unconsciously seeking, and not some unknown plan of creation, or the 
enunciation of general propositions, and the mere putting together and 
separating objects more or less alike (Darwin, 1859/2003, 437).  
According to Darwin, objects can, in principle, be classed in innumerable ways. Previous 
naturalists, such as Linnaeus and Adanson, respectively, tended to classify objects 
“artificially by single characters, or more naturally by a number of characters” (ibid., 
431); sometimes things were classed together for the purpose of making generalizations 
about the members so classed (ibid, 432, 437). Yet, each and every one of these strategies 
failed to identify “the hidden bond” (ibid., 437) that would serve to explain why 
similarities between members of a species obtain. For Darwin, individuals resemble each 
other in the ways that they do because they are part of a common lineage. Genealogical 
succession or descent, then, is the true natural organizing principle for classifying living 
things.  
1.2.4. Summary: Natural Kinds of Species   
 The eighteenth and nineteenth century debate about natural classification that 
culminated in Darwin’s The Origin of Species is noteworthy in a number of respects. 
First, the debate itself presupposes both that it is a fact about nature that there are kinds of 
species, and that the similarities and differences among individuals in virtue of which 
they are divided into kinds can serve as a basis for classification. In short, it presupposes 
that there are natural kinds of species and that they are knowable a posteriori. Second, 
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concerning the classification of living things, it would seem that Darwin’s solution to (4) 
required an answer to a further question: (5) how are individuals in nature related—i.e 
what kinds of things are they? Darwin’s postulation that species are historical entities 
provides an answer, and, as far as classification is concerned, a natural organizing 
principle whereby some headway can be made on the question of which resemblances 
matter and which don’t. Rather than sorting living things by means of arbitrarily choosing 
one resemblance to the exclusion of others—or attempting the Sisyphean task of taking 
into account all of the ways in which individuals resemble each other—we consider those 
“characters…which have been inherited from a common parent”, since the relationship to 
a common ancestor is the reason why individual members of a species resemble each 
other in the ways that they do. What makes a category of species “real” or “natural”, then, 
is not the sharing of some eternal essence, but those properties which correctly reflect its 
place in the tree of life.         
 Be that as it may, Darwin’s solution for the classification of living things does not 
solve the problem of classification writ large. While life is genealogical and thereby can 
be classified in an hierarchical fashion, this still leaves wide open the question of how 
other aspects of nature are ordered. For instance, Mendeleev’s periodic table of elements 
broke with the long-standing tradition in which attempts were made to organize all kinds 
of inanimate stuff in a tree-like fashion. Minerals, too, are no longer organized 
hierarchically.  Furthermore, although the principles used to classify species of plant and 10
 Mineralogical specimens are now classified according to both their chemical make-up and their 10
crystalloid shape. In the eighteenth century and prior it was common to extend the hierarchical approach 
used for classifying plants and animals to the classification of minerals and other inanimate substances.     
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animal were at one time extended to the classification of mental disorders , there have 11
been many candidates; and, indeed, as we will see, psychiatric classification is still 
awaiting its own natural organizing principle.                   
1.3 Natural Kinds  
 Mill was the first to translate eighteenth and nineteenth-century debates about 
scientific classification into natural kind talk. Like Darwin and Linnaeus—and unlike his 
contemporary William Whewell—Mill thought it plausible that some of our categories 
reflect real kinds of animals, plants, chemical elements, and so on.  Mill also recognized, 12
however, that not all of our scientific categories reflect real kinds. Many of our scientific 
categories are the subjects of open-ended investigation, and will surely be displaced in 
favour of new ones. And, indeed, in ‘Of Classification as Subsidiary to Induction’ in his 
Logic, Mill even seems to suggest that the goal of scientific classification is not 
necessarily to discover and then classify real kinds. Real kinds make up only a portion of 
our scientific classification schemes, and there are other legitimate uses to which 
classification can be put. In light of this, the important question regarding natural kinds, 
for Mill, is not simply, “What is a natural kind”?—but, given that there are natural kinds, 
and that they are knowable only a posteriori, “How do we know which of our scientific 
categories are real kinds and which are not?” I describe Mill’s answer to this question in 
what follows.  
1.3.1 Mill on Artificial Classes, Practical Classes, and Natural Groups  
 See Foucault (1972/2006), Part II, Chapter 1.11
 Mill uses the phrase ‘real Kind’ rather than ‘natural kind.’ I use these terms interchangeably throughout 12
this dissertation. 
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 Mill’s first gesture at a description of real kinds can be found in the section ‘Kinds 
have a real existence in nature’ of Logic. Here Mill points out that there is “a very 
remarkable diversity in this respect between some classes and others” (Logic I vii § 4). 
The class of white things, for instance, “are not distinguished by any common properties 
except whiteness; or if they are, it is only by such as are in some way dependent on, or 
connected with, whiteness” (ibid.). According to Mill, members of the class of white 
things do not share natural properties other than those which were used to mark the kind 
(namely, the property white). It is an artificial class. In contrast, members of classes such 
as animal, plant, sulphur, and phosphorus have in common properties in addition to those 
which are used to mark the kind. As he states: “a hundred generations have not exhausted 
the common properties of animals or of plants, of sulphur or of phosphorus; nor do we 
suppose them to be exhaustible, but proceed to new observations and experiments, in the 
full confidence of discovering new properties which were by no means implied in those 
we previously knew” (ibid.).  The latter, for Mill, are real kinds.  13
 But there is more to the story. Mill does not presuppose that all of our current 
categories of plants and animals and elements are real kinds. Indeed, Mill acknowledges 
that there are many uses to which classification can be put, and not all of these uses will 
 Indeed, Mill even seems to suggest that we will never discover all of the properties of a real kind, since 13
the common properties of real kinds are inexhaustible. In a recent treatment of natural kinds, Khalidi (2013, 
49-52) makes much of Mill’s notion of ‘inexhaustibility’, suggesting that it is an unnecessarily strict 
condition that Mill places on kindhood. After all, for any kind K it impossible to say definitively whether or 
not the properties of some kind will be inexhaustible or not, and there is in principle no reason to suppose 
that there will not be instances in which we discover all of the properties of a kind at the outset of our 
investigation. While there are certainly instances in which Mill seems to suggest that inexhaustibility (he 
also uses the terms ‘indefiniteness’ and ‘indeterminacy’) is a condition of kindhood (see, especially, Logic I 
vii  § 4), he also says that the properties of a kind are inexhaustible in that “Our knowledge of the properties 
of a Kind is never complete” (Logic IV vii § 4). In other words, Mill seems to be making the banal 
observation that it will always be possible that we will discover new properties of a kind that we did not at 
first consider. For this reason, I do not treat the condition of inexhaustibility seriously in what follows.  
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furnish us with real kinds. For instance, in ‘Of Classification as Subsidiary to Induction’ 
Mill observes that some classes are formed merely with a “particular end in view” (Logic 
IV vii § 2). Call these “practical classes”. With respect to these classes, the properties or 
characters that we attend to for the purpose of classification are the ones that merely serve 
certain parochial practical ends. A farmer who grows both flowers and garlic, and is 
interested in profiting from the sale of these two crops, does not consider garlic a lily, 
even if garlic is a lily (i.e. subsumed under the category Liliaceae) according to the 
botanist.  According to the farmer and her interests, garlic and lillies are two very 14
different kinds of thing. Garlic is a root crop and requires different care than a lily. Garlic 
is planted and harvested differently than a lily; it is dried, cleaned, and eventually used to 
flavour a dish. The implication of this, with respect to classification, is that the putative 
kind garlic may be classified in at least two different ways, both as a lily and not as a lily. 
As Mill makes clear, the varied uses to which we put classification makes it such that “the 
same objects…may admit with propriety of several different classifications” (Logic IV vii 
§ 2).  
 Be that as it may, it would be a mistake to think that a botanist’s classification 
scheme provides us with real kinds, whereas a farmer’s does not. As you will recall, 
Linnaeus’ critics dubbed his classification of plants “artificial” on the basis that the choice 
of sexual organs as an organizing feature of classification was an arbitrary one. Mill 
agrees, but for slightly different reasons. For Mill, the choice of sexual organs is arbitrary 
not merely because it is one property among many; rather, it is arbitrary (and, he adds, “of 
 Mill provides a similar example: “A farmer does not divide plants, like a botanist, into dicotyledonous 14
and monocotyledonous, but into useful plants and weeds” (Logic IV vii § 2). 
25
little use”) because classifying in this way does not allow us to say anything more about 
the thing that we are classifying.      15
 For Mill, then, there are many ways to divide the world, some approaches being 
useful and some less so. Most importantly, however, not all uses are on a par. When our 
goal is to learn about the world, and not merely to construct categories that serve our 
parochial practical ends, we search for natural groups. As Mill writes:   
But when we are studying objects not for any special practical end, but for the 
sake of extending our knowledge of the whole of our properties and relations, 
we must consider as the most important attributes, those which contribute 
most, either by themselves or by their effects, to render the things like one 
another, and unlike other things; which give to the class composed of them 
the most marked individuality; which fill, as it were, the largest space in their 
existence, and would impress the attention of a spectator who knew all their 
properties but was not specially interested in any. Classes formed on this 
principal may be called, in a more emphatic manner than any others, natural 
groups (Logic IV vii § 2; emphasis mine). 
In order to classify the world as it really is we must attend to “the most important 
properties, those which contribute most, either by themselves or by their effects, to render 
the things like one another.”  It would seem that, for Mill, we know that a kind is 16
“natural” or “real” when we recognize or discover those properties which make a thing 
the kind of thing that it is—the similarities in nature in virtue of which things are, as it 
were, divided into kinds.  
 But how do we know which properties “contribute most” to rendering individuals 
like one another? At this point Mill seems to suggest that the importance of a property 
 As Mill puts it: “to think of [plants] in that manner is of little use, since we seldom have anything to 15
affirm in common of the plants which have a given number of stamens and pistils” (Logic IV vii § 2).
 Regarding natural classification, Mill says: “the test of its scientific character is the number and 16
importance of the properties which can be asserted in common of all objects included in a group” (Logic IV 
vii § 2).
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consists in its aptness for making inductive generalizations. For instance, Mill writes: 
The ends of scientific classification are best answered, when the objects are 
formed into groups respecting which a greater number of general 
propositions can be made…the properties, therefore, according to which 
objects are classified, should, if possible, be those which are causes of many 
other properties: or at any rate, which are sure marks of them. Causes are 
preferable, both as being the surest and most direct of marks, and as being 
themselves the properties on which it is of most use that our attention should 
be strongly fixed (Logic IV vii § 2; emphasis mine).  
According to Mill, the important properties of a kind ensure the manifestation of other 
properties of the kind, either by causing them or being predictive (i.e. “sure marks”) of 
them. Given this, it would seem that, for Mill, “important properties” are projectable 
properties —i.e. properties which point reliably to other properties. 17
 But beyond the fact that natural groups allow us to make useful generalizations, 
why does Mill insist that classifying natural groups in the sense outlined above comes 
closer to tracking real divisions in nature? There is a clear rationale for this. If we are able 
to make reliable inductive inferences about individual members of a kind, then there must 
be something in nature making this possible.  Hence, the projectability of a category is 18
an epistemic mark of its naturalness (viz. realness). 
1.3.2 From Natural Groups to Natural Kinds 
 But projectability is not the whole story about real kinds. For Mill, natural groups 
come closer to tracking real kinds in nature than artificial classes and practical classes, 
but not all natural groups are real kinds (see, especially, Logic IV vii § 4). You will recall 
 Typically, projectablity is used to characterize terms or predicates which figure in reliable inductive 17
inferences (Cf. Goodman, 1983). In this dissertation I will often say that kinds, properties, categories, or 
concepts are projectable, which is just to say that the terms or predicates which refer to them are.   
 As Mill puts it: “If the class did not possess any characters in common, what general assertions would be 18
possible respecting it?” (Logic IV vii § 4).  
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that, in the previous section, I said that for Darwin the question of (4) which resemblances 
or similarities are the ones that, as nature would have it, determine whether an individual 
belongs to one species or kind and not another turned on the question: (5) how are 
individuals in nature related—i.e what kinds of things are they? Mill appears to share the 
same intuition. Although Mill was writing in pre-Darwinian days and thus was not privy 
to Darwin’s solution to (4) in the context of biological species, he takes his cue from 
chemistry. Of elementary chemistry Mill writes:  
The substances, whether simple or compound, with which chemistry is 
conversant, are Kinds, and, as such, the properties which distinguish each of 
them from the rest are innumerable; but in the case of compound substances 
(the simple ones are not numerous enough to require a systematic 
nomenclature), there is one property, the chemical composition, which is of 
itself sufficient to distinguish the Kind; and is (with certain reservations not 
yet thoroughly understood) a sure mark of all the other properties of the 
compound (Logic IV vii § 5; emphasis mine). 
In Mill’s view, there are many properties associated with a particular chemical compound. 
Nevertheless, with respect to classifying a real kind of chemical compound, one property 
matters more than any other: chemical composition.    
 But why suppose that chemical composition is the property that matters? It seems 
Mill is appealing here to Antoine Laurent-Lavoisier’s system of classifying chemical 
compounds, which first appears in Method de nomenclature chimique  in 1787. Implied 19
in this method of classification was the view that chemical compounds are composed of 
simple chemical substances linked by certain chemical affinities—e.g., the chemical 
 Co-authored with Guyton de Morveau, Berthollet, and Foucroy. 19
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compound H20 being composed of hydrogen and oxygen molecules in a ratio of 2:1.  To 20
be sure, Mill is somewhat hesitant in his claim about chemical composition, 
acknowledging its theory-dependence with the qualification “with certain reservations not 
yet thoroughly understood”. Such reservations notwithstanding, Mill’s central point is 
that, given that the arrangement of simple chemical substances does make a chemical 
compound the kind of thing that it is—i.e. given that Lavosier is right that the structural 
properties of chemical compounds “render the things like one another”—chemical 
composition is the property that matters. 
 According to Mill, then, natural kinds are at bottom collections of individuals in 
nature who have in common important properties, and we can be reasonably certain that a 
kind is “natural” or “real” when we discover rather than stipulate what these properties 
are. Moreover, ‘important’ here should be taken to mean “theoretically important” in the 
sense that the properties indicative of a real kind stand in an explanatory relationship to 
one another. For example, while it was once commonplace for chemists to use color as a 
basis for distinguishing between chemical kinds (the motivation being that substances 
which were otherwise alike in their observable properties often differed in color), color 
turned out to be an unreliable indicator of real chemical kinds. Why? Because, as it 
happens, there is no fundamental relation between color and chemical constitution. And, 
if chemical constitution does indeed explain why it is that chemical kinds are similar in 
the ways that they are, then color is not a reliable indicator of a real kind of chemical 
 This example is slightly anachronistic, as Lavoisier thought (at least for a short time) that the gases 20
hydrogen and oxygen were themselves compounds of heat and another substance. See Lefèvre (2012, 2018) 
for an account of Lavoisier’s method of classification according to composition.  
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element or compound. In short, color is not an important property. 
 The appeal to important properties is crucial for Mill. Even though projectable 
categories are “more natural” (inasmuch as individual members of these kinds have many 
properties in common) than arbitrary categories and mere practical categories, this does 
not entail that they are real kinds. After all, presumably many of our incomplete scientific 
categories and extra-scientific (or folk) categories are projectable. A farmer, for instance, 
can make generalizations about garlic, even if garlic is not a real kind according to our 
current best theories of the world. What is needed then—in order to individuate a real 
kind—is the discovery of those properties in nature that unify individual members of a 
kind.    
1.3.3 Summary: Millian Kinds 
 The eighteenth and nineteenth century debate about classification was premised 
on a distinction between natural and artificial classes. Although Darwin proposed a way 
of moving from artificial to natural classes in the context of biology, he did not explicitly 
say what it is that makes a kind “natural” or “real” more generally. This was Mill’s 
contribution. Since, in my view, Hacking’s “many radically incompatible theories of 
natural kinds now in circulation” can be read as different ways of responding to Mill’s 
account, it will be useful to first summarize the theses to which Mill appears committed: 
I. Mind-independence: For Mill, like Darwin, it is a fact about nature (independent of 
how we happen to classify the world) that there are kinds of things, substances, organisms 
and so forth, and the similarities among individuals in virtue of which they are divided 
into kinds (viz. important properties) “are made by nature” (Logic IV vii § 4). 
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II. Discoverability: It is possible to discover or recognize a posteriori what the important 
properties of a kind are. Hence, it is possible to discover and classify natural kinds.     
III. Mind-dependence: The recognition of the important properties of a kind “as grounds 
for classification and of naming, is…the act of man” (Logic IV vii § 4). Natural kind 
categories are “mind-dependent” in the sense that the only way to know whether a 
property is important or not is to appeal to our best theories about the world. Insofar as 
our theories about a kind are correct, that kind is “natural” or “real”.    
IV. Definability: A rough-and-ready characterization of “natural kind” is that it is a 
collection of individuals in nature who have in common important properties. As we have 
seen, Mill tells us what he thinks the important properties of chemical compounds are, but 
he does not say what kinds of properties are important more generally. As we will see in 
the next section, the attempt to define ‘natural kind’ more precisely has been the central 
focus of natural kind theorists in the twentieth and twenty-first century. 
V. Utility: Since a category or kind-concept might be put to many different uses, the 
utility of a kind inevitably varies across time and across space. This, however, does not 
entail that all uses are on a par. When our goal is to learn about the world, and not merely 
to construct categories that serve our parochial practical ends, our categories will tend 
toward real kinds in nature. 
VI. Classification: All classification schemes are “conventional” in the trivial sense in 
which each and every category or kind-concept is formulated relative to certain human 
interests. Be that as it may, relative to certain interests (e.g., identifying a unique species 
or a chemically pure substance), we are able to recognize what the important properties of 
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a natural kind are. Hence, a natural classification scheme is possible. Indeed, a natural 
classification scheme is desirable inasmuch as our goal as scientists is to develop 
categories which reflect the natural structure of the world.     
1.4 Theories of Natural Kinds 
 Most believers in natural kinds agree with Mill’s conceptualization of natural 
kinds as collections of individuals who share important properties (Cf. Boyd, 1999a, 
143-144; Kornblith, 1993, 36-40; Khalidi, 2013, 44, 54; Putnam, 1975a, 239) . As far as 21
the distinction between kinds that exist in nature and kinds constructed for our own 
convenience goes, this seems to me a reasonable requirement. Consider, for instance, the 
kind gold, an oft-used exemplar of a natural kind. As Kornblith (1993, 37) has noted, two 
samples of gold need not share all of their properties (contrary to what Locke has 
contended ). Two samples of gold may differ in size, shape, weight, temperature, and so 22
on. If we were to require that members of the same natural kind have all of their 
properties in common, then this would result in each sample of gold being a kind unto 
itself. If, on the other hand, we were to simply loosen this requirement so that members of 
the same natural kind need only have some of their properties in common (irrespective of 
whether or not they are important), then this would fail to exclude artificial kinds such as 
the class of white things. Indeed, this condition would fail to exclude any class of 
individuals that can be cobbled together on the basis that individuals have one or more of 
 Not all philosophers use the phrase ‘important property’. Other oft-used terms are ‘salient property’, ‘real 21
property’, ‘genuine property’, ‘real similarity’, ‘homeostatic property’, and so forth. In each and every case, 
however, these phrases are intended to convey the idea that the properties associated with natural kinds 
ought to be the ones that make it the kind of thing that it is. More on this below.    
 For instance, Locke says: “[I]t is…impossible, that two things, partaking exactly of the same real 22
Essence, should have different Properties…” (III, iii, 17).
32
their properties in common. 
 Clearly, in order to make the case that gold is a real kind, and that white things are 
not, we need to presuppose that natural kind categories are defined by more than mere 
similarity. Not all philosophers conceive of natural kinds in exactly this way, however. In 
the past century or so theories of natural kinds have deviated from Mill in one of two 
ways. Some philosophers think of natural kinds as vague categories which collect 
together individuals who are loosely similar, effectively excluding the condition that 
members of the same natural kind have in common important properties. Others add 
further conditions on natural kinds. Before proceeding with our discussion of the natural 
kind status of mental disorders in the next chapter, it will be useful to distinguish both of 
these positions from Mill’s.     
1.4.1 Cheap Similarity: Natural Kinds as Folk Categories  
 Far from Mill’s view that natural kinds are realities in nature that science is in the 
business of discovering, both Russell (1948) and Quine (1969) contend that natural kinds 
have their origin in pre-scientific or “folk” categories. Russell (ibid, 335), for instance, 
concludes that we posit kinds such as dogs and cats in order to establish such common-
sense inductions as “dogs bark” and “cats meow.” The assumption that dogs and cats are 
natural kinds, however, is merely a stopgap on the road to the more fundamental 
categories that science aims to uncover.   
 Quine’s (1969) analysis of natural kinds is similar. According to Quine, at the 
beginning stages of inquiry we place things that we find similar in categories that we 
deem to be natural kinds. Initially, such categories are grounded on intuitive or innate 
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judgements of similarity, or what Quine calls an “innate quality space” (ibid., 129). For 
instance, we might first organize things into kinds based on similarities in color—Mill’s 
class of white things, if you will. Nevertheless, as science matures, intuitive judgments of 
similarity are replaced with scientifically sophisticated ones, such that natural kinds based 
on “superficial” or “spurious” similarities such as color are replaced with categories “that 
have been found by scientific experience to facilitate induction” (ibid). Natural kind 
categories, on this account, do not reflect realities in nature; rather, they are merely useful 
crutches that enable us to accomplish fairly limited goals.   
 Dupré’s (1981, 1993, 2001, 2002) pluralism or promiscuous realism deviates 
slightly from the positions which I have just outlined. Dupré, like Quine, sees the concept 
of a natural kind as being grounded in judgements of similarity. Unlike Quine, however, 
Dupré does not think that folk categories will, as a matter of course, be superseded by 
scientific categories. His reasoning for this is fairly straightforward. Since there are many 
ways in which individuals in nature are similar, there are many ways in which one might 
legitimately divide the world. It all depends on what one is trying to do.  
 Take, for instance, the classification of whales. At one time biologists classified 
whales as kinds of fish based on shared habit and similarities in other gross phenotypical 
features. At the present time, however, whales are no longer classified as fish on the basis 
that they are descendants of a distinct evolutionary line. In fact, the lack of gills, the 
ability to give live birth, in addition to other typical mammalian properties, also 
distinguishes them phenotypically from other organisms that we tend to label ‘fish’. For 
Dupré, however, the purposes for which biologists classify organisms does not 
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necessarily coincide with that of the population at large. Even if biologists no longer 
consider whales as kinds of fish, the classification of whales as fish might be warranted in 
certain folk biological contexts, such as commerce. After all, given that whales are similar 
to fish in some respects, and given that the similarities that we attend to for the purpose of 
constructing a kind are relative to the uses to which they are put, whales qua fish also 
merit the label “natural kind”.        
 In the philosophical literature on natural kinds, Russell, Quine, and Dupré are 
most often interpreted as proposing distinct theories of natural kinds (see, for example, 
Cooper, 2004, 74-75, 2007, chapter 4; Hacking, 1991, 112-113, 2007, 226-227; Khalidi, 
2013, 56-65). Their respective attitudes toward natural kinds, however, are completely at 
odds with the approach adopted by Mill; and, relative to Mill, it is somewhat misleading 
to label these as theories of natural kinds. After all, according to the foregoing authors 
“natural kinds” are merely rough-and-ready categories which collect together individuals 
who are loosely similar. Conversely, for Mill, natural kinds are not categories at all, but 
kinds in nature—i.e. individuals in nature who are unified by real similarities.  
 This is a crucial difference. According to the former reading of natural kinds a 
category can be said to be natural if it collects together individuals who are similar in 
some way. Hence, chemical kinds which are distinguished on the basis of differences in 
color are “natural” in this sense. On Mill’s view, however, color is not sufficient to 
distinguish real chemical kinds from bogus ones. The reason for this, as we have seen, is 
that there is no fundamental relation between color and chemical constitution, and 
chemical constitution (so far as we know) explains the other properties of a chemical kind
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—e.g., flammability, toxicity, acidity, reactivity, heat of combustion, oxidation states, etc. 
In short, color is not an important property, and categories which are not constructed on 
the basis of important properties are not natural kinds. 
 In light of the fact that natural kinds as Russell, Quine, and Dupré understand 
them are characterized by mere similarity, and mere similarity is not sufficient for 
establishing that something is a real kind, it would be more fruitful to think of them as 
either practical or artificial kinds in the sense outlined in section 1.3. I will make this case 
more forcefully in chapter 3. For now, it is important to recognize that the phrase ‘natural 
kind’ means something very different for Russell, Quine, and Dupré than it does for Mill.  
1.4.2 Essentialism and Non-essentialism about Natural Kinds 
  If our purpose in positing natural kinds is to distinguish between kinds in nature 
and kinds constructed for our own convenience, then it is clear that members of natural 
kinds must be alike in important respects. The problem, however, is to say in just which 
respects members of the same natural kind must be alike. Even if we grant Mill’s point 
that the important properties of a natural kind are the ones that make a thing the kind of 
thing that it is, this does not appear to be all that informative. After all, what kinds of 
properties make a thing the kind of thing that it is? And must each and every one of these 
properties be possessed by each and every member of a natural kind? That is to say, are 
individual members of a kind unified in virtue of sharing an essence, or is it sufficient that 
members of the same kind share enough of their important properties in common? Let’s 
address the question about essences first before moving on to the question about what 
kinds of properties ought to be associated with a natural kind.  
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 Some philosophers favour a position, which goes under the name of essentialism, 
whereby members of the same natural kind must have all of their important properties in 
common, such that these properties are necessary and sufficient for determining kind 
membership. Familiar examples of putative essential kinds include kinds of chemical 
elements or compounds such as gold or water, respectively. For instance, with respect to 
chemical elements, some essentialists have contended that the number of protons in the 
nucleus of an atom is jointly necessary and sufficient for defining a particular chemical 
element (Ellis, 2001). That is to say, a particular arrangement of subatomic particulars is 
its real essence. And, given that each natural kind has a real essence, it will always be 
clear whether or not an individual is a member of a particular kind.  
 Most philosophers have argued against essentialism on the basis that many of our 
actual scientific categories do not in fact meet these conditions, but that it is also 
implausible to suppose that such categories are merely invented and have no claim to 
accurately describing a portion of nature. For instance, in a series of articles philosopher 
Richard Boyd (Boyd, 1989, 1991, 1999a, 1999b) has contended that, once we leave the 
world of chemistry for, say, biology, many of our kind-concepts are vague or fuzzy in the 
sense that members of the same kind share some but not all of their properties in 
common, and it will not always be clear when an individual is a member of a kind. For 
instance, there are no properties essential to the kind tiger (Panthera tigris). Intraspecific 
differences such as body size, pelage coloration, striping patterns, skull dimensions, 
craniological details, genetic, and molecular structures make it such that it is unclear 
whether the kind tiger is one kind of thing or many (Mazak, 2008). Yet, insofar as 
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members of the kind tiger are morphologically or genetically similar, they are plausibly 
members of the same evolutionary group, and so are distinguishable from other kinds of 
animals—as well as other species in the same genus Panthera, such as lions, leopards, 
jaguars, and snow leopards. 
 The essentialist position and the non-essentialist position are often pitted against 
each other in a never ending dialogue of the deaf. It is not difficult to see why. The non-
essentialist response, while plausible, is not a dialectically effective response to 
essentialism. The fact that many of our concepts are vague, fuzzy, and in some way 
connected to nature does not entail that kinds in nature (supposing that such kinds exist) 
are in fact structured in this way. It is perfectly possible that many of our current 
categories are convenient fictions which will be displaced in favour of new categories 
which, in the fullness of time, will meet some or all of the conditions of essentialism.  23
Consider a hypothetical kind K, which is associated with properties P1,…, P6. Suppose, 
further, that the condition we place on natural kinds is that the individual members of K 
need only have some of their important properties in common. In this scenario it will 
always be possible that there is some subset of individuals of K which are more 
fundamentally similar to each other than they are to other individuals of K (say, by 
consistently sharing properties P1, …, P3 and not properties P4, …, P6). If this is the 
case, then we have reason to subdivide K into K1 and K2. If individual members of K1 and 
K2 still do not share all of their important properties in common, then there is nothing 
 It also possible, as some essentialists contend (Cf. Ellis, 2001), that only a small set of privileged 23
categories may rightly be considered natural kinds.  
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from stopping us from revising our kinds further.  And so on.  24
 This difficulty, I believe, is one reason why essentialists insist that natural kinds 
must be defined by essences.  Many of our scientific concepts are fuzzy in light of our 25
incomplete knowledge of the world. Yet, if real kinds themselves are vague or fuzzy—i.e. 
if nature itself does not have clear boundaries—then how could we ever expect to 
differentiate between inchoate scientific categories and real kinds in nature? In other 
words, how could we ever know which categories are vague in virtue of our incomplete 
knowledge of the world and which categories are vague in virtue of the way the world is 
in fact structured?  
 Essentialism, of course, provides a ready solution to this problem. A kind is a 
natural kind just in case each and every one of the properties associated with the kind in 
question are shared by each and every individual member of the kind. We know that a 
category is a real kind when it conforms to this definition. Be that as it may, this solution 
appears ad hoc. For one thing, the fact that essentialists place conditions on natural kinds 
which are convenient for clearly distinguishing between natural kinds and other kinds of 
categories does not entail that natural kinds are in fact structured in the way that 
essentialists suppose. It is perfectly possible that many of our scientific categories are 
indeed natural kinds, and that we simply cannot know with certainty whether they are 
 The reverse is true as well. We may find that there is significant overlap between individual members of 24
K1 and K2 such that we are justified in combining two kinds into one.    
 But there are other reasons for positing essences. As has been pointed out elsewhere (Cf. Barker & 25
Kitcher, 2014, 40; Hacking, 2007a, 237), the idea of an essence is also invoked to explicate the idea of a 
law of nature or natural necessity. To take the simplest case, the fact that we can make law-like 
generalizations about hydrogen is explained by the fact that many of the properties of hydrogen flow from 
its essence—i.e. the distinctive features of the atoms which make it up, in this case each atom consisting of 
a single proton and a single electron.
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natural kinds, or whether they might be further revised so as to conform more closely to 
nature.  
 Furthermore, even if we grant that some natural kinds have essences—e.g., kinds 
of chemical elements such as gold, or kinds of chemical compounds such as water—this 
does not entail that all kinds in nature are structured in this way. After all, many complex 
biological kinds, such as kinds of tiger, do not (as far as we know) have essences. Should 
we simply conclude that tigers are not natural kinds, allowing the proverbial 
philosophical tail to wag the scientific dog? This seems unreasonable. Short of appealing 
to some metaphysical intuition about the nature of reality, we simply cannot know a 
priori whether or not the kind tiger is a natural kind in virtue of failing to have an 
essence. 
1.4.3 Kinds of (Natural Kind) Properties 
 From the standpoint of the life sciences the thesis that all natural kinds come 
equipped with essences would seem to be highly dubious.  Nevertheless, even if we 26
cannot conclude that individual members of a real kind are unified by an essence, can we 
say something more about what kinds of properties make a thing the kind of thing that it 
is?  
 As I outlined in the previous section, there are times when Mill seems to suggest 
that, with respect to natural kinds, certain kinds of properties are more important than 
 Indeed, even in the chemical case there are worrying examples. For instance, as Khalidi (2013) argues, 26
isotopes of the same chemical element share the same atomic properties, but may differ in other properties 
(e.g., melting point) as a function of differences in mass. Isomers and polymers also present difficulties for 
essentialism. For a recent criticism of essentialism, see Khalidi (2013, chapter 1 and chapter 5). I will not 
dwell on essentialism at length in this dissertation, as it is generally agreed by philosophers of psychiatry 
that psychiatric kinds do not have essences. 
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others (Logic IV vii § 2). For instance, when discussing natural groups Mill appeals to 
projectable properties (including causal properties); and, when discussing real kinds, Mill 
seems to appeal to the structural properties of a chemical compound.  
 Be that as it may, Mill never straightforwardly addresses the question of which 
kinds of properties are associated with a natural kind , leaving us to wonder how we 27
might generalize the example of chemical compounds to other putative natural kinds. 
Fortunately, other philosophers have since attempted to fill in that which Mill left vague. 
For instance, in discussing the kind water, Putnam contends that to be considered a 
member of this kind a liquid must “agree in important physical properties” (1975a, 239) 
with other liquids of the same kind:  
Normally the ‘important’ properties . . . are the ones that are structurally 
important: the ones that specify what the liquid . . . is ultimately made out 
of . . . and how they are arranged or combined to produce the superficial 
characteristics. From this point of view the characteristic of a typical bit of 
water is consisting of H20 (ibid., emphasis mine). 
Similar to Mill, Putnam believes that, with respect to the kind water, chemical 
composition is the property that matters. The only difference between Putnam and Mill is 
that Putnam gives us a clearer explanation as to why it matters. Rather than simply 
saying, as Mill does, that chemical composition is important because it is “a sure mark of 
all the other properties of the compound” or that “it renders the things like one another, 
 A likely explanation for this is that Mill does not think that natural kinds are held together by properties at 27
all, be they causal or essential. Rather, he thinks that natural kinds are regularities in nature that obtain 
between different things at the same time. Such regularities are held together by the laws of causation, 
specifically laws of coexistence which have the same reality as diachronic causal laws. See, especially, 
Magnus (2015) for an illustration of differences between Mill and other philosophers on this score. I will 
ignore this complication in what follows, since it is generally agreed that many kinds—particularly kinds in 
the social sciences—are not held together by laws, and there is no a priori reason to suppose that causal 
properties cannot play the same role that laws play in Mill’s account.  
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and unlike other things” Putnam makes clear to us that the particular arrangement of 
hydrogen and oxygen molecules is “important” because it is structured in such a way as 
to produce the other “superficial” properties of water, such as being colorless, odourless, 
tasteless, and transparent.    
 It is perhaps tempting to conclude from this that the particular arrangement or 
combination of hydrogen and oxygen molecules is the essence from which the other 
properties of water flow. To be sure, there are instances in which Putnam does speak in 
this manner.  Nevertheless, Putnam’s more general point is that, with respect to a natural 28
kind, there is a “hidden structure” (Putnam, 1975b, 235, 241) which produces the other 
superficial or stereotypical properties of a kind, and it is this hidden structure which 
generally “determines what it is to be a member of that natural kind” (ibid., 241). 
 The metaphor of a hidden structure is instructive, though stretched quite thin if 
taken literally. After all, what is the “structure” of a kind of species or a kind of disease? 
Consider the latter. One might plausibly point to etiology, since the etiology of a 
particular disease produces its characteristic or stereotypical symptoms. But most diseases 
arguably involve the interplay of many etiological and constitutive factors, and are 
perhaps best explained not by appeal to a defined structure but rather complex networks 
or patterns of causal mechanisms, some of which conspire to produce a disease in one 
instance but not in another (see, especially, Thagaard, 1998). For example, a duodenal 
ulcer might be produced by a Helicobacter pylori infection, but many people with this 
 For instance, when putting forth the idea that members of the same natural kind have “the same general 28
hidden structure” he adds (in both parentheses and scare quotes) “the same ‘essence’, so to speak”. See 
ibid., 235. Putnam’s account of natural kinds is often lumped together with Kripke’s (1980), but, as has 
been argued elsewhere (Hacking, 2007a, 227-228; 2007b), Putnam, unlike Kripke, does not conceive of 
natural kinds as generally being defined by essences.  
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infection do not get ulcers. Moreover, some people without a H. pylori infection do get 
duodenal ulcers, a hypothesized effect of either genetic predisposition, smoking and 
stress, the heavy use of aspirin, or some combination of the aforementioned.  
 Of course, one might argue that diseases are not natural kinds on the basis that 
they don’t have the same sort of microphysical structural make-up as chemical 
compounds.  But, as with the essentialist thesis, this conclusion begs the question in 29
favour of microphysical properties. The fact that the kinds that we happen to think are 
real are defined by microphysical properties does not entail that all natural kinds must be 
defined in this way.     30
 At this point we would seem to be right back where we started. If the important 
properties of a natural kind are not necessarily microstructural properties, then, again, 
what kinds of properties are associated with a natural kind? It is commonplace for both 
essentialists and non-essentialists alike to put forward the general desideratum that the 
properties associated with natural kinds ought not be superficial properties, but rather 
those properties which are responsible for the superficial properties of a kind. But what 
kinds of properties are these? As many philosophers have argued (Boyd, 1989, 1991, 
1999a, 1999b; Craver, 2009; Khalidi, 2013; Kornblith, 1993) the most plausible candidate 
would seem to be causal properties. After all, if members of some kind consistently share 
 Indeed, some essentialists do hold such a position. Cf. Wilkerson, 1988, 41.29
 Another reason for contending that the properties associated with a natural kind ought to be 30
microphysical properties is that microphysical properties are “more fundamental” than macrophysical 
properties inasmuch as they constitute them. Nevertheless, as has been noted elsewhere (Hacking, 2007a, 
205; Khalidi, 2013, 38-40), the properties that philosophers typically associate with natural kinds of 
chemical elements and compounds—molecules, atoms, protons, neutrons, electrons—are themselves 
(according to current physical theory) composed of more fundamental particles such as quarks, bosons, and 
fermions. If some kinds are not natural or real in virtue of being constituted by more fundamental 
“microphysical” properties, then surely the same logic extends to kinds of chemical elements and 
compounds.  
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a cluster of immediately observable or superficial properties, then presumably they do so 
because a causal relationship obtains between a set of properties whose co-instantiation 
causes the instantiation of other, more superficial, properties of a kind. 
 The appeal to causal properties would also seem to make intelligible Mill’s claim 
that the important properties of a natural kind are those which make a thing the kind of 
thing that it is, since, presumably, a thing possesses a characteristic set of properties in 
virtue of the properties which hold them together—namely, the properties which causally 
sustain or maintain them. The general picture of a natural kind on this account is not a 
kind of thing with a microphysical structure or essence, but rather a property cluster 
whereby the presence of some properties tends to favour the presence of others (Cf. Boyd, 
1989, 16; Khalidi, 2013, 78).  31
 Craver (2009, 579) and Khalidi (2013, 80) have labelled this latter 
conceptualization of natural kinds the “simple causal theory” of natural kinds. There are a 
number of reasons why this conception of natural kinds might be attractive. First, the 
simple causal theory supplements Mill’s theory of natural kinds by specifying for us what 
the important properties of a kind generally are. Moreover, while the simple causal theory 
presupposes that members of the same natural kind do have a shared “causal 
structure” (inasmuch as different causal properties conspire to produce a shared cluster of 
superficial or observable properties), it does so in such a way as to not stipulate what the 
precise structure of a natural kind is, thereby accounting for a wider range of natural kinds 
that might be found within different scientific disciplines.  
 Boyd calls the cluster of properties causally responsible for the other properties of a kind “homeostatic 31
causal mechanism(s)”. 
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 Most importantly, however, the simple causal theory can be seen as a middle-way 
between pluralism and essentialism about natural kinds. Natural kinds, on this account, 
are not inchoate folk categories defined by spurious or superficial similarities. Nor are 
they collections of individuals who are defined by some essence. Rather, they are kinds 
inasmuch as they are collections of individuals who are similar in virtue of the causal 
properties that make them so. As Khalidi (2013, 74) puts it: “once the existence of the 
properties within the cluster is understood to spring from certain causal mechanisms, this 
assures us that the properties have not been associated with each other on artificial 
grounds, merely as a result of our predilections to group certain properties together”.  
1.4.4 Summary: Causal Relations as Hidden Bonds  
 On the simple causal theory causation plays a major role in the individuation of 
natural kinds. Nonetheless, one might legitimately ask: why is it that causal properties or 
relations especially qualify as being indicative of which kinds are or are not real? A fully 
satisfactory answer to this question is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but two 
considerations are worth noting. First, if natural kinds are indeed collections of 
individuals who are fundamentally the same, then there must be some “hidden bond”, as 
Darwin put it, that would serve to explain why individuals are similar in the ways that 
they are. The appeal to causality would seem appropriate here, since causality is 
commonly acknowledged to be, in Hume’s words, the “cement of the universe” (THN 
Abstract ¶35).  
  Furthermore, in many instances science itself treats causality as a criterion for the 
reality of a kind. Consider, for instance, the kind dementia. Prior to the twentieth century 
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dementia was a broad clinical syndrome associated with global declines in intellectual 
functioning (e.g., difficulties with memory, abstract reasoning, and comprehension) (Cf. 
Berrios, 1987). As it happens, however, dementia is not a disease in and of itself. Rather, 
the term ‘dementia’ is a catch-all for different kinds of diseases which affect cognition, 
such as frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, Huntington’s disease, and perhaps 
even schizophrenia (formerly, “dementia praecox”). Theoretically, each of these diseases 
is distinguished from each other on the basis of causality—most often brain pathology, 
but also etiology in cases where etiology is known. To cite one example, in 1907 Aloys 
Alzheimer discovered a patient who did not have obvious cerebral atrophy but 
nevertheless had microscopic changes in their brain (the patient’s brain was cluttered with 
abnormal debris known as amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles). A century later 
these accumulations of protein—more concentrated in particular areas of the brain such as 
the medial frontal lobe, the inferior and medial parietal lobes, the medial temporal lobe, 
and the posterior cingulate cortex—are still considered the hallmarks of Alzheimer’s 
disease. 
 Supposing that science is in the business of explaining things, and to explain 
something (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) is to show how it fits into the causal structure of the 
world (Craver, 2007; Salmon, 1984), causal relations would seem to play a crucial role in 
determining which of our categories or kind-concepts ought to be considered real kinds. 
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But even if causal relations are not the privileged features of reality , they are certainly 32
viable candidates for the role of “important properties” in Mill’s sense of the phrase. 
Since the kinds I will be talking about in this dissertation are typically explained in terms 
of causal relations, I will proceed under the assumption that causation plays an important 
role in the individuation of natural kinds.   
1.5 Realism About Natural Kinds  
 Thus far I have argued that the central idea running through the history of natural 
kind theorizing is that natural kinds are, at bottom, collections of individuals who have in 
common important properties. Moreover, “important properties” should be taken to mean 
properties which cluster or “hang together” in virtue of being produced by causal 
properties. 
 The appeal to causal properties is crucial for natural kind realism. In the absence 
of knowledge about the causal structure of the world, it would be impossible to know 
whether the properties definitive of a kind do indeed cluster together, or whether these 
groupings are merely a reflection of our predilections to group certain properties together. 
 One skeptical worry raised by this account is how can we know, or reasonably 
believe, that the causal properties we’ve identified are real rather than nominal? The 
appeal to unobservable causal properties would seem to be a sham, unless we have reason 
to believe that unobservable causal properties are themselves real and not merely 
 Some philosophers, for instance, have contended that fundamental physics is not in the business of 32
describing causal relations at all, but, rather, the structural properties of the whole universe expressed 
through laws. As I mentioned earlier (see note 27), Mill himself preferred to characterize natural kinds as 
being held together by laws of coexistence rather than causes or causal relations. Be that as it may, there is 
no logical inconsistency in maintaining that some natural kinds are held together by laws and some by 
causal relations.
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nominal.   33
 Realists about natural kinds typically respond to this line of skeptical reasoning by 
invoking an amended version of the “no-miracles argument”. The no-miracles argument 
was put forth by Hilary Putnam, who contended that scientific realism “is the only 
philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle” (Putnam, 1975c, 73). 
According to Putnam, the best explanation for the success of science is the truth (or at 
least approximate truth) of science. If our best scientific theories were far from the truth, 
then the presumed success of these theories would simply be a miracle. Hence, the 
preferred explanation for the success of our best scientific theories is that they are 
approximately true, and closer to the truth than past scientific theory.  
 In Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic 
Epistemology Hilary Kornblith says more-or-less the same thing about natural kinds: 
If the scientific categories of mature sciences did not correspond, at least 
approximately, to real kinds in nature, but instead merely grouped objects 
together on the basis of salient observable properties which somehow answer 
to our interests, it would be utterly miraculous that inductions using these 
scientific categories tend to issue in accurate predictions. Inductive inferences 
can only work, short of divine intervention, if there is something in nature 
binding together the properties which we use to identify kinds. Our inductive 
inferences in science have worked remarkably well, and, moreover, we have 
succeeded in identifying ways in which the observable properties which draw 
kinds to our attention are bound together in nature. In light of these successes, 
 A similar point is made by Locke. In his Essay Locke argues that the classes or kinds that we recognize 33
are an intellectual invention, their essences nominal rather than real. This is not to say that there is nothing 
in nature sustaining the observed similarities among things. The point is that, since we know nothing of the 
internal essence of things, the sorting of things into kinds is entirely “the workmanship of the 
understanding.” As Locke (III, iii, 13) notes in the context of species of animal: “I would not here be 
thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature in the production of things, makes several of them alike: 
there is nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by seed. But yet, 
I think, we may say, the sorting of them under names, is the workmanship of the understanding, taking 
occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make general ideas, and set them in the mind, 
with names annexed to them…to which, as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be 
of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that classis [class]”. 
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we can hardly go on to doubt the existence of the very kinds which serve to 
explain how such successes were even possible (Kornblith, 1993, 42).  
Kornblith goes on to argue that, in science, we postulate unobservable causal properties 
for the purpose of explaining why observable properties are found to co-occur. When we 
postulate the existence of unobservable causal properties—or “hidden bonds”, as Darwin 
put it—and this postulation leads to explanatory and predictive success, then we have 
“extraordinarily good evidence that the structure postulated does genuinely exist” (ibid., 
43).  
 Similarly, Khalidi argues that the aim of science is to “identify projectible 
properties, particularly clusters of properties that point reliably to yet other property 
clusters” (Khalidi, 2013, 80) and “the fact that these properties are projectibly clustered 
indicates that there are casual links between them” (ibid). In other words, successful 
inductive inference would be utterly miraculous if our cluster concepts were not 
accommodated to the causal structure of the world.  
 One obvious difficulty with this response to skepticism about natural kinds is that 
‘success’ is both an ambiguous and vague notion. It is ambiguous in the sense that, even if 
we limit “success” to the epistemic purposes to which scientific investigation is put , a 34
category might be successful in some respects and not others. Consider, again, the 
concept of ‘dementia’. Although no serious scientist still considers dementia a kind unto 
itself, the concept of ‘dementia’ was successful in the sense that it allowed one to predict 
the general course and prognosis of the putative disease—namely, progressive cognitive 
decline. As it happens, however, the concept of ‘dementia’ turned out not to be 
 Cf. Khalidi (2013, chapter 2). 34
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explanatorily adequate, since individual members of the kind did not share a causal 
structure that sufficiently explained their shared symptomatology.  
 The term ‘success’ is also vague inasmuch as it admits of degrees. That is to say, a 
science and the kinds that it postulates can be more-or-less successful. For example, there 
was a time in the early classification of chemical kinds when color was moderately 
successful in distinguishing between different kinds of things. As Kornblith (1993, 39) 
notes, “differences in color among substances are indeed accompanied by differences in 
their possibilities of chemical combination”; yet, color turned out to be a “very imperfect 
indicator of chemical kinds” (ibid., 40).  
  It would seem, then, that limited predictive success is not sufficient for 
considering a kind natural—explanatory success is also necessary. In order to be 
reasonably sure that a kind is natural our postulation of unobservable causal properties 
ought to successfully explain why it is that the observable properties of a kind are found 
to co-occur.  
 This point will become especially acute when we discuss psychiatric kinds. As I 
will argue in due course, many psychiatric kinds have enjoyed some predictive success, 
but limited explanatory success.     
1.6 Conclusion 
 The theories of natural kinds outlined in this chapter do not exhaust everything 
that has been said about natural kinds.  Be that as it may, the idea that natural kinds are 35
 In chapter 3 I will address a slight variant of the simple causal theory when discussing mental disorders. 35
For further discussion of natural kinds, two of the best book-length surveys, with thorough references to the 
past forty years of debate, are Khalidi (2013) and Laporte (2004). 
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collections of individuals who are alike in important respects is sufficient to cast doubt on 
Hacking’s suggestion that skepticism or pluralism about natural kinds are the only 
possible ways of responding to the murkiness of the natural kind concept and its 
idiosyncratic usage amongst philosophers. In defining natural kinds more broadly as 
collections of individuals unified by important properties or real similarities, we can 
concede to the skeptic that there is no well-defined class of natural kinds, but also deny 
that natural kinds are merely collections of individuals similar in some respects. 
 More importantly, however, this conception of natural kinds will serve as an ideal 
starting point for assessing psychiatric kinds. As we will see in due course, debates about 
natural and artificial classes have not been lost on medicine.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Psychiatric Kinds and Natural Kinds  
[In the human mind there is a] a strong propensity not only to make divisions in 
knowledge where there are none in nature, and then to impose the divisions upon nature, 
making the reality thus comfortable to the idea, but to go further, and to convert the 
generalizations made from observation into positive entities, permitting for the future 
these artificial creations to tyrannize over the understanding.  
— Henry Maudsley, in The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind, 1867, 323-324.  
2.1 Introduction  
 Debates about natural kinds might seem remote from concerns about psychiatric 
classification, but the controversy over natural and artificial classification introduced in 
the previous chapter has never been lost on psychiatry. A recurring theme in nineteenth 
century psychiatry was whether or not the then nascent science of psychiatry ought to tow 
the line of biology and medicine more generally by attempting to build a so-called natural 
classification of mental disorders. The 1860-1861 debate on psychiatric classification 
organized by the Société Médico Psychologique serves as an apt illustration of this.  In 1
the session of 26 November 1860 Jules Falret accused current species (viz. kinds) of 
mental disorder as being artificial, in much the same way as Adanson and Darwin accused 
Linnaeus’ species and genera as being artificial. He argued that the categories of mental 
disorder recognized at the time  tended to be arbitrarily constructed around one feature 2
(e.g., the involvement of the intellectual faculty, a predominant idea or emotion or act, or 
 See Berrios (1999) for an extended summary of this debate.   1
 In the nineteenth century leading European classifications (or “nosologies”) of mental disorders were 2
typically made up of a short-list of conditions including melancholia (lypemania), mania, monomania, 
dementia, paralytic insanity, idiocy, and stupidity. As Berrios (1999) has noted, this list appears to have 
been a minor nosological expansion or modification of Cullen’s 1872 list (which included mania, 
melancholia and dementia) to which Pinel added idiocy, Esquirol added monomania, Georget added 
stupidity, and Parchappe added paralytic insanity. 
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the presence of this or that delusion) rather than a set of important features which, in the 
different individuals, evolved similarly across time.   
 While the way in which a disorder evolves over time (i.e. the order in which 
symptoms appear, etc.) was an important criterion for psychiatric classification according 
to Falret, it was not the only candidate. Candidates for a natural organizing principle of 
psychiatric classification included: etiology (the cause of a disorder), anatomy (lesions or 
atrophy in the brain observed post-mortem), clinical outcome (whether a disorder was 
curable or incurable), phenomenology (whether or not a particular symptom was present 
or absent, e.g., delusions), psychology (whether or not a particular mental faculty was 
implicated, e.g., the intellectual, emotional, or volitional faculties), and disease 
progression (i.e. whether or not a mental disorder worsened over time).  
 Unlike biology, however, there was no classificatory revolution in psychiatry. 
Some commentators, such as Philippe Buchez, suggested that, since the objective of 
psychiatric classification is diagnosis and treatment, mental disorders ought to be 
classified according to their causes, not their signs and symptoms. Yet others, such as 
Delasiauve and Garnier, rebutted that there are multiple features, factors, and influences 
that contribute to mental illness, and so the search for the cause of a mental disorder is at 
best utopian. With this in mind, Garnier himself suggested that the classification of 
mental disorders ought to be based on mental faculties, presumably under the assumption 
that a particular mental faculty was impaired in each and every instance of mental 
disorder, and that the various potential causes leading to such an impairment could then 
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be investigated.  3
  Today, more than 150 years after the foregoing debate took place, confusion 
concerning the ontological status of mental disorders, as well as how mental disorders 
ought to be classified, has not dissipated.  For the purposes of this chapter I will set aside 4
the question of the appropriateness or usefulness of natural classification to psychiatry 
and instead concentrate on whether or not mental disorders are natural kinds. As I briefly 
mentioned in chapter 1, part of the confusion over whether or not kinds of mental disorder 
are “real” or “natural” can be attributed to disagreement about what exactly real or natural 
kinds are. Another source of confusion I suspect stems from a subtle ambiguity in the 
question itself, an ambiguity which is most often glossed over in the philosophical 
literature on natural kinds and mental disorders. When one asks “Are mental disorders 
natural kinds?” one might mean one of three things: (i) Might there plausibly be natural 
kinds of mental disorder, or is there something in principle that prevents mental disorders 
from being natural kinds?; (ii) Supposing that nothing in principle prevents mental 
disorders from being natural kinds, are mental disorder categories listed in our current 
classification schemes natural kinds?; and, finally, (iii) Are some mental disorder 
categories not listed in our current classification schemes natural kinds? 
 In what follows I contend that, despite a few notable exceptions, there is no reason 
 Although, he would later admit that classifying according to impairments in, for example, judgement and 3
reasoning was more difficult than it at first appeared, since these mental capacities are also affected by other 
mental capacities such as memory and attention. 
 As I outlined in the introduction, some philosophers and scientists contend that there is a sense in which 4
some kinds of mental disorder are natural or real and that psychiatric classification ought generally to be 
developed in terms of a natural kind approach, since it would be an improvement on current psychiatric 
classification (Cooper, 2005, 2007; Kender et al., 2011; Tsou, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2016). Others 
contend that current mental disorders are not natural kinds at all, and that the natural kind approach to 
psychiatric classification may not even be possible or desirable (Hacking, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1999, 
2007c; Hyman, 2010; McGuinn, 1991; Zachar, 2002, 2014a, 2014b).
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to think that psychiatric categories or kind-concepts are natural kinds. In particular, I 
argue that, while nothing in principle prevents mental disorders from being natural kinds, 
paradigm examples of kinds of mental disorder, such as schizophrenia and depression, are 
individuated by superficial rather than important similarities, and so cannot be said to be 
natural kinds in the sense outlined in chapter 1. First, I critique and ultimately dismiss 
three general arguments for the conclusion that mental disorders cannot in principle be 
natural kinds. Second, I utilize my discussion of natural kinds in the previous chapter to 
make the case that one paradigmatic psychiatric kind, depression, is not a natural kind. I 
then generalize my treatment of depression to other categories of mental disorder—
adding the qualification that some non-paradigmatic mental disorders might plausibly be 
natural kinds. 
2.2 Can Mental Disorders Be Natural Kinds?     
 Oftentimes it is supposed that there is something fundamentally different about 
mental disorders which prevents them from being natural kinds. In this section I consider 
three arguments in favour of the conclusion that mental disorders cannot be natural kinds: 
(2.2.1) The Argument from History. Mental disorders cannot be natural kinds because 
they have histories quite unlike paradigmatic natural kinds; (2.2.2) The Argument from 
Looping. Mental disorders cannot be natural kinds because they are subject to looping 
effects, whereas natural kinds are not; (2.2.3) The Argument from Mind-Dependence. 
Mental disorders cannot be natural kinds because they are mind-dependent, whereas 
natural kinds are not. 
2.2.1 The Argument from History 
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 In comparison to some paradigmatic natural kinds, many kinds of mental disorder 
have atypical histories. Whereas hydrogen and helium are as old as the Big Bang, most 
mental disorders seem to have emerged only recently. The putative kind schizophrenia, 
for instance, was not introduced until 1908 by Eugen Bleuler , and descriptions of a 5
coherent schizophrenia-like presentation are virtually absent in the medical literature prior 
to the nineteenth century . What is more, some mental disorders seem to be what Hacking 6
(1998, 100) calls “transient”. They appear at specific times and places, eventually fade 
away, in some cases reappearing at other times and places. Hacking points to dissociative 
fugue, hysteria, and multiple personality disorder, but one could no doubt add others: 
neurasthenia, chronic fatigue syndrome, anorexia nervosa, attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), substance addiction, monomania.   7
 What are we to make of the apparent waxing and waning of psychiatric kinds over 
the course of the last 200 years? Some philosophers simply dismiss out of hand such 
kinds as hysteria and neurasthenia under the assumption that, since the categories are no 
longer in use, science has found them not to be real kinds (Cf. Khalidi, 2013, 64; 
Kornblith, 1993, 48-49). Other philosophers make stronger claims. They contend that 
such kinds cannot be natural kinds either because natural kinds are more-or-less 
ahistorical (Zachar, 2002; 2014, 149), whereas most psychiatric kinds are not, or because 
 Cf. Bleuler (1908)5
 See Shorter (1997, 61-62). Delusions, hallucinations, diminished emotional expression, disorganized 6
speech, and disorganized or catatonic behaviour are the most recently listed diagnostic criteria for 
schizophrenia. See APA (2013, 99). 
 For instance, in the first half of the nineteenth century monomania was the disease entity du jour within 7
French psychiatry; in the latter half of the nineteenth century it was hysteria. See Goldstein (2001) [1987] 
for a historical account of the rise and fall of the ‘monomania’ and ‘hysteria’ concepts in nineteenth century 
French psychiatry.  
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natural kinds are more-or-less stable objects of inquiry, whereas psychiatric kinds are not 
(Tsou, 2008, 66-67; Hacking, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1999, 2007c). Let’s consider the latter 
two claims concerning the possibility of mental disorders being natural kinds.   
 If it is possible for species to be natural kinds, then the assertion that mental 
disorders cannot be natural kinds since they are not ahistorical is clearly implausible. 
After all, as far as evolution by means of natural selection is concerned, species are 
historical kinds. They evolve across time and space. New species emerge and most 
become extinct. The historical nature of species is also reflected in biological taxonomy, 
where individuals are most often grouped together in virtue of their shared history. 
Although some biological taxonomists will consider synchronic features of organisms 
when grouping members of the same kind (namely, the phenetic school of taxonomy), the 
dominant trend in biological taxonomy is to group together individuals based on 
diachronic features (e.g., causal history, phylogeny, and descent).  
 But can species be natural kinds? As I outlined in chapter 1, the principle 
distinction between a natural kind and an artificial kind is that, in the former case, a kind 
is individuated by important properties, whereas, in the latter case, a kind is individuated 
by means of arbitrarily selecting some properties or similarities to the exclusion of others 
(see, especially, sections 1.2 and 1.3). Moreover, I said that ‘important properties’ is most 
often taken to mean causal properties, since, insofar as causal properties are responsible 
for the other properties of a kind, they make a thing the kind of thing that it is (see, 
especially, sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4). Species are good candidates for real kinds in the 
sense described. Generally speaking, with respect to species a shared history is a good 
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indication of other shared properties, both superficial and causal. (Cf. Khalidi, 2013, 131; 
Laporte, 2004, 21). This licenses both historical (or, one might say, “etiological”), 
physiological, behavioural, and ecological explanations with respect to why a particular 
species is the kind of thing that it is. Polar bears, for instance, can swim long distances in 
icy waters because their ancestors are amongst a group of bears which survived by 
adapting to such conditions, later passing on traits that make for efficient swimming in icy 
waters. That’s the historical explanation. But we may also appeal to the anatomical/
physiological features that make it such that polar bears are capable of swimming in icy 
waters, or we may point out the polar bears enjoy these adaptive features because they 
successfully carved out an ecological niche by moving from one habitat to another in 
search of more abundant resources (e.g., seals).   
 The fact that some natural kinds might exist for a period of time and then 
subsequently disappear also should not be surprising in light of what we know about 
infectious disease. By the sixteenth century smallpox had become a leading cause of 
mortality in much of the world. But diseases disappear. The last documented case was in 
1977, and the World Health Organization (WHO) announced its eradication in 1980.  8
 “Smallpox”. WHO Factsheet. Of course, the smallpox virus (there are two variants, Variola major and 8
Variola minor) itself might still exist (in biowarfare laboratories, for example), leaving open the possibility 
that smallpox might arise at some future date. 
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With 22 reported cases in 2017 , polio might soon follow.  Clearly, if there is something 9 10
that prevents kinds of mental disorder from being natural kinds, it’s not the fact that they 
do not exist at all times and in all places.      11
 While many philosophers of psychiatry do accept that historical objects such as 
species and diseases might be natural kinds, some still maintain that psychiatric kinds 
have histories totally unlike the histories of natural kinds, and this prevents them from 
being natural kinds.  Most notably, whereas kinds of species and disease are relatively 12
stable over time, and are thus stable objects of inquiry, (at least some) kinds of mental 
disorder appear to be “moving targets”. ‘Moving target’ is a phrase employed by Hacking 
(2006) to describe kinds which are always “on the move” (ibid., 293) in the sense that the 
properties associated with such kinds rapidly change over time. For instance, Hacking 
(1995a) asserts that multiple personality disorder , which was considered a special case 13
of hysteria prior to the publication of DSM-III, became a kind-concept or category unto 
 “Poliomyelitis”. WHO Factsheet. 9
 We can also account for the rise and fall of many infectious diseases by appeal to causation. In the 10
transition from nomadic to Neolithic society plants and animals were increasingly domesticated, forcing 
human beings to establish more permanent settlements. More-or-less daily contact with animals put in place 
the appropriate conditions for viruses, once exclusive to animals, to mutate and transfer to humans. The 
subsequent spread of infectious disease can be explained by a variety of factors: faecally-polluted water, 
population growth, population congestion in villages, towns, and cities, etc. The “fall” of (some) infectious 
diseases is of course more familiar. In the case of smallpox, the development of a smallpox vaccine 
(preceded by the method of inoculation or “variolation”)—coupled with more sanitary living environments, 
farming practices, and a concerted effort by the WHO and other health organizations to administer the 
vaccine worldwide—led to its demise. See Porter (2002). 
 Unless, of course, we suppose that a kind is “natural” or “real” only if it has existed since the beginning 11
of time. Indeed, Zachar makes this assumption in several places (see, e.g., Zachar, 2002, 167; 2014, 149), 
though he does not defend it. 
 Tsou (2008, chapter 2), for instance, makes this assumption in distinguishing between so-called “stable” 12
psychiatric kinds—namely, schizophrenia—and “unstable” psychiatric kinds such as hysteria. The former, 
for Tsou, is a natural kind, whereas the latter is not. 
 Since the publication of DSM-IV “Multiple Personality Disorder’” has since been relabelled 13
“Dissociative Identity Disorder”. The defining features of both the former and the latter are virtually 
identical from DSM-III to DSM-5.  
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itself following a series of reported cases of “multiples” in the 1970s. According to 
Hacking, the classification “multiple personality” was transformed because the 
experiences and behaviours of people who might have previously been diagnosed with 
hysteria rapidly changed to such an extent that having two or more distinct personalities 
became a predominant feature rather than just one of many hysterical signs. Let’s address 
the claim that “unstable” or “mutable” historical kinds cannot be natural kinds.  
 Although there might be reason to think that kinds of mental disorder change 
much more quickly than kinds of species, bacteria, viruses, and so forth, the assertion that 
kinds of mental disorder cannot be natural kinds in virtue of this fact is clearly a non 
sequitur. Even if it were true that the properties of mental disorders are continually 
changing, this would only imply that such kinds are difficult to study and classify, not that 
they cannot possibly be natural kinds. For instance, if Hacking’s story about multiple 
personality disorder is correct, it is possible that multiple personality arose as a kind unto 
itself not because we “made it up”, or because we finally identified a disorder which had 
always existed, but, rather, because a constellation of causal factors which were 
previously absent conspired to produce the cluster of signs and symptoms now associated 
with the disorder. If this is a possibility—and I think that it is—it is likewise possible that 
multiple personality disorder (and, indeed, any other “transient” or “mutable” psychiatric 
kind) is a natural kind in accordance with the account of natural kinds outlined in the 
previous chapter. In any case, in claiming that unstable kinds cannot be natural kinds, it 
would seem that some philosophers have confused an epistemological problem for an 
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ontological one.   14
2.2.2 The Argument from Looping 
 While the Protean nature of some psychiatric kinds does not in principle prevent 
them from being natural kinds, it has been suggested that the way in which kinds of 
mental disorder change makes them fundamentally different from natural kinds. For 
instance, in a series of publications Hacking distinguishes between “human kinds” and 
“natural kinds”, claiming that the former are subject to “looping effects” whereas the 
latter are not.  The phrase ‘looping effect’ refers to the way in which individuals’ 15
experiences and behaviours change in response to being classified or defined in a certain 
way, forcing us to constantly revise our categories in light of these changes. Unlike kinds 
of physical particles, chemical elements, and (most) species, human beings are both 
aware of, and concerned with, how they are classified. This results in a kind of feedback 
mechanism that appears to be absent in cases of paradigmatic natural kinds. 
 A looping effect, for Hacking, operates in the following way: Once we give a label 
to some human phenomenon—e.g., ‘hyperactive child’—we “get the notion that there is a 
definite kind of person” (Hacking, 1999, 27), the hyperactive child.  This “kind” then 16
becomes reified to an extent that parents, teachers, therapists, etc., begin to regard, and 
 Although I do not think that instability in principle prevents mental disorders from being natural kinds, in 14
practice instability might make it highly unlikely that our psychiatric kind-concepts or categories will 
reflect the natural structure of the world. I return to this issue in chapter 4. 
 Cf. Hacking (1992, 1995a, 1995b, 2007c). In more recent work (Hacking, 1999, 103-106) Hacking uses 15
the phrases ‘interactive kind’ and ‘indifferent kind’. If I understand Hacking correctly, these latter phrases 
should not be taken to be equivalent to the terms ‘human kind’ and ‘natural kind’, respectively, but as 
pointing to one crucial difference between the kinds of things which philosophers have traditionally called 
“natural kinds” and the kinds of things (e.g., child, adolescent, teenager, woman refugee, the unemployed, 
etc.) of which Hacking speaks. 
 This is my example. In the quotation just cited Hacking discusses the kind child television viewer. 16
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interact with, some children as if they were a distinct species of child. Children, being 
self-aware, respond in kind. They may begin to think of themselves as hyperactive 
children and alter their behaviour to further conform to this category. They may also react 
against, or reject, the label and/or the theories associated with it, changing their behaviour 
to further distance themselves from the putative kind. In either case, however, alterations 
in the experiences and behaviours of children who are categorized eventually results in 
individuals subsumed under the category ‘hyperactive child’ having different properties 
than they did previously. This change in properties then “loops back” (in the sense that a 
change in the properties previously associated with the kind is noticed by others), forcing 
us to revise our beliefs about the kind in question. This process can repeat indefinitely, 
making kinds of this sort “moving targets”.             
 In extreme cases the kind of feedback that Hacking discusses in connection with 
human kinds may result in the manifestation of an entirely new kind. Consider, again, 
multiple personality disorder. When patients with distinct personalities started to appear 
in popular culture in the 1970s (e.g., on American talk shows, in the book Sybil and the 
subsequent miniseries featuring the same title ) more and more people started presenting 17
with signs and symptoms now characteristic of multiple personality disorder. 
Accompanying the rise of cases of multiples was also a rise in the number of alters (i.e. 
distinct personalities) reported by patients and therapists , as well as a change in the 18
kinds of alters being reported (e.g., personalities of the opposite sex and animal 
 The book Sybil was written by Flora Schreiber and published in 1973. The miniseries Sybil was released 17
in 1976.  
 Kihlstrom (2005), for instance, cites a number of studies suggesting a rise from one alter personality 18
being typically associated with “multiple personality” prior to 1970 to an average of 13 by the mid-1980s.
62
personalities). In Hacking’s (1995a) view, multiple personality is a prime example of how 
looping effects may result in “making up [kinds of] people” that did not previously exist 
(ibid., 6) . Prior to the publication of DSM-III multiple personality was not considered a 19
kind unto itself. Once the label ‘multiple personality disorder’ entered the public 
consciousness, however, it served as a “semantic contagion” (ibid., 238, 247, 255-259). 
Individuals were increasingly regarded as a distinct species, expected to behave in ways 
consistent with the description of multiple personality.  What is more, in the same period 20
multiple personality became increasingly bound up with idea that the emergence of an 
alternative personality was a coping mechanism to deal with trauma from child abuse 
(often sexual in nature). According to Hacking, the explanation of multiple personality in 
terms of traumatic memories of child abuse provided the “narrative structure” whereby 
people could subsequently “make up themselves” (ibid., 6) (i.e. quite literally alter their 
own experiences) by redescribing and reworking their own memories.   21
 Granting, for the sake of argument, that human beings are subject to the kinds of 
looping effects that Hacking describes, in what way is this kind of feedback pernicious to 
the claim that mental disorders can be natural kinds? As some commentators have pointed 
out (Cf. Bogen, 1988; Cooper, 2004, 78-80; 2005, 59-61), it cannot merely be the fact that 
the classification of human kinds results in feedback. After all, some natural kinds are 
also altered by feedback as a consequence of our classificatory practices. Consider, for 
 See, also, Hacking (1986). 19
 The assumption Hacking makes here is that people “act under a description”. 20
 As he puts it: “[G]ood stories use explanations. Dissociation is explained as a coping mechanism. The 21
multiple comes to understand that she is as she is now because of the way she deployed coping mechanisms 
in the past. A narrative structure is available that can then be filled in with the appropriate scenes” (ibid., 
256). 
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example, herbicide-resistant weeds (or “superweeds”). In the 1990s engineers discovered 
a way to develop glyophosate-resistant crops. This allowed farmers to spray fields with 
herbicide (e.g., Monsanto’s roundup weedkiller, glyphosate being the primary ingredient), 
quickly killing weeds with little chance of harming the genetically-modified crops. While 
this method of using herbicides was much more efficient than methods used in the past, 
over time some kinds of plants developed a resistance to glyphosate and passed on this 
genetic material to offspring.  Evidently, classifying certain kinds of plants as “weeds” 22
triggered a chain of events whereby (some of) the very plants classified underwent 
significant change.   23
 The fact that the classification of human kinds results in feedback is not enough to 
prevent human kinds from being natural kinds, but perhaps feedback materializing in the 
case of human kinds is of a special sort. In several places Hacking appears to make this 
suggestion, asserting that only with respect to human kinds is it true that the ways in 
which an individual thinks about themselves thereby changes them. The reason for this is 
that only human beings are both aware of and care about how they are categorized.  24
 Consider, for instance, Hacking’s (1999, 105-106) discussion of microbes. 
Microbes are not passive. When we attempt to kill harmful microbes with penicillin, some 
may respond to this intervention by mutating in species-beneficial ways, eventually 
 A family of weeds that includes waterhemp (Amaranthus rudis), for instance, has developed glyphosate-22
resistant strains. See Service (2013). 
 Similarly, as Bogen (1988) has argued, classifying marijuana as ‘illegal’ can change the physical 23
appearance of the plant itself, since illegal marijuana plants are often grown in different environments—
e.g., basements, attics, closets, etc. The same type of feedback also appears to occur in the selective 
breeding of animals. See, e.g., Khalidi (2010, 2013, 147-148).  
 See Hacking (1999, 103-106). 24
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becoming resistant to our  antibacterial medication. Microbes are thus “interactive” in this 
sense that they change in response to our intervening on them. Be that as it may, microbes 
do not interact with the idea of microbes. That is to say, they are not interactive in the 
sense that they change in virtue of being aware that they are called microbes. Rather, they 
are “indifferent”.  
 In appealing to “awareness” on the part of those classified, Hacking appears to 
have pointed to an important difference between human kinds and natural kinds. The 
problem with this suggestion, however, is that Hacking himself does not seem to think 
that awareness on the part of the individual classified is a necessary condition for looping 
to take place.  And for good reason. Consider once more the case of the hyperactive 25
child. Even if a hyperactive child is unaware of how they are classified, they may 
nevertheless react to interventions predicated on the idea of hyperactive children. For 
instance, they may be placed in different classrooms, be given medication or 
psychological intervention, be treated differently at home or school, and so forth. Over 
time such interactions may result in hyperactive children having different properties than 
they did previously, forcing us to revise our beliefs about them.  
 As Khalidi (2013, 146-150) has argued, if awareness on the part of the individual 
classified is not a necessary condition for looping to occur, then there does not seem to be 
any fundamental difference between human kinds and natural kinds. After all, even if we 
stipulate that at least someone must be aware of a classification for looping to take place, 
this would fail to exclude so-called natural kind categories. Our awareness of microbes, 
 See, for example, Hacking (1999, 32, 103).  25
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for instance, occasions us to intervene on microbes in the ways that we do. This changes 
the way in which microbes behave, and loops back to force changes in our classifications 
and knowledge about them.  
 Notwithstanding the fact that some natural kinds appear to be subject to looping 
effects, Hacking nevertheless maintains that the way in which looping occurs in the case 
of human kinds marks a fundamental difference.  For example, after posing the question, 26
“Is there not a looping effect between the microbe and our knowledge?” (Hacking, 1999, 
106), Hacking replies: “My simple-minded reply is that microbes do not do all these 
things because, either individually or collectively, they are aware of what we are doing to 
them…they do interact with us. But not because they know what they are doing” (ibid.). 
This passage is somewhat cryptic, but here’s what I think Hacking is driving at: only 
human beings, as a distinct species, interact with ideas about them, either by becoming 
perspicaciously aware of how they are classified (i.e. hearing a word and understanding 
what it means), or by becoming more subtly aware of how they are classified in virtue of 
experiencing their own existence in a “larger matrix of institutions and practices 
surrounding this classification” (ibid., 103).  It would seem that, for Hacking, microbes 27
don’t interact with ideas about them not only because they are not (perspicaciously) aware 
of how they are classified, but because they don’t even experience themselves as being 
classified in a certain way.  
 As I have already noted in chapter 1, Hacking has since abandoned the notion of a natural kind. It is not 26
clear, however, what implications this has for his later distinction between interactive and indifferent kinds. 
Even if there is no such thing as a natural kind, one might still maintain a distinction between kinds which 
are subjects to looping effects and kinds which are not.     
 Although Hacking himself does not put it in this way, he gestures at these different forms of awareness in 27
several places (Cf. Hacking, 1999, 103, 105). 
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 If Hacking is right that only human beings interact with ideas about them , and 28
that looping occurs exclusively as a function of this interaction, then this certainly marks 
a difference between human beings and other kinds of species, chemical elements, 
physical particles, etc. What is not clear, however, is how this prevents human kinds from 
being natural kinds. As Cooper (2004, 79; 2005, 60) has pointed out, some kinds of things 
are vulnerable to mechanisms to which other kinds are not, but we would not cite this as 
evidence that they not natural kinds. For example, the fact that animals can be selectively 
bred whereas chemical elements cannot does not imply that the former are not natural 
kinds.  
 Unfortunately, Hacking himself is not altogether clear on how being subject to 
looping effects prevents a kind from being natural or real. In some places he suggests that 
feedback which results from the classification of human kinds occurs at a significantly 
greater rate than that which manifests in other kinds, ultimately confounding our ability to 
study and classify such phenomena.  As I have already argued (see section 2.2.1), 29
however, the fact that a kind rapidly changes does not in principle prevent it from being 
natural kind. In order to establish the conclusion that human kinds are not natural kinds 
Hacking must show that the difference between the former and the latter is 
metaphysically (as opposed to epistemologically) significant.  
 One might, for instance, object to this by maintaining that some non-human animals (e.g., dogs) interact 28
with ideas about them in the sense that they experience themselves as being classified in a certain way. I 
think Hacking’s likely reply to this would be that part of experiencing being classified in a certain way is 
caring about how you are being classified. Insofar as non-human animals are indifferent to how they are 
classified, they do not interact with ideas about them in the same way that human beings do. I will not 
expand on this point here, since, even if Hacking is right about this, I don’t think this prevents human kinds 
from being natural kinds. 
 Hacking (1999, 108) also claims that the rate of feedback marks a fundamental distinction between the 29
natural and human (or “social”) sciences. See also: Hacking (1992, 190). 
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 In other places Hacking appears to be working with an understanding of natural 
kinds which is at odds with how I’ve been discussing them. For instance, just after 
distinguishing between interactive and indifferent kinds, Hacking writes: “When 
philosophers talk about natural kinds, they take the indifference—in my technical sense—
of natural kinds for granted” (Hacking, 1999, 106). According to Hacking, when the 
concept of a natural kind came into currency philosophers thought of Nature as passive, 
not active. That is to say, in philosophizing about tigers, horses, water, sulphur, and so 
forth, philosophers did not anticipate that there might be kinds of things—namely, human 
kinds—which interact with their very own classifications. This might well be true, but it 
does not imply that human kinds are not natural kinds. Even if paradigmatic natural kinds 
are more passive than human kinds, human kinds might still be considered natural or real 
inasmuch as members of those kinds have in common important properties. Nothing 
about the idea of natural kinds logically implies that they are passive.       
 In my mind, Hacking has identified something unique about the way in which 
classification affects human beings. What he has not shown, however, is that this prevents 
human kinds from being natural kinds. Quite the contrary. If human kinds do indeed 
change in virtue of individual members of a kind interacting with ideas about them, then 
this mechanism of change would seem to be an important property of human kinds (and, 
hence, psychiatric kinds) qua natural kinds, one that ought to be taken into account if our 
goal is to have our categories reflect the natural structure of the world.   
2.2.3 The Argument from Mind-Dependence 
 When Hacking first introduced his influential looping effect argument he assumed 
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that the properties associated with human kinds do indeed change as a consequence of 
looping. He has since conceded the possibility that in some instances looping might only 
alter the superficial or stereotypical properties of a human kind, leaving the important 
properties unchanged. For instance, in The Social Construction of What (1999) Hacking 
posits that the putative kinds schizophrenia and childhood autism, though subject to 
looping effects, might be natural kinds in the sense that they are ultimately produced by 
some underlying “biological pathology P” (ibid., 119). According to Hacking, if 
childhood autism is (i.e. is identical to) a certain pathology P (e.g., a genetic, 
biochemical, or neurological abnormality), then it is “natural” or “real” for the reason that 
P “is, by hypothesis, not what it is in virtue of anything conscious, self-aware” (ibid.). 
While the idea of childhood autism might be “constructed” or “socially constructed” (this 
is Hacking’s terminology; see ibid., 121) in the sense that it interacts with researchers, 
therapists, and autistic children themselves, childhood autism itself—qua P—is not.    
Hacking’s discussion of childhood autism (and schizophrenia) highlights another possible 
reason for thinking why at least some human kinds cannot be natural kinds. As you will 
recall, in the previous chapter I called attention to a crucial feature of natural kinds 
according to Mill and other natural kind theorists: natural kinds are mind-independent in 
the sense that they exist independently of how we think of them. But if (some) human 
kinds are indeed shaped by mental properties such as our beliefs about ourselves, or 
others’ beliefs about us, then they would seem to be mind-dependent in a way in which 
paradigmatic natural kinds are not.  
  Mind-independence is often taken to be an important criterion for realism about 
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the external world, whether we are considering individual objects or kinds (Cf. Boyd, 
1989; Devitt, 2005; Kitcher, 1992). But as both Cooper (2004, 79-80; 2005, 61) and 
Khalidi (2013, 142-150) have noted, ‘mind-independence’ is an ambiguous notion. By 
“mind-independent” we might simply mean that some object or kind does not pertain to 
the mind. For instance, gold and sulphur are mind-independent in the sense that they are 
not associated with any mental properties, whereas schizophrenia is. “Mind-independent” 
might also refer to the fact that some object or kind is not a causal product of the mind, 
but has its properties in virtue of other, non-mental, processes. Finally, “mind-
independent” might imply that some object or kind exists independently of our beliefs 
about it, as opposed to being a name or category that we have devised merely for the sake 
of convenience or out of our own ignorance.  
 If Hacking is to be believed, (most) psychiatric kinds are mind-dependent in the 
second sense. Being subject to looping effects implies that a kind is, at least in part, a 
causal product of the mind. It is not obvious, however, in what way being a causal 
product of the mind prevents a kind from being natural or real. Minds, after all, are part of 
the universe, and we should not prejudge the issue of whether or not some mental states 
or processes can be natural kinds. For the sake of continuity, consider once more the case 
of multiple personality disorder (MPD). It’s easy to be skeptical about MPD. If Hacking 
is right, had we not introduced the notion of MPD then there would have been no MPD to 
discover. This suggests some sort of contrivance. Be that as it may, if we grant that a 
group of individuals sharing a cluster of MPD-like properties did indeed emerge as a 
consequence of how we chose to divide the world, then we are forced to admit the 
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possibility of MPD emerging as a real kind. 
 In my mind, only the third sense of mind-independence is relevant to the 
assessment of whether or not a kind is natural or real, and there is nothing to suggest that 
mental disorders cannot in principle be mind-independent in this way. To be sure, a 
psychiatric category might be mind-dependent in the sense that it is invented arbitrarily, 
out of mere convenience, or tainted by certain biases, presuppositions, vested interests, 
etc. But this might be true of any category. And, as far as I can see, no fundamental 
difference exists between psychiatric kinds and other kinds of things that would merit the 
conclusion that this sort of mind-dependence is inevitable. 
2.2.4 Summary 
 In this section I refuted three arguments that purport to show that mental disorders 
cannot be natural kinds. Other arguments (some of which were discussed in the context of 
essentialism in chapter 1) have been given for restricting natural kinds to the basic 
sciences such as physics and (perhaps) chemistry as opposed to the non-basic or “special” 
sciences, such as biology, psychology, psychiatry, and so forth. Nevertheless, these 
arguments are not exclusive to psychiatric kinds and so will not be discussed further in 
this dissertation. Let us now move on and consider whether or not mental disorders are in 
fact natural kinds.  
2.3 Are Mental Disorders Natural Kinds? 
  Before considering whether or not current kinds of mental disorder are natural 
kinds it would be fruitful to remind ourselves of the account of natural kinds developed in 
the previous chapter. I argued that the central idea of a natural kind is that it is a collection 
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of individuals who are alike in important properties. These properties are “important” in 
the sense that they cluster or “hang together” in virtue of being produced by certain causal 
mechanisms. In short, natural kinds are clusters of properties which cluster together 
because they have a common causal structure. This is what philosophers typically mean 
when they say that the important properties of a kind make it the kind of thing that it is. 
 As we have seen, natural kinds are most often discussed in connection with kinds 
of things or stuff—e.g., physical particles, chemical elements, biological species, etc. 
Kinds of mental disorder, however, are generally believed to be kinds of states or 
processes. That is to say, psychiatric kinds are not entities in themselves, but states or 
processes (most often considered to be pathological in nature) that an entity is subject to. 
Examples of natural kinds of states might include atomic states (e.g., oxidation state), 
biological states (e.g., homeostasis), neurological states (e.g., vegetative states), 
psychological or mental states (e.g., sadness, happiness, disgust, fear), and so on. 
Examples of natural kinds of processes might include chemical reactions, pathological 
disease processes, and biological processes such as metabolism and reproduction.  
 Although it might sound odd to say that there are individual members of a natural 
kind of state or process, the account of natural kinds discussed in the previous chapter can 
be readily adapted to deal with natural kinds of states or processes. Rather than saying 
that a natural kind of process is a collection of individuals who are alike in important 
properties, we might say that a natural kind of state or process refers to instances or 
happenings in nature that involve the same set of important features or properties. 
Consider, for example, homeostasis. Homeostasis is a biological process whereby an 
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organism maintains a stable internal state in spite of environmental variation and 
disturbances. Homeostatic regulation generally involves the following features: (i) 
System Variable (the biological characteristic to be regulated/maintained—e.g., 
temperature, glucose levels, weight); (ii) Set Point/Range (the optimal value or state of 
the system variable—e.g., a core body temperature of 37 degrees Celsius or 98.6 degrees 
Fahrenheit for human beings); (iii) Detector (the physiological structure/mechanism that 
monitors the system variable with respect to deviations around the set point—e.g., the 
Preoptic Area of the Hypothalamus (POA) and Anterior Hypothalamus (AH) monitor 
their own structural temperature, as well as receiving input from thermoreceptors in the 
skin); and Correctional Mechanism (a mechanism that restores the system variable to 
the set point—e.g., homoeothermic or endothermic organisms such as mammals and birds 
often make use of internal physiological mechanisms—e.g., vasoconstriction or 
vasodilation—to maintain an almost constant body temperature, whereas poikilothermic 
or ectothermic organisms such as amphibians, reptiles, and most fish lack an internal, 
physiological mechanism of temperature regulation, and so regulate temperature by 
changing their environment).  30
 To be sure, different organisms regulate different variables, have different set 
points, as well as different mechanisms for detecting and correcting their own internal 
states. Nevertheless, within a particular species particular homeostatic processes tend to 
be uniform. Human beings, for example, use the same set of causal mechanisms to 
 Mammals, of course, might also change their environments for the purpose of temperature regulation 30
(e.g., find appropriate shelter, protection, cover and/or relief from cold or heat; put on clothes, take off 
sweaters) in addition to relying on internal physiological mechanisms.  
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achieve temperature regulation—and, in light of this, one can speak of homeostatic 
temperature regulation as a natural kind of process.  
 For a type of mental disorder to be considered a natural kind, then, the causal 
properties of instances of the disorder must all be similar, much like the causal properties 
of homeostatic temperature regulation. Unfortunately, as Cooper (2005, 72) has 
previously noted, in many instances the causes of mental disorder are so poorly 
understood that it is impossible to tell whether this condition is met. While I cannot, in 
this dissertation, do justice to each and every category currently listed in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) or the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD), I will proceed here by arguing that one paradigmatic psychiatric kind, 
depression, cannot be considered a natural kind. Following this I will suggest that what is 
true of depression is, mutatis mutandis, true of most (though not all) categories of mental 
disorder currently recognized by psychiatry.   
2.3.1 Characteristics of Depression (“Major Depressive Disorder”) 
 If one were to simply look at the most recent version of the DSM—the DSM-5—
in order to determine whether or not the category of depression reflects a real kind in 
nature, one should quickly conclude that it does not. The category of depression, as with 
most categories of mental disorder currently listed in the DSM, is highly disjunctive. 
What I mean here by “disjunctive” is that a category or kind-concept collects together 
individuals who might have very little or nothing in common. For example, because 
individuals meet the criteria for depression so long as they present with five or more 
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symptoms, none of which are necessary , there are, logically speaking, 227 possible 31
ways to meet the symptom criteria for major depressive disorder (MDD) (Cf. Zimmerman 
et al., 2015). It is also possible for two individuals diagnosed with depression to have very 
little in common. One individual, for instance, might be classified as depressed in virtue 
of meeting criteria (1)-(5) (see note 31), whereas another individual might be classified as 
depressed in virtue of meeting criteria (2) and (6)-(9). 
 If two or more individuals diagnosed with depression share very few properties in 
common, then it is highly unlikely that MDD is a natural kind. After all, if MDD were a 
real kind, then we would expect instances of this kind to have more-or-less the same 
range of observable properties, since instances in nature that involve the same set of 
important causal properties typically involve a similar range of effects. As Kendell (1975, 
69) puts it: “it’s almost impossible to visualize how a discontinuity could exist at a 
symptomatic level without being a reflection of a more fundamental discontinuity 
elsewhere.”  32
 There are two possible responses to this kind of assessment of the DSM category 
of depression, as well as other similarly disjunctive categories. First, one might object 
that, although diverse symptom profiles are theoretically possible, in practice individuals 
present with much more homogenous symptom profiles. Second, one might attempt to 
 At least one of these symptoms must be low mood or loss of pleasure, but there is no one symptom which 31
is necessary for being considered a member of the putative kind depression. The nine criteria for depression 
are as follows: (1) persistent low mood, (2) anhedonia (the inability to take pleasure in activities which were 
previously considered pleasurable), (3) weight loss or weight gain, (4) insomnia or hypersomnia, (5) 
psychomotor agitation or retardation, (6) fatigue, (7) feelings of worthlessness or excessive guilt, (8) 
difficulty thinking or making decisions, and (9) recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation. See APA 
(2013, 160-161). 
 See also: Guze (1992). 32
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weaken the link between causes and effects and maintain that, although individuals 
diagnosed with MDD might have heterogeneous or diverse symptom profiles, the signs 
and symptoms of mental disorders are superficial properties rather than causal ones, and 
so it is possible that individuals classified as depressed are superficially dissimilar yet 
importantly the same. Let’s consider each of these points in turn.  
 Recent research does support the view that MDD is more homogenous in practice 
than in theory. For instance, examining more than 1500 patients who met the DSM-IV 
criteria for MDD , Zimmerman et al. (2015) found that individuals met MDD symptom 33
criteria in 170 different ways, with a relatively small number of combinations accounting 
for more than 40% of patients. More recently, Park et al. (2017) identified 119 different 
symptom profiles amongst 853 individuals who met the DSM-IV criteria for MDD, the 
most common of which consisted of meeting all nine criteria.  
 Although these findings do suggest that MDD is more homogenous than a 
superficial analysis of the DSM might lead us to believe, this does not imply that MDD is 
a natural kind. For one thing, 119 possible symptom profiles for MDD is still quite 
heterogenous in comparison to, say, schizophrenia, in which there are 27 possible ways to 
meet DSM criteria, or anorexia nervosa, which only has 1 diagnostic combination. Most 
importantly, however, even if we grant that MDD is a unified syndrome, there is no 
guarantee that this putative syndrome or cluster of properties is produced or generated by 
 The criteria for MDD in DSM-IV and DSM-5 are virtually identical (compare: APA, 1994, 327 and APA, 33
2013, 160-161). The only important difference between the newest version of the DSM (i.e. DSM-5) and 
DSM-IV is that the “Bereavement Exclusion” was removed in DSM-5. In DSM-IV the bereavement 
exclusion states: “The symptoms are not better accounted for by Bereavement, i.e., after the loss of a loved 
one, the symptoms persist for longer than 2 months or are characterized by marked functional impairment, 
morbid preoccupation with worthlessness, suicidal ideation, psychotic symptoms, or psychomotor 
retardation”. 
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the same set of causal properties. While one might plausibly infer that the same range of 
effects will result from the same type of disease process across different token instances, 
the reverse inference often does not hold. For example, two individuals might both 
present with a cough, chest pain, fatigue, weight loss, and fever—yet, in one case the 
cluster of symptoms is the effect of pulmonary tuberculosis, whereas in the other case it’s 
the effect of lung cancer. To conclude that MDD is a natural kind on the basis that there 
are a set of individuals who share the same immediately observable properties would be 
the rough equivalent of concluding that pulmonary tuberculosis and lung cancer are two 
of a kind, or that gold and pyrite (iron sulphide or “ersatz gold”) are the same kind of 
thing since they have in common the observable properties of being shiny, yellow, and 
metallic.       
 But what of the objection that individuals classified as depressed might be 
superficially dissimilar yet importantly the same? Although we might plausibly maintain 
that the same set of causal properties involves a similar range of effects across each and 
every instance of a particular disease, a scenario in which this is not the case is not 
altogether unusual. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (“Lupus”), for instance, is a chronic 
autoimmune inflammatory disease that can affect any area of the body. Since lupus can 
affect different parts of the body, symptoms tend to vary significantly from person to 
person depending on what part of the body is affected. Symptoms may also come and go, 
and may be mild, moderate, or severe.  
 Given that lupus is a natural kind of disease, one that manifests in various ways 
though has a distinct pathophysiology, we cannot rule out the possibility that MDD 
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reflects a real kind in nature on the basis that it is a heterogenous concept. In the end, 
what we need to know is whether or not there are causal properties that would serve to 
unify diverse manifestations of MDD. It is to this question which I now turn.  
 2.3.2 Causes of Depression   
 Genetic. What is the causal structure of depression—i.e. what are the causal 
properties that make depression the kind of thing that it is? Some genetic research 
supports the view that depression is heritable, with monozygotic twins having a 
concordance rate of 40% (Sullivan, Neale, & Kendler, 2000).  Nevertheless, this only 34
makes it moderately likely that one twin will develop depression if the other does, and the 
search for a “depression gene” has thus far been met with frustration. Perhaps the most 
well-known candidate is the serotonin transporter gene, 5-HTTLPR, which can be found 
in the promotor region near the DNA sequence for the serotonin transporter protein. The 
promotor region controls the level of expression of the serotonin transporter protein, 
which itself is responsible for ensuring that serotonin can move back into the axon 
terminal from the synapse (“reuptake”) to be reused. In theory, the higher the expression 
of the protein, the quicker serotonin can be taken out of the synapse. The body of 
evidence for the association of the 5-HTTLPR gene with major depression remains 
mixed. Some studies have replicated these and similar findings whereas others have not 
(Munafo, 2012). One meta-analysis of 39 studies between 1996 and 2009 (Clarke, Flint, 
Attwood, & Munafo, 2010) did find a statistically significant association between 5-
HTTLPR polymorphism (namely, a “short” allele, which causes different levels of 
 Heritability is around 30% for men and 40% for women. 34
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transporter expression than a “long” allele) and unipolar depression, although the authors 
caution that the effect size is quite small. In other words, even if the 5-HTTLPR gene 
does play a role in depression, then this role is unlikely to be fundamental, since the effect 
size attributable to the single genetic variant is very small.  35
 Neurochemical. We often hear depression characterized as a “chemical 
imbalance”. Neurochemical theories of depression first emerged in 1950s following 
observations of the effects of certain medications, such as resperine (a blood pressure 
medication), on mood. The most influential of these theories is the “monamine 
hypothesis” of depression, in which depression is said to be caused by a deficiency of the 
monoamine neurotransmitters (dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotonin), particularly 
serotonin. Evidence for the role of serotonin in depression comes from a few different 
sources. First, early studies found that depressed individuals had lower levels of serotonin 
metabolites in their cerebralspinal fluid (Cf. Traskman-Bendz, Asberg, Bertilsson, & 
Thoren, 1984). Second, reducing serotonin levels by eating a diet low in tryptophan 
appears to produce depression-like symptoms (Booij et al., 2002; Smith, Fairburn, & 
Cowen, 1997), as well as negative mood bias (van der Veen, Evers, Deutz, & Schmitt, 
2007)—i.e. responding more strongly to negative rather than positive emotional stimuli. 
Third, some more recent studies have found abnormal (lower) levels 5-HT (serotonin) 1A 
receptors in the brains of individuals diagnosed with depression as compared to controls 
(Drevets et al., 1999; Sargent et al., 2000). And, finally, antidepressant medications—
 It should also be mentioned that both short and long alleles of 5-HTTLPR gene have roughly the same 35
frequency in the overall population (45% of the alleles in the gene pool are short, whereas 55% are long; 
see Caspi et al., 2003), suggesting that there must be more to depression than the 5-HTTLPR gene, since it 
is estimated that, at any given time, only about 5% of people worldwide meet current diagnostic criteria for 
depression.
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namely, monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), and 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)—act by boosting serotonin levels in the 
synapse (and, in the former two cases, dopamine and norepinephrine as well) either by 
blocking the breakdown of serotonin and other monoamines in the presynaptic cell or by 
blocking the reuptake of serotonin in the presynaptic cell.  
 The evidence for the role of serotonin in depression would seem to be 
overwhelming; yet, the story of depression appears to be much more complicated than 
simply “low levels of serotonin cause low mood”. For one thing, reducing serotonin 
levels by eating a diet low in tryptophan doesn’t appear to have the same effect on healthy 
individuals in comparison to those who have previously experienced an episode of 
depression (Murphy et al., 2002), suggesting that low serotonin levels are not sufficient to 
produce depression. What is more, the link between lower levels of serotonin receptors 
and depression is inconsistent. While some studies have found such a link, others have 
not (Meyer et al., 2004; Parsey et al., 2006), and still others have found raised levels of 
serotonin receptors (Reivich, Amsterdam, Brunswick, Yann Shiue, 2004).  
 The evidence from treatment is likewise unconvincing. Some medications with 
little to no effect on serotonin (e.g., desipramine, bupropion) are just as effective in 
treating depression as SSRIs (Clayton et al., 2006).  Furthermore, many treatments 36
which appear to alleviate symptoms of depression—e.g., sleep deprivation, medically-
induced seizures, in addition to antidepressants—also happen to stimulate the expression 
of a protein known as brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), which is responsible for 
 For instance, in some experimental studies medications which affect glutamate signalling appear to have 36
antidepressant-like effects (Mathews & Zarate, 2013).
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regulating the growth, survival, and plasticity of neurons. Studies of depressed suicide 
victims have found lower levels of BDNF principally in the plastic regions of the brain, 
such as the hippocampus (Dwivedi et al., 2003), suggesting that perhaps antidepressants 
(as well as other effective treatments of depression) work by acting on BDNF rather than 
on serotonin.      37
 In short, we still cannot say whether or not the psychopharmacological agents 
which we use to treat depression are specific to, or necessary for, their antidepressant-like 
effects. And, in any case, just because antidepressants (particularly SSRIs) increase 
serotonin levels, this does not imply that low serotonin is the causal basis of depression. 
As David Healy puts it: arguing “backward from the efficacy of [a] treatment to what 
might be the cause of the disorder [makes] little more sense than arguing that because 
aspirin was useful in treating rheumatoid arthritis there must be some kind of aspirin 
deficiency implicated in rheumatoid arthritis” (2004, 191).  To be sure, the 38
neurotransmitter serotonin might be involved in depression in some way—perhaps by 
affecting (or being affected by) brain activity in particular regions of the brain (more on 
this below)—but this is a far cry from the claim that low serotonin causes or gives rise to 
the symptoms associated with depression. 
 Neural Circuitry. Not only is the neurochemical theory of depression 
underdetermined by evidence, but considered as a standalone theory of depression it is 
 Although, as Moncrieff (2007) has noted, research into depression and other brain abnormalities—such as 37
cortisol levels, brain volume abnormalities, and BDNF—have thus far been inconsistent, failing to show 
that these factors are specific to depression, let alone causal.   
 Interestingly, some studies have found placebos to be nearly as effective as SSRIs in relieving the 38
symptoms of depression (Kirsch et al., 2008; see also Kirsch, 2010). If the efficacy of an SSRI in treating 
depression is evidence that depression is caused by a serotonin deficiency, then, by parity of reasoning, the 
efficacy of a placebo in treating depression is evidence that depression is caused by a placebo deficiency.  
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implausible. Neurotransmitters are a necessary component of neurotransmission (namely, 
by transmitting excitatory or inhibitory signals across a chemical synapse), but as far as 
we know all of our thoughts, desires, emotions, intentions, and so forth, are a 
consequence of more diffuse brain activity. Even if it were true that neurotransmitters 
such as serotonin in some sense “cause” the symptoms typically associated with 
depression, presumably they only do so in virtue of affecting brain activity in specified 
ways. In light of this, chemical imbalances in the brain are at best part of the causal story 
of depression. 
 But what kind of brain activity is associated with depression? In the past two 
decades neuroimaging studies of depression have shown patterns of underactivity and 
overactivity in a widespread network of brain regions, including the anterior thalamus, 
hippocampus, anterior cingulate, subgenual cingulate, orbitofrontal cortex, lateral 
prefrontal cortex, and medial frontal cortex (Seminowicz et al., 2004). The subgenal 
cingulate cortex appears to be a key node in this network, as it is consistently overactive 
in individuals diagnosed with depression and returns to normal levels of activity in those 
who have recovered from depression, regardless of treatment method (Drevets, Savitz, & 
Trimble, 2008).  The subgenal cingulate plays a central role in emotion regulation via its 39
connection to the amygdala and other core limbic structures. Although the amygdala itself 
is able to assign emotional valance to external stimuli by drawing on different sensory 
modalities (e.g., visual, auditory, somatosensory, gustatory, and olfactory inputs), it could 
easily overreact to external stimuli (e.g., a rubber snake) or fail to react to external stimuli 
 And in some instances using deep brain stimulation in order to reduce activity in this area results in 39
remission. See Mayberg et al. (2005).  
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(e.g., the death of a loved one) if not modulated by the more sophisticated cortical 
networks found in the subgenal cingulate.   
 Communication between the amygdala and the subgenal cingulate is not all there 
is to emotion regulation, however. Research suggests that many other cortical areas 
modulate the activity of the subgenal cingulate itself. For example, the orbitofrontal and 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortices have strong inputs into the subgenal cingulate, and 
increased activation or deactivation in these areas appears to be associated with the use of 
context and cognitive strategies to appraise or reappraise a distressing stimulus 
(Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007). Interestingly, in individuals 
diagnosed with depression increased activation of the ventrolateral cortex is correlated 
with increased activation of the amygdala, whereas in healthy control subjects increased 
activation of the ventrolateral cortex is correlated with decreased activation of the 
amygdala. This suggests that perhaps in the former case increased activation is a sign of 
negative reappraisal or “catastrophizing” (e.g., failing a course is interpreted as career-
ending), whereas in the latter case its a sign of positive reappraisal or an individual 
making light of a situation (e.g., failing a course is interpreted as not a big deal in the 
grand scheme of things).       40
 All of this is to say that the relationship between brain activation and emotion 
regulation is not altogether straightforward and predictable. Depressed patients and non-
 It should be noted that the precise role of the amygdala in human emotion is still contentious. Individuals 40
with bilateral lesions to their amygdala typically have normal emotional functioning with the exception of 
the ability to learn and express fear (Hayman et al., 1998), suggesting that the amygdala is not necessary for 
processing other emotions such as happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, and surprise. For instance, S.M.— 
oftentimes referred to as the “woman without fear”—lacked an amygdala on both sides of the brain (and no 
other brain tissue) as a consequence of Urbach-Wiethe disease. Although the loss of her amygdala impaired 
S.M.’s capacity for experiencing and recognizing fear, it did not remove her capacity to experience and 
recognize other human emotions (Cf. Young, 2010). 
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depressed patients alike may have similar activity in the same brain region, yet this 
activity has differential effects elsewhere in the brain. What is more, even amongst 
depressed patients themselves the same brain regions—e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex—can be either underactive or overactive, 
suggesting that in some instances of depression there is a lack of cognitive modulation, 
allowing subcortical regions such as the amygdala to operate unchecked, whereas in other 
instances of depression there is too much cognitive modulation in the form of negative 
reappraisal (Oschner et al., 2004). 
 Network models of depression which focus on “abnormal” interactions between 
limbic areas responsible for emotional states and cortical areas which modulate these 
states  are not wholly inconsistent with neurochemical and genetic theories of 41
depression. For example, a 5-HTTLPR polymorphism may cause an imbalance in 
serotonin which may, in turn, cause an increase or decrease in brain activity in particular 
neural networks. The problem, however, is that at present this is pure speculation. While a 
bottom-up causal process of this sort is possible, it is equally possible that neurochemical 
and genetic changes are being driven by top-down processes, such as an increase or 
decrease in brain activity in response to environmental stimuli (more on this below). Most 
importantly, for our present purposes, is the possibility that what we now call 
“depression” is not one kind of natural process, but many. For instance, bottom-up 
processes may be more prevalent in some instances of “depression” whereas top-down 
processes may be more prevalent in others. And, as I have already said, even so-called 
 See, for instance, Mayberg’s (1997) limbic-cortical dysregulation model.  41
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top-down processes, such as the modulation of limbic areas by cortical areas, might differ 
between depressed patients.   42
 Psychological and Environmental. Thus far I have highlighted some of the 
putative causal factors involved in depression at the level of genes, chemistry, and 
neurocircuitry. In addition to this there is a much older tradition which has emphasized 
the important causal role of both psychological and environmental factors in depression. 
For example, in the preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy Robert Burton writes: “There 
is no greater cause of melancholy than idleness, no better cure than business” (1621/1651, 
20). As Radden (2000, 4-19) argues, in the long tradition of writing about melancholy  43
there is an evident association between melancholy and idleness (and boredom), as well 
as the palliative effects of labor (particularly, meaningful labor). Idleness, however, was 
not seen to be the only possible cause of melancholy. In addition to idleness, Burton 
himself recognizes many “inward” and “outward” causes of melancholy (see Burton, 
1621/1651, 127-128), including excessive labor/study, brain injury, excessive sexual 
indulgence, excessive alcohol use, bad diet, sorrow or loss, fear, worry, envy, shame, 
hatred, anger, ambitiousness, covetousness, and pride.  
 Indeed, even bottom-up processes might differ between depressed patients. Consider the fact that damage 42
to different subcortical limbic regions of the brain might similarly affect different individuals. For instance, 
some patients with a tumour in the ventromedial hypothalamus have exhibited depressive-like symptoms 
(Veendrick-Meekes et al., 2007). As well, reduction in hippocampal volume has been linked to depression 
and bipolar disorder (Frey et al., 2007; Roddy et al., 2019). Furthermore, a bilateral lesion to the ventral 
globus pallidus results in symptomatology consistent with severe depression with anhedonia (Miller et al., 
2006). As it happens, the ventral globus pallidus is adjacent to the ventral striatum, which has been deemed 
the “pleasure centre of the brain”—and stimulating the nucleus accumbens of the ventral striatum does in 
fact decrease symptoms of severe depression in some individuals (Benezzouz et al., 2000).
 The term ‘melancholy’ does not have the exact same connotation as ‘depression’ or ‘major depressive 43
disorder’. As Radden (2000) notes, from Galen onwards the central states associated with melancholy have 
been fear and sadness. While sadness (i.e. “depressed mood”) remains a part of the DSM diagnosis of 
depression, the subjective state of fear has dropped out entirely. NB. ‘Melancholy’ should not be confused 
with ‘melancholia’. The latter term often referred to a range of conditions, sometimes conditions similar to 
depression or melancholy, but oftentimes conditions which more closely resembled delusional disorders.        
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 Medical theorizing in Burton’s day was dominated by the humoral theory of 
medicine, whereby excess or deficiency of thought, desire, or action were considered bad 
for both body and mind (the proximal cause being excess or deficiency in one or more of 
the four bodily humors: blood, yellow bile, black bile, and phlegm). What is striking, 
however, is that four hundred years on many of Burton’s claims have been corroborated. 
Depression is associated with traumatic brain injury (Jorge, Robinson, & Moyer, 2004), 
particularly damage to the left hemisphere. Depression is comorbid with Alcohol Use 
Disorder—though, it is not entirely clear whether alcohol causes depression or whether 
depression causes alcohol use (Boden & Fergusson, 2011).  Lifestyle factors such as 44
sleep, diet, and exercise are also implicated in depression, most likely via their affects on 
various neurobiological pathways such as neurotransmitter processes, immuno-
inflammatory pathways, the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis, antioxidant 
defence systems, neuroprogression, and mitochondria (Lopresti, Hood, & Drummond, 
2013). In addition, individuals diagnosed with depression are three times more likely than 
those not diagnosed with depression to have experienced a stressful life event prior to the 
onset of depression (Harkness, 2008), particularly childhood trauma or loss.        45
 Nevertheless, as with the genetics, chemistry, and neural circuitry, the 
environmental level of analysis is not fully explanatory. For example, although 
 Of course, it is also possible that some third factor explains the cooccurrence of both depression and 44
alcohol use. 
 In fact, children who are victims of physical, sexual, and/or emotional abuse are two to five times more 45
likely than those who have not been abused to develop depression in adulthood (Harkness & Lumely, 
2007). As well, according to one estimate, nearly seventy-five percent of depressed individuals have 
suffered at least one severe loss event in the six months prior to the onset of depression (Brown & Harris, 
1989), a finding which hearkens back to Freud’s (1917/1961) claim in Mourning and Melancholia that at 
least some instances of depression are a consequence of an inability to cope with loss. “Severe loss event” 
might refer straightforwardly to the death of a loved one. It might also refer to other significant life events 
such as the loss of one’s job, the loss of one’s home, etc.
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experiencing a stressful life event is a strong predictor of depression, not everyone who 
experiences a stressful life event ends up depressed. This suggests that there must be 
some other factor accounting for why stressful life events trigger depression in some 
individuals and not others. To this end, personality and cognitive psychologists tend to 
invoke psychological or cognitive mechanisms, often insisting that “stressful life event” 
should be taken to refer to events which are interpreted as stressful by an individual, 
rather than a class of events deemed to be stressful from some objective standpoint. 
Freud, for instance, pointed out that even a relatively “insignificant” life event (e.g., 
failure on an exam, making a mistake at work, etc.) might be interpreted as stressful by 
some individuals.  The American psychiatrist Aaron Beck later developed this insight, 46
insisting that one’s emotional response to a situation is determined by the way in which a 
situation is appraised or evaluated, and people prone to depression tend to appraise even 
the most innocuous events (e.g., not being acknowledged by an acquaintance in the 
grocery store ) negatively (Beck, 1972).  47
 Beck’s cognitive model of depression is certainly consistent with our current 
understanding of emotion, whereby emotions are controlled/modified by cognitive 
interpretation occurring after physiological reaction to some stimulus.  Be that as it may, 48
 Freud referred to these cases as instances of “imagined loss” whereby an individual unconsciously 46
interprets comparatively banal life events as severe loss events. See Freud (1917/1961). 
 This is an example of jumping to conclusions, a cognitive distortion in which one interprets things 47
negatively in the absence of facts to support one’s conclusion. Other examples of cognitive distortions 
include: all-or-nothing thinking (“I’m a failure if I don’t get an ‘A’ in calculus”), overgeneralization (“I 
never do anything right”), and magnification or catastrophizing (“Failing this course will ruin my life”). 
 Since Schacter & Singer (1962) showed that emotions require both a physical (visceral) and cognitive 48
(interpretation of the context) component, most theories of emotion have incorporated both bottom-up 
visceral factors and top-down contextual factors, differing only in the degree of emphasis placed on either 
bottom-up or top-down processing.   
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it is still not clear from this why some individuals are more likely than others to appraise 
situations negatively. Beck himself suggested that some individuals’ negative cognitive 
style is a consequence of a “depressive schema” (i.e. rigidly held negative core beliefs 
about the self, world, and the future) which has developed over time in response to early 
experiences with the world (Beck, 1979). But this is consistent with competing etiological 
accounts of depression. For instance, a negative cognitive style might arise in response to 
insecure attachment to a parent (Bowlby, 1980), early maltreatment internalized as a child 
(Young, 1994; Lumely and Harkness, 2007) , or even a 5-HTTLPR polymorphism 49
(Hayden et al., 2008).  50
 Perhaps most importantly, it is by no means clear that each and every case of 
depression involves cognition. As I said earlier, it is possible that in some instances of 
depression there is a lack of cognitive modulation, allowing subcortical limbic regions 
responsible for emotion to operate unchecked. It is also possible that one or more of these 
regions is damaged (or at least not functioning optimally), causing depressive-like 
symptoms and behaviour (see note 42).  
2.3.3 The Natural Kind Status of Depression 
  The fact that depression as we currently conceive it is associated with a variety of 
complex causal factors has led some to describe it as a “multifactorial” illness, much like 
diabetes or heart disease.  The problem with describing depression as a multifactorial 51
 For example: “I’m unlovable”, “People are out to hurt me”, “The world is a dangerous place”, etc.49
 In particular, Hayden and her colleagues found that seven-year-old children who are homozygous for the 50
short allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene displayed a bias toward processing information more negatively than 
those with other genotypes. 
 This is the tack most often taken in textbook descriptions of depression (see, for example, Dozois & 51
Firestone, 2010, 173; Eagleman & Downar, 2015, 546).  
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illness, however, is that it begs the question in favour of the conclusion that depression is 
indeed one kind of thing—a real kind in nature. As I have tried to make clear in the 
foregoing, there are good reasons to doubt this. Our current category of depression is 
heterogenous with respect to both superficial and causal properties. Far from reflecting a 
set of properties which cluster or “hang together” in virtue of sharing a similar causal 
structure, ‘depression’ would seem to be a ragbag term which collects together instances 
which are quite dissimilar both in terms of their observable and unobservable properties. 
 It must be emphasized that my conclusion that depression is not a natural kind 
should not be read as implying that, in order to be considered a natural kind, each and 
every instance of depression ought to share a common essence, or that individual 
members of the kind “depression” share all of their properties in common. It is general 
consensus in the philosophy of psychiatry that kinds of mental disorders, much like 
species, do not have essences (Cf. Kincaid & Sullivan, 2014). My point, rather, is that 
there is no evidence to suggest that the signs and symptoms which are characteristic of 
depression cluster together because of a common causal structure. In the absence of 
knowledge of the causal structure of “depression”—i.e. how unobservable causal 
properties conspire to produce the observable signs and symptoms of depression—it is 
impossible to know whether or not the properties of depression do indeed cluster together, 
or whether these groupings are merely a reflection of our predilections to group certain 
properties together. 
 To put this in terms of the notion of ‘scientific success’ discussed in chapter 1 (see 
section 1.5), the concept of ‘depression’ has enjoyed moderate predictive success (e.g., we 
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can predict that some individuals diagnosed with depression will respond to 
antidepressant medication) but very little explanatory success. As I suggested in the 
previous chapter, a kind is plausibly natural when our postulation of unobservable causal 
properties successfully explains why it is that the observable properties of a kind are 
found to co-occur. At present, this cannot be said to be true of depression. Indeed, some 
have argued that, while the most severe form of clinical depression—which has variously 
been called melancholia, endogenous depression, or nuclear depression—is a kind unto 
itself, most instances of clinical depression fall on a continuum with normal unhappiness 
(Cf. Haslam, 2002, 211; Horowitz & Wakefield, 2007). 
 Nor should my argument be taken to imply that, in order to be considered a 
natural kind, kinds of mental disorder ought to have a common unobservable biological 
causal structure. I agree with Khalidi (2013) that there is simply no a priori or a 
posteriori reason to restrict natural kinds to biological kinds, or even to physical kinds. As 
I argued above (see section 2.2.3), the fact that at least some kinds of mental disorder are 
“mind-dependent” in the sense that they are (at least in part) a causal product of the mind 
does not entail that they cannot be real. Be that as it may, there is also no evidence to 
suggest that instances of depression involve a common unobservable psychological or 
cognitive causal structure. In fact, as Horowitz & Wakefield (2007) have argued, there are 
good reasons to think that severe depression primarily involves a common biological 
causal structure, whereas mild to moderate depression primarily involves psychological 
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and environmental (including social) causes.         52
2.3.4 The Natural Kind Status of Other Mental Disorders 
 When one considers other DSM mental disorders, the heterogenous nature of 
mental disorder concepts is even more pronounced. According to Olbert, Gala, and Tupler 
(2014), there are currently 636,120 possible ways to meet the criteria for posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), 116,200 for ADHD, 32,647 for conduct disorder, 23,422 for panic 
disorder, and so on. Indeed, in most cases two individuals diagnosed with the same 
mental disorder will share on average less than half of their symptoms—and in some 
cases they will share no symptoms in common at all. As I said earlier in the context of 
depression, while heterogeneity itself does not imply that a kind is not natural, it seems 
highly unlikely that such extreme heterogeneity in symptomatology would not implicate 
the involvement of different causal processes.  
 Most importantly, however, even in cases in which there is much less 
heterogeneity in symptomatology relative to other mental disorders, such as 
schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder , there is no consensus amongst experts with 53
respect to which causal properties explain the superficial properties of these putative 
disorders. Schizophrenia, for instance, has been described as a genetic disorder, a 
neurochemical disorder, a neurodegenerative disorder, a neurodevelopmental disorder, 
and even a psychogenic disorder. In chapter 3 and chapter 4 I will consider schizophrenia 
in more detail. For now it is enough to say that schizophrenia is so poorly understood that 
 In fact, as Radden (2000) has argued, it has long been thought that there is a form of what we now call 52
“depression” that is at least qualitatively distinct from other forms of depression. Historically, this form has 
been referred to as “melancholy”. See note 43. 
 There are 27 diagnostic combinations for schizophrenia and 15 for autism spectrum disorder. See ibid. 53
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at minimum we must remain agnostic about whether or not it is a natural kind.     
 Furthermore, from a historical standpoint, given that categories of mental disorder 
have been, and still are, constructed on the basis of signs, symptoms, course, and outcome
—as opposed to knowledge of the causal structure of the world—it would be 
serendipitous indeed if the causal properties which are responsible for psychopathological 
phenomena stood in simple causal relationships to DSM constructs (Cf. Tabb, 2015). Just 
as the combined presence of coughing, chest pain, fatigue, weight loss, and fever turned 
out to be an unreliable indicator of a natural kind of disease, so the combined signs and 
symptoms of current psychiatric concepts are likely to be at best imperfect indicators of 
natural kinds of mental disorder.     
 There are exceptions. Down Syndrome is a kind of genetic disorder in which the 
causal properties are well-known. It is caused by an anomaly on the twenty-first 
chromosome—specifically, a trisomy on chromosome 21 (i.e. an extra twenty-first 
chromosome) which causes biochemical abnormalities which, in turn, impair brain 
development. While it would be incorrect to assert that each and every case of Down 
Syndrome is identical (e.g., some individuals with Down Syndrome are higher 
functioning than others), it is nevertheless clear that sharing a genetic anomaly of this sort 
explains why it is that individuals with Down Syndrome share other similar properties. 
The same can be said for Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, Fragile X syndrome, and 
neurocognitive disorders such as Huntington’s Disease. 
2.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I argued that, while nothing in principle prevents mental disorders 
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from being natural kinds, there is no reason to think that the mental disorder categories 
listed in our current classification schemes are natural kinds. In fact, when one considers 
research into the causes of paradigmatic mental disorders such as depression, the more 
likely conclusion to draw is that most mental disorder concepts are not natural kind 
concepts, but rather catch-all terms which potentially conceal important distinctions that 
exist between individuals diagnosed with these disorders.    
 As I said in the introduction to this dissertation, the most recent version of the 
DSM, DSM-5, includes a total of 541 diagnostic categories, 151 of which are defined by 
predetermined inclusion-exclusion criteria. In an essay of this scope I simply cannot 
address each and every one of these categories, nor can I accord proper justice to even 
several of them. While I do consider depression and schizophrenia to be paradigmatic 
kinds of mental disorder—and, in light of this, my conclusions are likely to generalize to 
most kinds of mental disorder—ultimately the question concerning whether or not some 
kind of mental disorder is natural or real needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
All of this is to say that what I have said about depression here, and what I will have to 
say about schizophrenia in the next two chapters, should not be taken to apply necessarily 
to each and every category listed in the DSM. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Psychiatric Kinds and Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds
[I]t is often imagined that progress has been made simply because fancy names have been 
given to old things. 
— Phillipe Chaslin, in La ‘psychiatrie’ est-elle une langue bien faite?, 1914, Revue 
Neurologique, 26: 16-23. 
3.1 Introduction  
 Thus far I have argued that natural kinds are collections of individuals who have 
important properties in common—namely, a shared causal structure—and that most 
psychiatric kinds are not natural kinds in this sense. In fact, when one considers research 
on paradigmatic mental disorders such as depression, the more plausible conclusion to 
draw is that many, if not most, mental disorder concepts are catch-all terms which 
potentially conceal important distinctions that exist between individuals diagnosed with 
these disorders. 
 Even though psychiatric kinds are not natural kinds in the sense in which I have 
been discussing natural kinds, in recent years some philosophers have maintained that 
there is a sense in which at least some kinds of mental disorder can be considered 
“natural” or “real”. In particular, philosophers of psychiatry have defended the 
Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) view of natural kinds (Cf. Kender, Zachar & Craver, 
2011; Tsou, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2016) as a way of conceptualizing mental disorders. 
In addition to maintaining that some psychiatric kinds are natural kinds in accordance 
with the HPC theory, some philosophers have advanced the further claim that HPC kinds 
are “useful models for psychiatric classification” (Kendler et al., 2011, 1143). That is to 
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say, assuming that at least some of our current psychiatric categories are not HPC kinds, 
revising our categories in such a way as to reflect HPC kinds would be an improvement 
on current psychiatric classification.    
 In this chapter I argue that philosophers of psychiatry who claim that mental 
disorders are HPC kinds, and that the HPC theory is a useful model for psychiatric 
classification, often equivocate between two very different versions of the HPC theory of 
natural kinds. In particular, I contend that there is both a strong and weak reading of the 
HPC theory, and that mental disorders are only HPC kinds in the weak sense. The upshot 
of this, I argue, is that philosophers cannot consistently hold both that psychiatric kinds 
are HPC kinds and that HPC kinds are useful models for psychiatric classification. I 
conclude this chapter by clarifying the sense in which I think kinds of mental disorder can 
be said to be “natural” or “real”.  
3.2 Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds 
  As I tried to make clear in chapter 1, the phrase ‘natural kind’ can be construed in 
a variety of ways, and philosophers still disagree about which theory of natural kinds 
ought to be adopted. Given such uncertainty, the descriptive claim that some mental 
disorders are natural kinds in the HPC sense of ‘natural kind’ requires further 
commentary. In this section and the next I will clarify what it means to say that a category 
is an HPC kind, as well as attempt to situate HPC kinds amongst the theories of natural 
kinds discussed in chapter 1. In section 3.4 I will address the argument that (some) mental 
disorders are HPC kinds.     
3.2.1 Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds  
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 In chapter 1 I briefly introduced Boyd’s (1989, 1991, 1999a, 1999b) account of 
natural kinds as an alternative to essentialism about natural kinds. For Boyd, while there 
may be properties essential to kinds of chemical elements, there are not (as far as we 
know) properties essential to kinds of species. Yet, according to Boyd it would be hasty to 
conclude from this that the kinds of species that we currently recognize are merely 
invented and have no claim to accurately describing a portion of nature. To be sure, 
members of a particular species do not share some simple, deterministic essence; 
nevertheless, unlike the motley collection of things on my desk or Mill’s category of 
white things, they do have much in common. On Boyd’s view species are “homeostatic 
property cluster” (HPC) kinds in the sense that members of a species imperfectly share 
homeostatically related morphological, behavioral, and physiological features. On this 
view, natural kinds are not groups of entities that have every property in common; rather, 
natural kinds are groups of entities that share stable similarities. What is more, the HPC 
approach supposes that there are causal mechanisms (or “homeostatic causal 
mechanisms”) that are responsible for the similarities apparent among members of a 
particular kind. That is, the underlying mechanisms of a species cause the members of 
that species to have similar features.  1
 Boyd summarizes his view by listing ten features of HPC kinds (ibid., 16-17). I’ve 
further condensed these into seven characteristics below:   
F1) Property Cluster: a cluster of properties that regularly co-occur;  
F2) Homeostatic Mechanism: a mechanism, set of mechanisms, or processes that 
 See, especially, Boyd (1999b), 81. 1
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explains why a cluster of properties regularly occur together;  
F3) Causal Importance: the property cluster together with the homeostatic 
mechanism(s) feature in some theoretically or practically important inductive 
generalization;  
F4) Extensional Vagueness : an HPC kind term t refers to individuals that display the 2
homeostatic clustering of some but not all properties in a property cluster (and some but 
not all of the homeostatic mechanisms associated with the property cluster in question) 
such that it is sometimes unclear whether or not an individual is a member of some kind, 
k;  
F5) Naturalism : HPC kind term definitions are a posteriori, theoretical definitions (as 3
opposed to conceptual, analytic definitions). And, given extensional vagueness, it is often 
difficult to determine theoretically (if at all) which properties belong to the definition of a 
kind term, t;   
F6) Revisability : revising our taxonomy of kinds in order to remedy extensional 4
vagueness would be at the expense of preserving the naturalness (viz. realness) of the 
kind in question; and 
F7) Individuation: HPC kinds are individuated historically, not extensionally.  
 With respect to F1, a property cluster refers to some more or less stable 
phenomenon of interest. In the context of psychiatry, a property cluster may refer to the 
 This feature is intended to summarize Boyd’s (1989, 16-17; 1999, 143-144) features vi and viii, “imperfect 2
homeostasis” and “extensional indeterminacy”, respectively.  
 This feature is intended to summarize Boyd’s (ibid.) features v and vii, “natural definitions” and “a 3
posteriori knowledge”, respectively. 
 This feature corresponds with Boyd’s (ibid.) feature x, which outlines the refinement of natural kind terms. 4
I discuss Boyd’s (ibid.) iv and ix below, as I take these to be summarizations of what HPC kind terms are.  
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“signs and symptoms” of mental disorders. For instance, the phenomenon of major 
depressive disorder is defined as a cluster of symptoms which often co-occur, including 
depressive mood, insomnia or hypersomnia, anhedonia, fatigue, and feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt. Likewise, hallucinations and delusions—common symptoms of 
schizophrenia—regularly occur together (ibid.). 
 F2 is invoked by Boyd in defence of realism about natural kinds. Boyd’s argument 
for realism is abductive. According to Boyd, there exist property clusters that are useful 
for explanation, prediction, and control. The best explanation for these property clusters is 
that there exists something in the natural structure of the world which sustains them—
namely, homeostatic mechanisms. The phrase ‘homeostatic mechanism’ appears to have 
two slightly different implications for Boyd. First, a mechanism is homeostatic if it is able 
to explain the co-occurence of phenomenal properties in the property cluster. Second, a 
mechanism is homeostatic if it maintains a stable cluster of properties by ensuring that 
deviations from the cluster have a low chance of persisting.   5
 F3 is more difficult to interpret. Boyd says that the homeostatic clustering of 
properties in a property cluster is “causally important.” That is, “there are (theoretically or 
practically) important effects which are produced by a conjoint occurrence of (many of) 
the properties in F together with (some or all of) the underlying mechanisms in 
question” (1989, 16; 1999, 143). It is not entirely clear what Boyd intends by this. As 
 It should be noted that, while Boyd often employs the notion “underlying mechanism”, he also allows that 5
a “homeostatic mechanism” might be defined by causal relations among the phenomenal properties 
themselves. Thus a homeostatic mechanism need not be “underlying” or “lower-level.” It might involve 
etiological causes of a property cluster; it might also involve causes at different levels of explanation (for 
instance, evolutionary, genetic, psychological, physiological, behavioral, social, etc). For example, in the 
case of species, the homeostatic mechanisms may be intrinsic (e.g. gene exchange within a population or 
developmental factors) or extrinsic (e.g. a species's evolutionary niche provides common selective factors). 
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Craver (2009, 578) points out, “causally important” may mean either that (i) HPC kinds 
figure in generalizations that are important for our own aims or objectives, or that (ii) the 
property cluster itself is “causally relevant” to something (i.e. it makes some difference). 
The first notion of “causal importance” clearly introduces conventional elements, 
inasmuch as HPC kinds are recognized partly on the basis of whether they are deemed by 
some scientist as “important” phenomena. The second notion of “causal importance” rests 
on the putatively more objective notion of “causal relevance.” An inclusive definition of 
“causal relevance”, however, will certainly recognize more kinds than science will ever 
find useful.  
 I am inclined to side with the first interpretation, for two reasons. First, Boyd 
himself neither introduces nor defends the notion of “causal relevance” here. Second, 
Boyd argues elsewhere (Boyd, 1999a, 148, 157-162) that the recognition of a natural kind 
is “discipline relative.” That is to say, whether or not some kind is deemed “real” consists 
in part on the contribution that that kind-concept makes in accommodating our inductive 
practices to the relevant causal factors that sustain them. The implication of this—with 
respect to classification—is that there is no one unique way to classify some phenomenon 
of interest.  What is more, natural kinds, on this account, can be found both within and 6
outside of scientific practice. Thus our ordinary language category “lily” (a bulbous, 
flowering plant with large trumpet-shaped flowers) is a natural kind category (in the HPC 
sense of ‘natural kind’) even if it does not map onto the botanists’ category “Liliaceae”, 
which also includes onions and garlic. According to Boyd, the term ‘lily’ is useful for 
 Indeed, Boyd agrees with this aspect of Dupré’s (1981) “promiscuous realism”. See ibid., 160-161. 6
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gardeners and horticulturists in achieving particular horticultural and aesthetic aims 
precisely because it is accommodated to causal factors that are relevant to the growing 
and cultivation of such a plant (i.e. the causal factors that serve to sustain the cluster of 
properties—e.g., aesthetic properties—that one is interested in). In any case, I return to 
the notion of ‘accommodation’ in the next section.    
 F4 is introduced to distinguish HPC kinds from essentialist kinds. With respect to 
F4, Boyd (1989) notes that “property cluster definitions” do not provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions; rather, they provide only sufficient conditions (viz. the possession of 
an adequate number of properties) for something to fall within the extension of a term. As 
such, HPC kind terms are characteristically vague and imprecise. An HPC kind term t, 
however, does refer to things that display the homeostatic clustering of most (but not all) 
properties in a property cluster. Thus, for Boyd, HPC kind terms refer to kinds of things 
that are more-or-less stable inasmuch as they share an imperfect homeostasis.  
 F5 is introduced by Boyd to highlight the a posteriori, theoretical nature of HPC 
kind terms. According to Boyd, HPC kinds are indeterminate as a consequence of 
extensional vagueness. Since members of an HPC kinds do not have all of their properties 
in common, it is a difficult theoretical question which properties or homeostatic 
mechanisms belong in the definition of an HPC kind, k. Nevertheless, determining which 
phenomenal and causal properties provide the natural definition for a kind term, t, (if this 
can be determined at all) is an a posteriori, theoretical question, not a conceptual one. 
Contrast this with essentialist definitions, which—at least on one account—are supposed 
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to be analytic even if discovered a posteriori (Cf. Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1975b).  7
 Craver (2009) argues that F6 is susceptible to both a weak and strong reading. The 
strong reading implies that “the correct taxonomy of natural kinds must be immune to 
revision in light of future discoveries about the mechanistic structure of the world” (ibid., 
579). That is to say, a correct taxonomy of natural kinds should reflect the natural 
structure of the world by ignoring causally irrelevant differences between members of a 
kind and recognizing causally relevant differences between members of a kind. The weak 
reading implies that a taxonomy of natural kinds simply recognize “sets of things that are 
similar enough for our explanatory or instrumental projects” (ibid.). For instance, for 
botanists, tomatoes are fruits; for culinarians, tomatoes are vegetables. In short, any 
taxonomy of kinds will depend on which properties one considers to be part of the 
definition of a kind. This, in turn, will depend on the purpose for which the definition 
itself is being used.  
 In my view, both of these interpretations are incorrect. While it is clear that, for 
other reasons, Boyd is committed to the weak reading (a point which I will argue below), 
in this particular passage Boyd is concerned here with naturalism, not regimenting 
classification. These are Boyd’s own words:  
No refinement of usage which replaces t by a significantly less extensionally 
vague term will preserve the naturalness of the kind referred to. Any such 
refinement would either require that we treat as important distinctions which 
 This does not dismiss the likelihood that it is difficult, epistemically speaking, to determine which 7
properties belong in the definition of essentialist kinds such as “water.” The point seems to be—or at least 
this is how I read Boyd—that the ontological nature of HPC kinds makes this determination more difficult. 
After all, a member of an HPC kind differs from each and every other member in some way or another. 
Thus, with regard to HPC kind membership, one must determine which of these differences do or do not 
make a difference. As Boyd puts it: “In such cases, the relative importance of the various properties in F and 
of the various mechanisms in determining whether the thing falls under t—if it can be determined at all—is 
a theoretical rather than a conceptual issue” (Boyd, 1989, 16).   
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are irrelevant to causal explanation or to induction, or that we ignore 
similarities which are important in just these ways (Boyd, 1989, 17; emphasis 
mine).  
Nothing in this passage suggests a normative constraint on taxonomy. The point here 
seems to be that revising our taxonomy of kinds in order to remedy extensional vagueness 
or indeterminacy would be at the expense of preserving the naturalness (viz. realness) of 
the kind in question. 
 This interpretation is made more clear, I think, from Boyd’s discussion of property 
cluster definitions just prior to discussing the characteristics of HPC kinds (see especially 
the final paragraph of ibid., 15). Here Boyd notes that property cluster definitions have 
been defended by the ordinary language philosophical tradition as being perfectly 
appropriate and necessary for ordinary linguistic usage. Boyd, however, thinks that such 
definitions are also appropriate and necessary, mutatis mutandis, for linguistic usage in 
the sciences. The reason for this is that, as he states, “there are a number of scientifically 
important kinds, properties, relations, etc. whose natural definitions are very much like 
the property-cluster definitions postulated by ordinary-language philosophers” (ibid., 15). 
This is particularly evident in the special sciences which study “complex structurally or 
functionally characterized phenomena” (ibid., 16). Boyd uses biological species as the 
paradigm case of HPC kinds throughout his writings (see, for example, ibid., 17-18; 
Boyd, 1991, 142). As a consequence of evolution (specifically, heritable variation), he 
says, members of a species imperfectly share homeostatically-related morphological, 
behavioral, and physiological features. That is, the extension of species terms is 
necessarily indeterminate as there exist populations which are intermediate between two 
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species. Thus, Boyd concludes, to employ only essentialist definitions in order to remedy 
such indeterminacy would be “scientifically inappropriate and misleading” (Boyd, 1989, 
18; see also: Boyd, 1991, 142). 
 Finally, Boyd introduces F7 in an attempt to account for the variability of a kind 
itself. After all, if, over time and space, the property cluster and homeostatic mechanisms 
of a kind change (as F4 and F5 entail), then in what respect is it the same kind? Boyd’s 
answer to this is that HPC kinds are not individuated extensionally but historically. He 
explains this in the context of species: 
[T]he property cluster and homeostatic mechanisms which define a species 
must be individuated non-extensionally as a process-like historical entity. This 
is so because the mechanisms of reproductive isolation which are 
fundamentally definitional for many sexually reproducing species may vary 
significantly over the life of a species. Indeed, it is universally recognized that 
selection for characters which enhance reproductive isolation from related 
species is a significant factor in phyletic evolution, and it is one which 
necessarily alters over time the species’ defining property cluster and 
homeostatic mechanisms (ibid., 18; emphasis mine).  
The point here seems to be that, while a species may vary across time and space, both in 
terms of its “defining property cluster and homeostatic mechanisms”, it is still the same 
species. According to Boyd, this is a necessary feature of HPC kinds in accounting for 
species, since species evolve across time and space.   
3.2.2 HPC Kinds in the Taxonomy of Natural Kinds  
 In the taxonomy of natural kinds Boyd’s HPC view is most often presented as a 
third way between skepticism and essentialism about natural kinds (Boyd, 1989, 1991, 
1999a; Craver, 2009; Griffiths, 1999; Kornblith, 1993). The HPC framework is non-
essentialist inasmuch as it neither restricts natural kinds to kinds defined by internal, 
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microstructural essences (e.g., the atomic structure of gold or the DNA of a particular 
species), nor does it require that each and every member of an HPC kind have all of their 
properties in common. Boyd is also a realist about natural kinds, and distances himself 
from skepticism by maintaining that the property clusters indicative of natural kinds are 
the consequence of similarity-generating (or “homeostatic”) mechanisms in nature, not 
merely the way human beings think about the world. As others have pointed out (Cf. 
Craver, 2009, 578; Griffiths, 1999, 218) homeostatic mechanisms on Boyd’s account are 
supposed to serve the same explanatory purpose as essences do on the traditional account 
(Cf. Boyd, 1999b, 218).  
 In light of what has been said so far, it would seem that a term, for Boyd, denotes 
a natural kind when it picks out a cluster of properties which are held together by one or 
more known casual mechanisms.  Things are not quite so simple, however. As I 8
mentioned earlier (note 6), Boyd also aligns himself with Dupré’s doctrine of 
promiscuous realism, and this presents some difficulty for interpreting the HPC theory of 
natural kinds. As you will recall from chapter 1, the only condition that the promiscuous 
realist places on natural kinds is that individual members of a kind are similar enough for 
our explanatory or instrumental projects. As I argued in chapter 1, however, mere 
similarity is not sufficient for establishing that something is a real as opposed to an 
artificial kind. Individual members of the putative kind depression, for instance, might be 
similar with respect to some of their signs and symptoms, nevertheless differing in some 
more fundamental way (e.g., one individual is reacting to loss whereas another is 
 This rendering of Boyd’s account would also place the HPC theory of natural kinds alongside the simple 8
causal theory described in chapter 1 (see, especially, section 1.4.3). 
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suffering from some brain abnormality). While depression would count as a natural kind 
on Dupré’s account, the assertion that depression is a natural kind would seem to belie 
Boyd’s point that natural kinds are the consequence of similarity-generating (or 
“homeostatic”) mechanisms in nature, as there is no reason at present to think that 
individual members of the putative kind depression are anything more than superficially 
similar.   
 Boyd’s commitment to both realism and pluralism about natural kinds leaves us 
with at least two possible versions of the HPC theory of natural kinds, both of which have 
implications for the ontological status of psychiatric kinds qua HPC kinds and the status 
of the HPC framework as a usefulness model for psychiatric classification. The former, 
stronger reading implies that a correct taxonomy of natural kinds will identify clusters of 
properties which are homeostatically-related. For example, if schizophrenia is an HPC 
kind, then we would expect there to be a causal relationship between the observable 
properties of schizophrenia (e.g., delusions, hallucinations, etc.) and the properties (e.g., 
excess dopamine) which produce them. If, on the other hand, the observable properties of 
schizophrenia turn out to be produced by distinct causal mechanisms in different 
individuals, then a correct taxonomy should recognize that difference. The latter, weaker 
reading implies that a taxonomy of natural kinds which picks out sets of things that are 
similar enough for our explanatory or instrumental projects is sufficient to merit the label 
‘natural’. If schizophrenia is a useful category for clinicians, then there is no need to 
nitpick over the details. It all depends on what one is trying to do.  
 In the next section I argue that Boyd is in fact committed to the weak version of 
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HPC kinds. On Boyd’s view, a category is a natural kind just in case it is accommodated 
to the causal structure of the world in virtue of being accommodated to the inferential 
practices of the researcher. The implication of this for classification is that categories on 
the HPC account are revised in accordance with the instrumental objectives of the 
researcher, first and foremost, and only secondarily to the causal structure of the world. 
This presents a dilemma for philosophers of psychiatry who would commit themselves to 
Boyd’s account of natural kinds. As I intend to argue in section 3.4, the argument that 
paradigmatic mental disorders such as schizophrenia and depression are HPC kinds only 
goes through if we presuppose Boyd’s version of HPC kinds (particularly Boyd’s 
accommodation thesis, which I discuss below). Boyd’s accommodation thesis, however, 
is too weak to serve as an objective arbiter of classification. This conclusion should be 
unpalatable to philosophers of psychiatry who hold both that psychiatric kinds are HPC 
kinds, and that HPC kinds are useful models for psychiatric classification. Far from being 
“useful models for psychiatric classification”, HPC kinds place no constraints whatsoever 
on classification.  
 This consequence of the HPC theory should not be surprising given a close 
reading of Boyd’s account of HPC kinds, however. As we will see in the next section, the 
HPC theory of natural kinds was not developed for the purpose of providing a definition 
of natural kinds to which our classifications ought to aspire—rather, Boyd’s theory is a 
post-hoc explanation of the success of our inductive practices. In particular, Boyd wanted 
to offer an explanation of how some of our concepts can be deemed “natural” despite 
being heterogenous and vague. 
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3.3 Boyd’s Accommodation Thesis  
 Boyd’s accommodation thesis is an aspect of the HPC account that is rarely 
touched upon in the philosophy of psychiatry literature. This is unfortunate, since, as I 
will argue in the following, it is clear that this thesis commits Boyd to the weak reading of 
HPC kinds, and this significantly loosens the prescriptive force of the HPC theory for 
classification. What is more, philosophers of psychiatry who assert that some mental 
disorders are HPC kinds, or that the HPC framework is a useful model for psychiatric 
classification, appear to be implicitly committed to this thesis.  
3.3.1 HPC Kinds and Accommodation  
 A superficial reading of Boyd’s HPC theory of natural kinds would seem to 
suggest that HPC kinds are individuated by the recognition of both a property cluster and 
the homeostatic mechanism(s) which explain the clustering of said properties. This, 
however, is not Boyd’s view. In response to the question, “how are we to tell which of our 
categories are natural kinds?”, Boyd contends that questions concerning the natural kind 
status of our categories reduces to questions about how well our categories are 
accommodated to inductive practices. In defending his “accommodation thesis”, Boyd 
says:  
It is a truism that the philosophical theory of natural kinds is about how 
classificatory schemes come to contribute to the epistemic reliability of 
inductive and explanatory practices. Quine was right in “Natural 
Kinds” (1969) that the theory of natural kinds is about how schemes of 
classification contribute to the formulation and identification of projectible 
hypotheses (in the sense of Goodman 1973). The naturalness of natural kinds 
consists in their aptness for induction and explanation… (Boyd, 1999a, 147; 
emphasis mine).  
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According to Boyd, explanatory and inductive success is the best guide to the naturalness 
of our categories. The best explanation of this success, moreover, is that there is an 
“accommodation between conceptual and classificatory practices and causal 
structures” (Boyd, 1999a, 142). Thus, our categories are “natural” inasmuch as they are 
accommodated to the inferential practices of the researcher, objectives which are assumed 
by Boyd to be accommodated to the causal structure of the world.   
 But in what sense do classificatory schemes “contribute to” the reliability of our 
inductive practices? Boyd has a ready answer for this:  
[W]e are able to identify true generalizations in science and in every-day life 
because we are able to accommodate our inductive practices to the causal 
factors that sustain them. In order to do this—to frame such projectable 
generalizations at all—we require a vocabulary, with terms such as sodium 
salt and flame, which is itself accommodated to relevant causal structures. 
This is the essence of the accommodation thesis regarding theoretical natural 
kinds (ibid., 148; emphasis mine).  
According to Boyd, classificatory schemes “contribute to” the reliability of our inductive 
practices inasmuch as the success of our inductive practices is contingent upon the 
utilization of natural categories—i.e. categories that are accommodated to the causal 
structure of the world. The picture is something like this: in scientific practice we 
postulate a category. Many categories will not be projectable. Indeed, we can postulate 
categories that will not be projectable despite fitting all past data—e.g., grue and bleen 
(Cf. Goodman, 1983). Presumably we revise, or eliminate, such categories. Eventually, 
however, some provisional categories will prove to be successful inasmuch as they allow 
us to make successful predictions. Suppose, for instance, that we begin conducting 
laboratory experiments on samples of a substance that we have provisionally termed 
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‘phosphorus’. In so doing we find that each and every sample of phosphorus reacts 
similarly under similar laboratory conditions. That is, we are able to predict how a sample 
of phosphorus will react when placed under various laboratory conditions. Why are we 
able to make such predictions? According to Boyd, such predictions are possible precisely 
because the term ‘phosphorus’ is accommodated to the causal structure of the world. 
 One must recognize, however, that for Boyd natural kind concepts do not 
themselves provide conditions for individuating a kind. That is to say, we do not know 
that a concept is a natural kind concept because we have some prior idealized definition 
of natural kind that our current concept conforms to. This interpretation would be 
completely at odds with Boyd’s naturalism discussed in the preceding section (see, 
especially, my rendering of Boyd’s F5 and F6). Rather, we know that a concept is a 
natural kind concept when we are able to wield the concept in the service of making 
projectable generalizations. The fact that we are able to make projectable generalizations 
at all is explained by our concepts being accommodated to the causal structure of the 
world.   
 Hence, with respect to our classificatory schemes, we know that we have a natural 
classification when the categories that make up a classification can be put in the service 
of making projectable generalizations. Again, the fact that we are able to make 
projectable generalizations at all is explained by our categories being accommodated to 
the causal structure of the world. In short, Boyd’s HPC kinds are explanatory; they are 
able to explain why a classification is successful, but do not themselves provide the 
resources for individuating kinds.  
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 It follows from Boyd’s accommodation thesis that there are many different ways 
to classify phenomena while still maintaining the “naturalness” of one’s classification. 
Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, Boyd agrees with this aspect of Dupré’s “promiscuous 
realism” (see Boyd, 1999a, 160-161). After all, if one can make projectable 
generalizations using one’s categories, then they are able to do so only insofar as their 
categories are accommodated to causal features of the world. If their categories are 
accommodated to causal features of the world, then they are “natural”. Hence, if one can 
make projectable generalizations using one’s categories, then they are in this sense 
“natural kinds”. 
 Boyd’s accommodation thesis also entails that natural kind classifications are not 
limited to scientific practice, but are central to many ordinary practices. The example 
Boyd uses is our ordinary language category ‘lily’. The category ‘lily’ is a natural kind 
category, even if it does not include onions and garlic (as the the botanists’ category 
‘Liliaceae’ does). According to Boyd, the term ‘lily’ is useful for gardeners and 
horticulturists in achieving particular horticultural and aesthetic aims precisely because it 
is accommodated to causal factors that are relevant to the growing and cultivation of such 
a plant. Likewise, for botanists, tomatoes are fruits; for culinarians, tomatoes are 
vegetables. 
 The accommodation thesis, as far as I can see, is employed by Boyd for the 
purpose of preserving a naturalistic interpretation of some of our scientific and extra-
scientific categories while at the same time avoiding thorny metaphysical questions about 
kindhood. Boyd, it would seem, is sceptical that we can know which similarities do or do 
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not—metaphysically speaking—underpin kinds. This is clear from the explanatory nature 
of HPC kinds and the fact that Boyd maintains that it is often difficult to determine 
theoretically (if at all) which properties belong to the definition of a kind. More 
importantly, however, Boyd agrees with Dupré’s view that our natural kind categories are 
conventional inasmuch as they are relative to the use to which they are put (see, 
especially, Boyd, 1999a, 158-162). As Dupré (1981, 82) argues, there are many 
“sameness relations that serve to distinguish classes”, none of which are privileged. The 
“sameness relations” or “similarities” that serve to underpin a “kind” are ultimately 
contingent on the relevance that that kind-concept has to some inductive or explanatory 
goal.  
3.3.2 Weak and Strong Accommodation 
 The upshot of Boyd’s accommodation thesis regarding natural kinds is that a 
category need not “cut nature at the joints” or reflect the causal structure of the world 
precisely in order to be considered a natural kind. In fact, if we take Boyd’s 
accommodation thesis seriously, the only condition that Boyd places on natural kind-
concepts is that they be projectable. The projectability of a concept, for Boyd, ensures that 
it is connected to to the causal structure of the world in some way. Call this “weak 
accommodation”. 
 Natural kinds as Boyd understands them are a far cry from the definition of 
natural kinds that I’ve been working with thus far. Take, for instance, the kind dementia 
discussed briefly in chapter 1. On Boyd’s account, dementia would be considered a 
natural kind. After all, if an individual is diagnosed with “dementia", then we can fairly 
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confidently predict their general course and prognosis—namely, progressive cognitive 
decline. The category of dementia, in other words, is projectable. Be that as it may, no 
serious scientist would consider dementia a kind unto itself. Individuals members of the 
putative kind dementia are at best superficially similar—they possess no shared causal 
structure that sufficiently explains their shared symptomatology. Indeed, it is now well-
recognized that the term ‘dementia’ is a catch-all for different kinds of diseases which 
affect cognition, such as frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, Huntington’s 
disease, etc.  
 By all accounts the newer concepts of frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer’s 
disease, and Huntington’s disease more accurately reflect the way the world is than the 
nineteenth century concept of dementia. To put this in the context of Boyd’s 
accommodation thesis, the former concepts are strongly accommodated to the causal 
structure of the world (call this “strong accommodation”), whereas the latter concept of 
dementia is at best weakly accommodated. Boyd’s HPC theory of natural kinds, however, 
makes no distinction between weak and strong accommodation, and thus places the 
concept of dementia ontologically on a par with the concepts of frontotemporal dementia, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and Huntington’s disease.  
 This is an unintuitive consequence, one that is particularly problematic for 
philosophers of psychiatry who claim that revising psychiatric kinds in line with the HPC 
framework would be an improvement on current classification. In medicine, at least, 
heterogeneous concepts like dementia are the kinds of concepts that we are trying to 
avoid. To conclude that dementia is a natural kind, and that we should revise our 
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categories in such a way as to reflect natural kinds in this sense, would be would be the 
rough equivalent of concluding that cough disorder is a natural kind, and that our 
classifications of other kinds of disease should resemble that of “cough disorder”. 
 In the next section I contend that, in their attempts to establish that some mental 
disorders are natural kinds in the HPC sense of ‘natural kind’, this is precisely the kind of 
absurd consequence that some philosophers of psychiatry have unwittingly committed 
themselves to.  
3.4 Psychiatric Kinds and Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds                   
 Philosophers of psychiatry generally agree that, as with species, mental disorders 
are not good candidates for the essentialist model of natural kinds (see, especially, 
Kincaid & Sullivan, 2014). According to Kendler et al. (2011), essentialism cannot 
capture the very real, yet complex and “fuzzy” nature of psychiatric disorders. First, 
essentialism entails that a common essence is directly and causally responsible for the 
defining features of a particular psychiatric disorder. While the essentialist model of 
natural kinds may be able to account for static elements such as gold, it is unlikely that 
essentialism can capture the nature of complex biological phenomena. For instance, 
Kendler et al. (2011) argue that “evolving organisms vary too much from one to the 
next...for the concept of an ‘essence’ to be very useful” (ibid., 1144). More specifically, 
many illnesses (including psychiatric illnesses) arise “from a wide range of genetic, 
metabolic, behavioral and environmental risk factors” (ibid), rather than from the single, 
simple causal agent assumed by essentialism. In other words, psychiatric disorders most 
likely have a variety of different causes related to their manifest signs and symptoms.  
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 In light of these considerations, it has become increasingly common for 
philosophers of psychiatry to defend the HPC view of natural kinds as a way of 
conceptualizing and classifying mental disorders. Kendler et al. (2011), for instance, 
contend that psychiatric disorders should be seen as “mechanistic property cluster (MPC) 
kinds”, which are similar to Boyd’s HPC kinds. On this view, psychiatric disorders are 
seen as sharing “stable similarities” both among their clinical features and among their 
underlying mechanisms and etiology. The MPC framework, it is argued, is the preferable 
guide for psychiatric classification, as it provides a way for tying psychiatric 
classification to causes, which would be in line with much of the rest of medicine. 
Similarly, in his dissertation and a series of articles (Tsou, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2016) 
Jonathan Tsou has contended that at least some mental disorders are HPC kinds, and that 
psychiatric classification should classify them as such in order to provide more useful 
diagnostic categories.   
 In the following I show how the argument that paradigmatic mental disorders such 
as schizophrenia and depression are HPC kinds only works if one presupposes Boyd’s 
version of HPC kinds—namely, that the concepts of ‘depression’ and ‘schizophrenia’ are 
weakly rather than strongly accommodated to the causal structure of the world. If this is 
right, then philosophers of psychiatry cannot consistently hold both that psychiatric kinds 
are HPC kinds, and that HPC kinds are useful models for psychiatric classification. First, 
I consider Tsou’s argument for the conclusion that depression and schizophrenia are HPC 
kinds. I then address Kendler et al.’s suggestion that mental disorders ought to be 
conceptualized as MPC kinds.    
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3.4.1 Are Mental Disorders HPC Kinds? 
   Tsou has been the most prominent defender of the view that some mental 
disorders are HPC kinds. In particular, Tsou contends that the neurobiological 
mechanisms that underlie the characteristic signs and symptoms of schizophrenia and 
depression are best able to account for the fact that we can make successful inferences 
about members of these kinds. That is to say, the reason that we can predict the prognosis, 
progression, and treatment response of an individual diagnosed with a particular mental 
disorder is precisely because the signs and symptoms of the disorder in question are 
constituted by stable neurobiological mechanisms. 
 Throughout his writings Tsou is not always clear about whether he has in mind the 
strong or weak version of HPC kinds, which makes interpreting his claim that depression 
and schizophrenia are natural kinds particularly difficult. The argument that depression 
and schizophrenia are HPC kinds in the sense that members of these kinds have a similar 
biological causal structure would seem to presuppose at the very least that members of the 
same HPC kind must have in common important causal properties, which is consistent 
with the strong version of HPC kinds and the general conception of natural kinds 
presented in chapter 1.  In fact, however, in several places Tsou appears to make an even 9
stronger claim. Unlike myself, Tsou considers Hacking’s argument from looping (see 
section 2.2.2) a considerable challenge to the view that mental disorders are natural kinds. 
While Tsou does not doubt that kinds such as depression and schizophrenia are subject to 
 Indeed, Tsou often contrasts natural kinds of mental disorder such as depression and schizophrenia with 9
what he considers to be artificial kinds of mental disorder such as narcissistic personality disorder, hysteria, 
and multiple personality disorder on the basis that research on the latter “consistently fail to yield any 
information on the etiology or causal structure of such classifications” (Tsou, 2008, 63).
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looping effects, he contends that depression and schizophrenia remain stable in spite of 
looping effects—and hence, are natural kinds—because “they are constituted by a set of 
stable biological mechanisms (e.g. neurobiological mechanisms)” (Tsou, 2016, 412).  10
This would seem to imply that—at least as far as mental disorders are concerned—
members of the same natural kind must have a shared biological structure.   
 Nevertheless, Tsou consistently qualifies his claim that some mental disorders are 
natural kinds by invoking Dupré’s doctrine of promiscuous realism or pluralism (Cf. 
Tsou, 2008, 68; 2013, 463; 2016, 410). Specifically, Tsou says that, in line with Dupré’s 
pluralistic approach, he is only articulating “one sense in which some mental disorders 
can be understood as natural kinds” (Tsou, 2008, 68; emphasis mine)—i.e. one sense in 
which members of, say, schizophrenia are “relevantly similar to one another with respect 
to some natural (or ‘real’) properties” (Tsou, 2016, 463). This would seem to imply that 
members of a kind need not have a shared biological structure—or, indeed, a shared 
causal structure at all—to be considered a natural kind. After all, as I have already 
discussed at length, if we adopt Dupré’s pluralistic approach to natural kinds, then it is 
sufficient that members of natural kind have some properties in common, irrespective of 
whether or not they are causal. 
 In light of Tsou’s seeming commitment to different, incompatible versions of 
natural kinds we are left with the following question: are depression and schizophrenia 
 Tsou uses this same argument throughout his writings (Cf. Tsou, 2007; 2008, 74-79; 2013, 462-463). As I 10
pointed out in chapter 2 (secion 2.3), Hacking had already anticipated this objection in his The Social 
Construction of What (1999). Here Hacking concedes to the possibility that in some instances looping 
might only alter the superficial or stereotypical properties of a human kind, leaving the important properties 
unchanged. For instance, Hacking posits that the putative kinds schizophrenia and childhood autism, though 
subject to looping effects, might be natural kinds in the sense that they are ultimately produced by some 
underlying “biological pathology P” (ibid., 119), which itself is supposed to be not subject to looping 
effects.   
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HPC kinds—and hence, natural kinds—in virtue of (i) a shared biological structure, (ii) a 
shared causal structure, or (iii) a shared set of natural properties which are projectable? In 
what follows I argue that Tsou’s claim that depression and schizophrenia are natural kinds 
is only plausible if we assume (iii).  
 With respect to (i), one should first of all be skeptical that having a shared 
biological structure is a necessary condition for a mental disorder to be considered a 
natural kind. As I have already argued in chapter 2, Hacking’s looping effect argument 
does not entail that mental disorders cannot in principle be natural kinds. If this is right, 
then Tsou’s appeal to “stable biological mechanisms”, mechanisms which are assumed 
not to be subject to looping effects, is superfluous, since even properties which are subject 
to looping effects can, in principle, be constitutive of a natural kind. Unless we are 
prepared to argue that biological properties are somehow “more real” or “more natural” 
than, say, psychological, social, or environmental properties , then we cannot a priori 11
discount the possibility that a mental disorder is a natural kind in virtue of its members 
having, for example, a shared psychological causal structure—or, indeed, a shared causal 
structure which includes some combination of chemical, neurological, psychological, 
social, or environment properties.        
 Even if it is not necessary that members of the same natural kind of mental 
disorder share the same biological causal structure, having a shared biological causal 
structure is certainly sufficient for being considered a natural kind in the sense of (ii)—
and, indeed, in the sense described in chapter 1. But what is the shared causal structure of 
 I already tried to dispel this line of argumentation in chapter 1 when discussing microphysical properties 11
(see, especially, section 1.4.3 and note 30 in chapter 1).     
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depression and schizophrenia?   
 According to Tsou, “multiple lines of research”  support the “well-confirmed” 12
hypothesis that the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (viz. delusions and 
hallucinations) are caused by excessive dopamine in the mesolimbic pathway in the brain. 
As well, for Tsou, pharmacological research shows that depression is caused by deficient 
activity of serotonin and norepinephrine (monoamine neurotransmitters). Hence, “mental 
disorders that are MPC kinds, such as schizophrenia and depression, possess a distinctive 
and stable biological causal structure” (Tsou, 2016, 412). This biological structure (or, in 
Boyd’s terminology, ‘homeostatic mechanism’) is able to explain the co-occurring 
properties of schizophrenia, as well as why we are able to make successful predictions 
about individuals who are diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
 As I argued in chapter 2, the ‘monamine hypothesis’ of depression is severely 
underdetermined by evidence. At best, serotonin (and other monamine neurotransmitters) 
are in involved in depression in some way. This, however, is a far cry from Tsou’s claim 
that deficiencies in monamine neurotransmitters explain how it is that depression comes 
about. In fact, most researchers have been forced to admit that older theories of 
depression that merely focus on abnormalities in neurotransmitter systems are far too 
simplistic.   
 Furthermore, when we take into account the broader range of evidence concerning 
the potential causes of depression, it would appear that there are many different ways that 
one might get depressed—i.e. many different causal processes that produce the 
 But mostly pharmacological research on antipsychotics and antidepressants. See, e.g., Tsou, 2008, 84-89; 12
Tsou, 2012; Tsou, 2016, 411-412.      
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phenomenon of “depression” as we currently conceive it. Even if we restrict our analysis 
to the brain—the organ which presumably generates all of our perceptions, actions, 
thoughts, feelings, and emotions—there is at present no evidence that individual instances 
of the putative kind depression share a causal structure. In fact, as I have already argued 
in the previous chapter, there is some evidence to the contrary.      
 Consider also schizophrenia.  Evidence for the dopamine hypothesis of 13
schizophrenia has come from two separate observations. First, the use of drugs that 
increase dopamine levels (e.g., amphetamines, cocaine) can produce some of the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia, such as complex hallucinations and paranoid delusions. This 
is most often referred to in the scientific literature as “amphetamine psychosis”. Second, 
typical antipsychotic medications work by not allowing dopamine to bind to the D2 
dopamine receptor. In particular, medications which successfully block 65-80% of D2 
receptors in the ventral striatum appear to significantly reduce the positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia (Howes et al., 2009).   14
 Yet, only one third of schizophrenic patients respond favourably to antipsychotic 
medication (Cf. Harvey et al., 2007). Recent evidence also suggests that other 
neurotransmitter systems are involved in schizophrenia. Cannabis use, for instance, 
significantly increases the risk of schizophrenia, especially if used in adolescence 
 The five (DSM-5) criteria for schizophrenia are as follows: (1) delusions, (2) hallucinations, (3) 13
disorganized speech (e.g., incoherent speech or “word salad”), (4) grossly disorganized or catatonic 
behavior, (5) negative symptoms (e.g., apathy, avolition, social withdrawal, poverty of speech or thought, 
flat affect, anhedonia). For a diagnosis of schizophrenia, at least two of (1)-(5) need to be present, and at 
least one of these symptoms must be either delusions, hallucination, or disorganized speech. See APA 
(2013, 99).
 Below this level, positive symptoms of schizophrenia tend to persist. Above this level, significant side 14
effects of low dopamine transmission begin to occur—e.g., tremors, dystopias, akathisia, and Parkinsonian 
rigidity. 
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(D’Souza, 2007). Cannabis acts on a distinct neurotransmitter system involving 
cannabinoid receptors, which in turn interact with many other neurotransmitters in the 
brain, not only dopamine. Likewise, some researchers have contended that too little 
glutamate, rather than too much dopamine, can account for both the positive and negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia (Olney & Farber, 1995). 
 Furthermore, as with depression, when we take into account the broader range of 
evidence concerning the potential causes of schizophrenia, it would appear that much 
more is involved than neurotransmitters. Biologically-inclined scientists, for instance, 
have posited more complex neurodevelopmental theories in which schizophrenia is 
conceptualized as a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by abnormal brain 
development Rapoport, Giedd & Gogtay, 2012). These theories have been proposed not 
only in response to the empirical inadequacy of antiquated neurotransmitter theories, but 
also in response to evidence that suggests that schizophrenia is associated with a rapid 
pruning of cortical connections in a widespread set of brain regions such as the anterior 
and dorsal medial temporal lobes (van Haren et al., 2007), reduced hippocampal and 
frontal lobe volumes (Vita et al., 2006), as well as cytoarchitectural abnormalities in 
schizophrenic patients including smaller somas and decreased dendritic spines in 
pyramidal neurons in the prefrontal cortex (Glantz & Lewis, 2000).  
 Most importantly, perhaps, while Tsou assumes schizophrenia to have a stable 
biological basis, it’s not at all clear in what way internal neurobiological mechanisms 
“cause” schizophrenia. For one thing, there is also evidence that environmental factors are 
involved in the development of schizophrenia. For example, the risk of developing 
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schizophrenia is increased by way of maternal infections such as polio, influenza, rubella 
(Brown & Patterson, 2011); maternal stressors such as depression, grief, flood and famine 
(Khashan et al., 2008); and even social factors such as childhood trauma, social isolation, 
living in a city, and belonging to a minority ethnic group (Van Os & Kapur, 2009).    15
 Given this, it is unclear why Tsou thinks that the positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia are “caused by” excessive dopamine. A cursory glance at the scientific 
literature suggests that the potential causes of schizophrenia are much more varied than 
Tsou admits. At most, one can grant that the neurotransmitter dopamine is involved in 
schizophrenia in some way. This is hardly a ringing endorsement for the view that 
excessive dopamine in the mesolimbic pathway is a “homeostatic” mechanism which 
sustains the clustering of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. 
 Does this entail that schizophrenia is not an HPC kind? Not necessarily. As I have 
already said, if by HPC kind we mean that members of a kind (iii) share a set of natural 
properties which are projectable, then schizophrenia is most certainly a natural kind in 
Boyd’s weak HPC sense of ‘natural kind’. Consider the following argument: 
P1. The DSM category schizophrenia allows us to make projectable generalizations. 
P2. The best explanation for this is that the category ‘schizophrenia’ is accommodated to 
the causal structure of the world. 
P3/C1. Therefore (by abduction), the concept ‘schizophrenia’ is accommodated to the 
causal structure of the world [by P1 & P2].  
P4. HPC kinds, according to Boyd, are natural kinds inasmuch as they are accommodated 
to the causal structure of the world.   
P5/C2. Therefore, the DSM kind schizophrenia is a natural kind in the HPC sense of 
‘natural kind’.   
As you will recall from chapter 1, a category is “projectable” just in case it allows us to 
 See also van Os, Kenis & Rutten (2010) for a review of evidence concerning environmental factors and 15
schizophrenia. 
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make reliable inductive inferences. Hence, insofar as the category schizophrenia allows 
us to make reliable inductive inferences, it is a natural kind. Although the term ‘reliable’ 
is left undefined by Boyd (as well as other philosophers who take projectability to be an 
epistemic marker of a natural kind), I take “reliable inductive inference” here to mean that 
we can predict with greater than chance probability some fact about members of the 
category in question. For example, the fact that we can predict with greater than chance 
probability that any given schizophrenic will experience auditory hallucinations (in fact, 
the number is somewhere around 70% of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia; see 
Andreason & Flaum, 1991) entails that schizophrenia is a natural kind. 
 Be that as it may, it is crucial to recognize how easy it is for a category to fulfill 
this condition. As we have just seen, schizophrenia can be considered a natural kind in the 
foregoing sense even in the absence of knowledge of its causes. Substitute any other 
DSM category for schizophrenia and what you have is the basis for an argument that 
could be used to defend the view that any mental disorder is a natural kind. This is an 
unintuitive consequence. According to critics of the DSM—including Tsou himself—
most psychiatric categories are too heterogeneous and thus unlikely to inform precise 
diagnoses and treatments of mental disorders. What is more, it is assumed that current 
psychiatric categories are too heterogenous precisely because they ignore causal 
properties in favour of superficial properties, such as signs and symptoms. Given this, it 
would seem that the HPC theory of natural kinds is not a useful model for classification 
after all: 
P6. Members of an HPC kind share a set of natural properties which are projectable, but 
an HPC kind is heterogeneous in the sense that members may differ significantly both in 
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their superficial and causal properties.  
P7. According to critics of the DSM, DSM kinds (including schizophrenia) are too 
heterogeneous in the sense that members differ significantly both in their superficial and 
causal properties.  
C3. Therefore, conceptualizing mental disorders as natural kinds in the HPC sense of 
‘natural kind’ will be of no help in revising current mental disorder categories, if such 
revisions are meant to pick out more homogenous kinds [by C2 & P6, P7]. 
 This leaves us in a bit of a quandary. If we loosen our definition of natural kinds to 
include categories which are merely projectable, then the assertion that mental disorder x 
is a natural kind is rather empty, amounting to little more than a rhetorical strategy—
giving “fancy names to old things”. If, on the other hand, we insist that members or 
instances of a natural kind share a common causal structure, then the assertion that mental 
disorder x is a natural kind is descriptively false, since there is not enough evidence at 
present to know whether this condition is met (as I have argued both here and in the 
previous chapter).  
 As well, in order for the prescriptive claim that psychiatric kinds ought to reflect 
natural kinds to be meaningful at all, it would seem that we must presuppose at the very 
least that members or instances of a natural kind share a causal structure, requiring us to 
jettison the conclusion that paradigmatic mental disorders such as depression and 
schizophrenia are natural kinds. 
3.4.2 Are Mental Disorders MPC Kinds?  
 Although Tsou often equivocates between different, incompatible definitions of 
“natural kind”, the pervading assumption in his writings is that mental disorders are HPC 
kinds—and hence, natural kinds—in virtue of having a shared biological structure. In 
contrast to this view, Kendler, Zachar, and Craver (2011) have argued that mental 
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disorders are “mechanistic property cluster (MPC) kinds”—and hence, natural kinds—in 
virtue of being produced by “stable patterns of complex interaction between behavior, 
environment and physiology that have arisen through development, evolution and 
interaction with the environment” (Kendler et al., 1147). Psychiatric disorders, on this 
view, are defined by stable similarities among properties of mind/brain states, including 
interactions between “genes, cell receptors, neural systems, psychological states, 
environmental inputs and social–cultural variables” (ibid).   
 MPC kinds are similar to HPC kinds inasmuch as they posit mechanisms that 
ensure that certain properties are instantiated together. Kender et al. (2011) are not 
explicit about which of Boyd’s F1-F7 they are committed to. Nevertheless, the following 
three passages are informative:  
Property clusters do not have simple, deterministic essences. Not all members 
need overlap in some single set of traits; rather, members are clustered near 
one another in a feature space because of developmental, evolutionary and 
physiological causal mechanisms and constraints (ibid., 1146; emphasis 
mine). 
The ‘kind-ness’ of species is not, from an MPC perspective, produced by a 
defining essence but rather from more or less stable patterns of complex 
interaction between behavior, environment and physiology that have arisen 
through development, evolution and interaction with an environment. It is this 
often complex and intertwined mechanism that produces the imperfectly 
shared characteristics of the members of a species. Such kinds are more 
heterogeneous than elements in a periodic table. Unlike all atoms of gold, 
individual members of a species need not share all their properties. Across 
the range of a species, some systematic differences may arise in 
subpopulations in coloration, body weight or food preference. Hybrids can 
also occur. However, the fuzziness of these boundaries does not detract from 
their stability (ibid., 1146-7; emphasis mine). 
Members of MPC kinds are not similar merely in their superficial properties 
(like all the things in refrigerators), but because the co-occurrence of these 
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properties from individual to individual is explained by causal mechanisms 
that regularly ensure these properties are instantiated together. Indeed, MPC 
kinds are useful for prediction, explanation and control precisely because the 
kinds are sustained by causal mechanisms. Such clusters allow us to make 
projective inferences about the past, present and future on the basis of an 
item’s membership in a kind (ibid., 1147; emphasis mine).  
The first and third passages commit Kendler et al. (2011) to Boyd’s F1 and F2. While 
Kendler et al. employ the phrase ‘mechanistic property clusters’ rather than ‘homeostatic 
property clusters’, the implication is the same: property clusters are explained by the 
mechanisms which produce them.  
 The second passage entails Boyd’s F4. As Kendler et al. note, the boundaries of an 
MPC kind are “fuzzy”; members of an MPC kind “imperfectly share” characteristics; and 
MPC kinds are “heterogeneous.” In other words, members of an MPC kinds have some 
but not all of their properties in common (extensional vagueness). As such, it will not 
always be clear whether or not some thing is member of some kind, k (indeterminacy). 
Kender at al. later describe the fuzzy or heterogeneous nature of MPC kinds by making 
reference to their prototypical structure (see ibid., 1148). According to Kendler et al., one 
can expect a wide range of members of a kind such that there are members of a “central”, 
“large” (the terms ‘central’ and ‘large’ are left vague and indeterminate on their account) 
group who share most of the characteristics of a kind (such as the putative kind 
“schizophrenia”), and members of outlying groups who share less of the features of the 
kind in question.  
 Kender et al. do little to address the other features of Boyd’s account or his 
accommodation thesis. This is unfortunate, since it is not clear from their description of 
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MPC kinds whether they think that psychiatric categories are, or ought to be, weakly or 
strongly accommodated to the causal structure of the world. For instance, the passages 
just quoted would seem to imply the strong view—namely, that MPC kinds are natural 
kinds in virtue of members sharing a causal structure, albeit complex. Nevertheless, 
Kendler et al. also allow that “the same cluster of symptoms might arise from different 
etiological, underlying or sustaining mechanisms in different cases” (ibid., 1148). This 
would seem to imply that members of the same MPC kind need not share a causal 
structure after all.  
 Yet, if MPC kinds are just as heterogeneous as DSM kinds, then it is unclear in 
what way MPC concepts are more useful for classification than their DSM counterparts. 
Indeed, the inference from ‘mental disorders are MPC kinds’ to ‘classifying mental 
disorders as MPC kinds will provide more useful diagnostic categories’ is a non sequitur; 
it is based on the false assumption that MPC kinds are less heterogenous than DSM 
categories. What is more, the paradigm examples of MPC kinds given by Kendler et al. 
(and, indeed, Tsou) are all examples of heterogeneous DSM kinds, which makes this 
argument all the more perplexing.  
3.4.3 Summary 
 In the foregoing I have argued that paradigmatic mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia and depression are HPC kinds only works if one presupposes Boyd’s 
version of HPC kinds—namely, that the concepts of ‘depression’ and ‘schizophrenia’ are 
weakly rather than strongly accommodated to the causal structure of the world. Boyd’s 
weak accommodation thesis, however, is too weak to serve as an objective arbiter of 
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psychiatric classification, since it permits significant heterogeneity both at the level 
phenomenal and causal properties. It would seem, then, that if philosophers would like to 
maintain that HPC kinds are “useful models for psychiatric classification”, they must 
commit themselves to a stronger view of natural kinds.     
3.5 The Reality of Mental Disorders 
 In chapter 1 (section 1.4.1) I drew a distinction between Mill’s understanding of 
natural kinds and that of Russell, Quine, and Dupré. The latter authors, I suggested, 
understand natural kinds to be merely rough-and-ready categories which collect together 
individuals who are loosely similar. Quine, for instance, thinks that natural kind 
categories are grounded on intuitive or innate judgements of similarity, and will be 
replaced in the course of scientific inquiry. Conversely, for most natural kinds realists, 
natural kinds are clusters of properties which cluster together because they have a 
common causal structure. As Khalidi (2013, 46) has argued, natural kinds are the kinds of 
categories that come at the end of scientific inquiry, not the beginning. 
 In my mind, current kinds of mental disorder are at best the kinds of categories 
that come in the middle of scientific inquiry. As I have suggested both here and in the 
previous chapter, individuals who are diagnosed with a DSM mental disorder are similar 
in many respects. For instance, individuals diagnosed with depression often have most of 
their observable properties in common (see section 2.3.1). What is more, many DSM 
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categories are projectable in the sense that they enjoy moderate predictive success.  In 16
light of this, psychiatric kinds are undoubtedly more “real” or “natural” than Mill’s class 
of white things, postal codes, telephone area codes, and the like. Be that as it may, they 
are not on a par with chemical kinds, biological species, and many kinds of physical and 
neurological disease. The reason for this is not, as is commonly misunderstood, that they 
have no essence (Cf. Zachar, 2002; 2014) or underlying biological cause (see section 
3.4.1 above).  The reason for this is simply that they do not (so far as we know) have 17
unobservable causal structure which explains why the observable properties appear to co-
occur. 
 In light of what has been said, it is best to think of kinds of mental disorder as 
both “hypothetical constructs” and “useful heuristics”. By “useful heuristic” I mean that 
psychiatric categories provide us stable “objects” to observe and study, and in some 
instances might even be both construct valid or predictively valid (see note 16). Be that as 
it may, they remain “hypothetical constructs” rather than “real kinds” because there is at 
present no convincing evidence to suggest that the observable properties of kinds of 
mental disorder are held together by an unobservable causal base.  
 Scientists often distinguish between construct validity and predictive validity to describe psychiatric 16
categories. Traditionally, the requirement for a psychiatric concept to be considered “construct valid” is that 
either the observable features of the kind-concept are empirically inter-correlated (i.e., they constitute a 
“syndrome”) or that there is a well-established theoretical framework within which the concept is 
embedded. The requirement for a concept to be considered “predictively valid” is that it should enjoy 
predictive success (e.g., predicting that schizophrenia runs in families or that schizophrenia is responsive to 
certain sorts of treatments). In my mind, even if a psychiatric concept meets the requirements for both 
construct and predictive validity, this does not imply that it is a natural kind. First, the fact that the 
observable features of a kind are empirically inter-correlated does not necessarily imply that they cluster or 
“hang together” because they have a similar causal structure. Second, as I outlined in section 1.5, a kind-
concept can enjoy predictive success without reflecting a real kind in nature. If this is right, then concepts 
such as ‘schizophrenia’ might be both construct valid and predictively valid and still not “natural” or “real” 
in the sense described in chapter 1—though, others have argued that they don’t not even meet these 
requirements. Cf. Poland (2004).  
 See also section 2.3.3. 17
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 As we will see in the next chapter, from a historical standpoint it is clear that 
psychiatric categories were constructed not on the basis of established theoretical 
knowledge of their causal nature, but, rather, in accordance with the hope that, in dividing 
the psychiatric domain in this way, the true causal nature of mental disorders would be 
discovered.   
3.6. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have conceded that mental disorders are natural kinds in Boyd’s 
weak sense of ‘natural kind’. Be that as it may, it is difficult to imagine that this is what 
philosophers of psychiatry have in mind when they assert that psychiatric classifications 
ought to be revised so as to reflect natural kinds. For instance, both Kendler at al. and 
Tsou assume that the DSM has failed as a medical classification system precisely because 
it is not a causally-based classification (see, for example, Kendler at al., 2011, 1143 and 
Tsou, 2016, 406). The HPC view of natural kinds, however, does not require that 
categories be individuated according to their causes; at most it requires that a category be 
accommodated to the causal structure of the world in virtue of being accommodated to the 
inferential practices of the researcher. 
 It would seem, then, that when philosophers of psychiatry say that psychiatric 
classifications ought to classify natural kinds, what they really mean to say is that 
psychiatric classifications ought to classify HPC kinds in the strong sense of ‘HPC kind’, 
which is consistent with the view of natural kinds discussed in chapter 1. As I have argued 
throughout this dissertation, there is no reason to think that current psychiatric categories 
are natural kinds in this sense. This, however, is not to say that psychiatric classification 
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cannot in principle be revised so as to reflect the causal structure of the world. The next 
chapter will be devoted to whether or not this normative ideal of scientific classification is 
plausible. 
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CHAPTER 4  
Psychiatric Kinds and Natural Classification 
  
[H]owever we devise [a diagnostic schema] we realize that it cannot work; that we can 
only make temporary and arbitrary classifications; that there are a number of different 
possibilities which account for the fact that different workers construct entirely different 
schemata; and that classification is always contradictory in theory and never quite squares 
with the facts. Why then do we keep on making this vain attempt?  
— Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, 1959, 604. 
4.1 Introduction  
 Thus far I have been asking the question “Are mental disorders natural kinds?” I 
have argued that nothing in principle prevents mental disorders from being natural kinds. 
It’s just that, at the present moment, there is no strong evidence to support the view that 
current psychiatric kinds are natural kinds. A question that I have not yet addressed, 
however, is whether or not it is plausible to expect that our psychiatric categories will 
come to reflect natural kinds. Is this normative ideal an appropriate or useful goal for 
psychiatry, or should we abandon it altogether?  
 When philosophers suggest that our psychiatric categories ought to reflect natural 
kinds they presuppose a picture of the world in which the properties of kinds of mental 
disorder cluster together in ways that are useful for psychiatric classification. They also 
presuppose that by consulting our best theories about the world we can know which 
clusters are real and which are bogus.  
 In this chapter I aim to cast doubt on these assumptions. First, I argue that the idea 
that our best theories about the world are a reliable guide to which psychiatric kinds exist 
and which don’t is historically false. In fact, the evolution of the ‘schizophrenia’ concept 
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suggests that schizophrenia is a kind in search of a theory, not a kind firmly established 
by theory. Our best theories of schizophrenia are not guides to whether or not 
schizophrenia is real or bogus. Quite the contrary. In theorizing about schizophrenia one 
presupposes the existence of the very thing they are attempting to theorize about.   
 Second, I challenge the assumption that kinds of mental disorder do indeed cluster 
together in in ways that are useful for psychiatric classification. In psychiatry, presumably 
our ultimate goal is to treat those individuals who suffer from problems which are 
psychopathological in nature. I contend that the phenomenologically and causally 
complex nature of psychopathological phenomena makes the traditional approach of 
dividing up the psychopathological domain by postulating hypothetical constructs 
impractical for these purposes.       
 In light of the above considerations I conclude that the normative ideal of natural 
classification—i.e. classifying real or natural kinds in the sense described in chapter 1—is 
not appropriate as a general strategy for psychiatry. In the conclusion to this dissertation I 
propose an alternative way forward. Rather than assuming a priori that there are indeed 
real kinds of mental disorder that cluster together, and expending our energy on 
establishing their reality, a more tractable and theoretically promising approach would be 
to first explain how particular kinds of experiences and behaviours—e.g, hallucinations, 
delusions, disorganized thinking, mania, low mood, etc.—are produced. In short, 
classification should be secondary, not primary, to psychiatric research.  
4.2 The Origin of Schizophrenia 
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 Psychiatrist and prominent schizophrenia researcher Nancy Andreason once said 
that to be ahistorical is “to lack the capacity the see things within the context of the broad 
sweep of time” (Andreason, 1994, 1405). In the context of surveying changing definitions 
of ‘schizophrenia’ she describes the ahistorical fallacy in the following way:  
The Ahistorical Fallacy rests on three faulty assumptions. The first 
assumption is that “proposition X must be true because it is what the ‘experts’ 
are teaching”. The second assumption is that “proposition X must be true 
because it is the most recent one to be put forth”. The third assumption, which 
buttresses the first two, is that “if information increases, knowledge increases 
as well” (ibid.; emphasis in original).    
Realists about natural kinds suggest that the only way to know whether or not a kind is 
“real” or “natural” is to consult our best theories about the world (Cf. Khalidi, 2013, 2; 
Kornblith, 1993, chapter 3).  This may very well be true. This does not imply, however, 1
that our best theories of the world inevitably, and as a matter of course, furnish us with 
real kinds. As we have already seen (see chapter 3), philosophers who argue that kinds of 
mental disorder, such as schizophrenia and depression, are natural kinds are often content 
to defer to the experts. In doing so they presuppose the existence of the very thing they 
are attempting to describe, and often assent to theories of mental disorders that are either 
simplistic or plainly false. In short, they have fallen prey to the ahistorical fallacy, 
assuming that the kinds that we currently recognize, as well as our theories about them, 
are reliable guides to the existence of real kinds of mental disorder. What I have to say 
about schizophrenia in this chapter should disabuse us of this notion.  
4.2.1 The Schizophrenia Concept 
 As so Khalidi continues: “[I]t is not that our best theories and settled knowledge actually determine which 1
kinds exist, but rather that they serve as our best guide to the existence of the kinds of things in the 
world” (ibid.; emphasis in original).
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 If schizophrenia is a natural kind, then we would expect that, as a matter of 
historical fact, the concept would have been progressively refined over time so as to more 
closely reflect the real structure of the world. According to one hypothesis—call it the 
“continuity hypothesis” —this is indeed the case. Our current concept of ‘schizophrenia’ 2
began with partial descriptions in the early to late nineteenth century. Haslam (1809) 
observed a schizophrenia-like presentation in young persons, with chronic delusions and 
hallucinations accompanied by disorganized thinking.  In the middle of the nineteenth 3
century Morel (1860, 516, 566) coined the term ‘démence précoce’, meant to describe 
cases of cognitive deficit in early adolescence. During the late nineteenth century 
Kahlbaum (1874) observed patients who had marked psychomotor disturbances, 
including mutism, negativism (no response to instructions or external stimuli), 
stereotypies (frequent and repetitive movements), catalepsy (muscular rigidity and fixity 
of posture), waxy flexibility (resistant to being moved), and verbigeration (very fast and 
incomprehensible speech). He called this clinical presentation “catatonia”. And, finally, 
during the same decade Hecker (1871) coined the term ‘hebephrenia’, which meant to 
capture an illness affecting young persons who presented with feelings of sadness, 
delusions, bizarre behaviour, a tendency to laugh and tell silly jokes. 
 It was left to Kraepelin at the end of the nineteenth century to integrate these 
partial, incomplete clinical descriptions under a single nosological entity termed 
 I borrow this phrase from Berrios (2003, 113). Shorter’s (1997, 99-109) description of Kraepelin’s 2
classificatory revolution, and his (unsubstantiated) derision of other contemporary research programs, is a 
fitting example of the continuity hypothesis. 
 The most famous case is that of James Tilly Mathews, described by John Haslam (Cf. Haslam, 1809, 3
49-51, 64-67). According to historian Edward Shorter (1997, 62-63), Phillipe Pinel also described a similar 
case (Cf. Pinel, 1809, 182). 
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‘dementia praecox’.  In the sixth edition of his Psychiatrie Kraepelin (1899a) brings 4
together Kaulbaum’s catatonia, Hecker’s hebephrenia, and his own “dementia 
paranoides”, in which delusions and hallucinations were prominent. According to the 
continuity hypothesis, Kraepelin’s new “dementia praecox” was superior to previous 
nosological entities since it was based on pure empirical observation. Kraepelin recorded 
thousands of case histories on special cards, followed his patients up, analyzed the data, 
and was led to the inexorable conclusion that catatonia, hebephrenia, and paranoid 
dementia were really different aspects of one kind of disease, and that dementia praecox 
was also separable from manic-depressive insanity  on the basis of differences in course, 5
outcome, and symptoms.  
 The origin story of the ‘schizophrenia’ concept ends with the publication of DSM-
III in 1980. After an all too long hiatus, whereby the concept was used inconsistently 
amongst researchers and clinicians (because of the undue influence of Bleuer, Meyer, and 
psychoanalysis on American psychiatry), Kraepelin was rediscovered. While DSM-III 
opts for Bleuer’s (1908) term ‘schizophrenia’ instead of ‘dementia praecox’, the 
 As Berrios (2003, 117, 128) suggests, Kraepelin might have taken the phrase from Arnold Pick, who in 4
1891 suggested that dementia in young people should be called “dementia praecox.” 
 In the early 1850s Pierre Falret and Jules Baillarger observed that mania and depression were not isolated 5
symptoms, but often alternated over the course of a person’s life, which they called “circular insanity” (Cf. 
Sedler, 1983). Kraepelin (1899a) re-baptized this and other so-called affective disorders as “manic-
depressive illness”. See section 4.5.1 below. 
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nosological entity itself largely resembled Kraepelin’s , and still does to this day. Included 6
are the subtypes disorganized (hebephrenia), catatonic, and paranoid. And emphasis is 
placed on course (at least 6 months duration and deterioration from previous levels of 
functioning).  7
4.2.2 Kraepelin’s Recantation 
 Is the continuity hypothesis supported by historical evidence? It is true that the 
concept of ‘dementia praecox’ was a consequence of empirical observations. Kraepelin, 
for instance, took great pains to record longitudinal observations of a large number of 
clinical cases. These empirical observations, however, were not “pure”. While it has been 
argued elsewhere that the observations Kraepelin recorded on his cards contained 
insufficient information to draw any statistical conclusions (Weber & Engstrom, 1997) , it 8
is more important to recognize that the putative kind dementia praecox was only plausible 
at the time if one already had preconceived notions about its nature. Kraepelin himself 
recognized that the phrase ‘dementia praecox’ encapsulated diverse clinical 
 See APA (1980, 181-193; 1994, 273-290; 2013, 99-105). Our current ‘schizophrenia’ concept was also 6
influenced by Schneider’s (1950) first-rank symptoms, which were first incorporated in the Research 
Diagnostic Criteria (RDC), a prelude to DSM-III (Cf. Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, 1978). Schneider took his 
first-rank symptoms to be decisive in the diagnosis of schizophrenia. They included: audible thoughts; 
voices arguing about, or discussing, the patient; voices commenting on the patient’s actions; experiences of 
influences on the body; thought withdrawal and other interference with thought; thought broadcast 
(diffusion of thought); delusional perception; and other experiences involving “made” impulses and feelings 
experienced as caused by an outside agency. As Jablensky (2010) notes, the International Classification of 
Mental and Behavioural Disorders (ICD-10) places much greater emphasis than the DSM on Schneider’s 
first-rank symptoms (particularly in allowing for a diagnosis of schizophrenia when only one of Schneider’s 
first-rank symptoms is present for at least a month), though both classification systems are in essence 
Kraepelinean.
 In the most recent version, DSM-5, the subtypes are dropped, but the same catatonic, hebephrenic, and 7
paranoid delusional symptoms remain. DSM-III-DSM-5 do not strictly require a progressively deteriorating 
course, but do require a “deterioration from previous levels of functioning”, and schizophrenia is 
distinguished from schizophreniform disorder and brief psychotic disorder principally on the basis of 
duration of symptoms (1 month but less that 6 months for the former, and 1 day but less than 1 month for 
the latter).
 But see Jablensky (1999) for a defence of Kraepelin’s statistical conclusions. 8
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presentations ; yet, on the basis that they all had a similar course (a general loss of mental 9
efficiency and loss of control over volitional action), he maintained that they were 
fundamentally the same disorders (Kraepelin, 1899a, 103; 1899b). But why assume that 
course was indicative of a real kind of disorder and not pathognomonic symptoms, which 
was largely the default approach at the time? As it happens, Kraepelin was much taken by 
the idea, popular in biological taxonomy, that natural kinds could properly be identified 
by close analysis of their natural history (Cf. Berrios & Hauser, 1988; Berrios, 2003; 
Jablensky et al., 1992). For Kraepelin, natural kinds of diseases were assumed to be 
biological and evolutionary in origin, having a predictable course resulting in atavistic 
behaviors.    10
 Not everyone was convinced by Kraepelin, however. Carl Wernicke (1906) 
observed cases of hebephrenia in puberty which resolved over time, leaving one’s mind 
intact. Bleuler (1911) also believed there to be cases which did not evolve into a terminal 
state of deterioration, and spoke instead of a “group of schizophrenias”, rather than the 
 In fact, in successive editions of his Psychiatrie, Kraepelin broadened the category to include nine clinical 9
forms. Alongside catatonia, hebephrenia, and paranoid dementia, Kraepelin added: dementia praecox 
simplex (general decline in many psychological capacities), depressive dementia praecox (depression 
followed by slowly progressive cognitive decline, avolition, and sometimes delusions), circular dementia 
praecox (prodromal depression followed by gradual auditory hallucinations, delusions, fluctuations of mood 
and impulsivity), agitated dementia praecox (acute onset, perplexity or exaltation, multimodal 
hallucinations, fantastic delusions), schizophasia (prominent deterioration of expression in speech, with 
little impairment otherwise). Cf. Kraepelin (1909).  
 Degeneration theory (the idea that a hereditary taint could lead to the devolution of an organism from a 10
complex to a simple, less differentiated form) and Faculty psychology (the idea that there are three 
separable mental functions—the intellectual, emotional, and volitional) served as influential conceptual 
frameworks in the nineteenth century. As Berrios (2003) notes, the former likely influenced the ‘dementia 
praecox’ concept, and the latter the distinction between dementia praecox (intellectual insanity), manic-
depression (emotional insanity), and psychopathic/antisocial personality (volitional insanity). See also: 
Berrios and Hauser (1988). 
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all-encompassing “dementia praecox” . Most importantly, both Bleuler and Wernicke did 11
not assent to Kraepelin’s a priori assumption that dementia praecox was a degenerative 
disease affecting the brain. Both believed dementia praecox to be fundamentally a 
dysconnection syndrome. Bleuler, for instance, hypothesized that schizophrenia is a 
consequence of a “splitting of different psychic functions” (ibid., 1911, 5).  By “splitting 12
of different psychic functions” Bleuler meant that there is a disintegration of different 
mental functions (particularly the functions of intellect and emotion) which resulted in the 
loose associations observed in schizophrenia. Wernicke too  hypothesized that 
schizophrenia-like presentations (Wernicke died in 1905 before the term ‘schizophrenia’ 
ever appeared) are a result of the interruption (“sejunction”) of associative connections in 
the brain (Cf. Wernicke, 1900). The principal difference between Bleuler and Wernicke is 
that the former conceived of dysconnection in a functional sense, whereas the latter 
conceived of dysconnection in an anatomical sense.  13
 Towards the end of his career Kraepelin all but recanted his earlier view that 
dementia praecox could be reliably distinguished from other kinds of mental illness. For 
 Bleuler did not believe schizophrenia to be a disease per se, but rather a group of diseases. As Shorter 11
(1997, 107) has noted, even a quarter of Kraepelin’s own patients recovered, so it is likely that Kraepelin 
was aware of this issue. Interestingly, when Kraepelin first described dementia praecox in 1896 he believed 
it to be distinct from catatonia and paranoid dementia, and closer to Hecker’s hebephrenia. It wasn’t until 
1899 that Kraepelin decided to group catatonia, paranoid dementia, and hebephrenia under the broader 
category ‘dementia praecox’. 
 In fact, the etymology of schizophrenia from Greek is skhizein (“to split”) and phren (“mind”). Bleuler 12
introduced the term ‘schizophrenia’ to replace ‘dementia praecox’ because he believed the splitting of 
psychic functions to be one of the most important features, and he thought that ‘dementia praecox’ had 
fatalistic undertones, since it was taken by many to mean dementia affecting young people. Cf. Bleuler 
(1911). 
 Indeed, a version of the dysconnection hypothesis was resurrected in 1993 (Cf. Friston and Frith, 1995; 13
Weinberger, 1993) and is still alive and well (Cf. Friston et al., 2016).  
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instance, of the distinction between dementia praecox and mental manic-depressive 
illness, Kraepelin states:  
[I]t it is becoming increasingly obvious that we cannot satisfactorily 
distinguish these two diseases…it is conceivable that there may be an overlap 
in the clinical signs which are normally observed in schizophrenia and manic-
depressive psychosis…It is an everyday experience that manic and depressive 
features can occur transiently in frank schizophrenic illnesses (Kraepelin, 
1920/1992, 527-528). 
Although Kraepelin was reluctant to give up on the idea that dementia praecox is a 
degenerative brain disease , he grants that “schizophrenic symptomatology is in no way 14
confined to dementia praecox” (ibid., 523).  As evidence, he cites the fact that 15
schizophrenic manifestations are comparable to some of the behaviours and experiences 
found in children and in dream states, which are clearly not a consequence of progressive 
brain atrophy.    
 In the end, Kraepelin conjectures that there might be three broad forms of mental 
illness (affective, schizophrenic, and encephalopathic) in which there is a continuum 
between more and less severe forms (based on the extent of brain damage), but 
nevertheless a significant overlap in symptomatology. According to this picture, 
“affective illnesses” are largely psychogenic in origin, having no identifiable brain 
 For example, after admitting that we cannot reliably distinguish between dementia praecox and manic-14
depressive illness, he says: “In any case, we cannot help but maintain that the two disease processes 
themselves are distinct. On the one hand we find those patients with irreversible dementia and severe 
cortical lesions. On the other are those patients whose personality remains intact. This distinction is too 
overwhelming for us to accept much overlap between the two groups, particularly as we can often predict 
the course of the two from the clinical signs” (ibid., 527-528). Indeed, throughout this essay it is clear that 
Kraepelin has not shaken off the influence of degeneration theory (see note 10), frequently conceptualizing 
mental illness, including schizophrenia, as “vestiges of earlier stages of evolution”, in which animal-like (or 
child-like) instinctual mechanisms have not been “subjugated to more sophisticated mechanisms” (ibid., 
522). 
 It is crucial to note that Kraepelin uses the terms ‘dementia praecox’ and ‘schizophrenia’ separately 15
throughout this essay, suggesting that he still believed dementia praecox to be but one type of Bleuler’s new 
diagnostic entity “schizophrenia”.    
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damage, whereas “encephalopathic illnesses” include diseases with clearly identifiable 
brain damage, such as neurosyphilis and encephalitis, and “schizophrenic illnesses” fall 
somewhere in between these two extremes.   
4.2.3 Conclusion: The Fallout 
 The assumption that the course and prognosis of a disorder was indicative of real 
kinds of disease was understandable at the time Kraepelin was writing given the 
widespread influence of degeneration theory (see note 10), and the success in identifying 
distinct pathological processes in the cases of general paresis of the insane (tertiary 
syphilis) and, later, Alzheimer’s disease. Such exceptions notwithstanding, this 
conceptual framework has not been successfully applied to schizophrenia. To date, no one 
has been able to point to a pathological disease process specific to schizophrenia. And, in 
fact, the belief that individuals with schizophrenia get progressively worse appears to be a 
myth (Cf. Zipursky & Abid, 2015). Yet, as numerous authors have pointed out (Cf. 
Berrios & Hauser, 1988; Jablensky, 2007), we still live in a Kraepelinian world. Our 
category of schizophrenia today is, for all intents and purposes, the same one Kraepelin 
proposed in 1899 (see note 6 and note 7).   
 The fact that Kraepelin introduced the concept ‘dementia praecox’ based on a 
theoretical guesswork is not a particularly unusual aspect of science. The Austrian 
philosopher of science Otto Neurath once famously said that scientists  
are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never 
able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one 
must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In 
this way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped 
entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction (Neurath, 1921, as cited in 
Cartwright et al., 2008, 191). 
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And so it is with the science of psychiatry. We don’t have a definition to ground a theory, 
nor a theory to ground a definition. Be that as it may, what is unusual in psychiatry is that, 
for almost forty years since the publication of DSM-III, the ship has been left largely 
intact, only a select few beams having been replaced. Perhaps most striking is the fact that 
our current concept of ‘schizophrenia’ has not been revised despite the fact that, more 
than a century on, no one has been able validate Kraepelin’s theoretical claims. Far from 
theories being our best guide to the existence of the kinds of things in the world, it would 
seem that, in the case of psychiatry at least, theories often take on a life of their own, 
determining which kinds exist, and thereby constraining what it is that we theorize about. 
4.3 The Resurrection of Schizophrenia 
 Although Kraepelin believed himself to be identifying natural disease entities by 
way of pure observation, and not conjectural theories about the brain (Cf. Shorter, 1997, 
101-109), it is nevertheless clear that his own classification system was influenced by 
unsubstantiated theoretical presumptions about dementia praecox.    
 Be that as it may, Kraepelin was anything but dogmatic about his own 
classification system, even questioning the entire project of psychiatric classification 
toward the end of his career. It is a wonder, then, that a bit of theoretical guesswork on the 
part of Kraepelin has had such a widespread influence on contemporary psychiatry. Why 
is it that our current concept of ‘schizophrenia’, which largely reflects Kraepelin’s 
‘dementia praecox’, has not been progressively revised over time in light of new 
empirical observations? Contrary to the continuity hypothesis, Kraepelin’s schizophrenia 
was resurrected not because we accumulated further evidence that he was right. Instead, 
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in response to a professional crisis the architects of DSM-III were eager to accept 
Kraepelin’s assumptions without reservation.  
4.3.1 Psychiatry In Crisis 
 The birth of our contemporary concept of ‘schizophrenia’ is best understood 
against the backdrop of psychoanalytically-inspired theories of schizophrenia, which 
reached their apogee in the 1960s. As we have already seen, in the early years Kraepelin 
and his followers assumed schizophrenia to be a neurodegenerative disease. Although 
Bleuler (and Wernicke) disagreed, he observed, as did Kraepelin (1919), that 
schizophrenia tended to run in families, and likely had a hereditary component (Cf. 
Bleuler, 1911). Freud, who interpreted schizophrenia—particularly its delusional 
character—as a regression to the id-dominated grandiosity and wish-fulfillment 
fantasizing of early infancy (Cf. Freud, 1923/1961) , nevertheless assumed it to be 16
determined by a hereditary disposition (Cf. Dalzell, 2018).  While there was 17
disagreement at the time about whether or not schizophrenia was neurodegenerative, most 
agreed that it most likely had a significant biological component.    
 Things started to change drastically in the late 1920s. While the idea that one’s 
 “Antipsychiatric” writers also thought schizophrenia to be a return to a primitive, primordial state, though 16
they often romanticized rather than pathologized it (Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1977/1983; Laing 1967). The 
idea that the schizophrenic mind is primitive is perhaps most clearly expressed in Julian Jaynes’ The 
Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (1976/1990), where he speculated that, 
not so long ago, all human beings heard voices, which were generated by the right hemisphere of the brain 
and perceived by the left hemisphere as if external. According to Jaynes, as recently as 3000 years ago 
human beings lacked the capacity of meta-awareness (consciousness of consciousness), schizophrenia being 
a vestige of a primitive mental organization—an archaic, bicameral mind (see, especially, ibid., Book III, 
chapter 5). 
 In fact, in light of this assumption Freud assumed schizophrenia to be beyond the reach of psychoanalytic 17
therapy, and did not recommend it as a treatment option. Cf. Shorter (1997, 175).  
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environment could cause mental illness was by no means new , it had never been 18
extended in any comprehensive way to the domain of psychosis. As Shorter (1997, 176) 
notes, an important figure in this movement was Harry Stack Sullivan, who began 
treating individuals he diagnosed as “schizophrenic” after arriving at the Sheppard and 
Enoch Pratt Hospital in Townson, Maryland in 1922. Drawing upon his therapeutic 
experiences with six male schizophrenics, Sullivan concluded that schizophrenia was a 
maladaptive adjustment or reaction to anxiety (Sullivan, 1927, 105), a personality trait 
which had its origin in early painful interpersonal experiences (Sullivan, 1931). Frieda 
Fromm-Reichmann—who arrived at the Chestnut Lodge in Rockville, Maryland in 1935, 
and was to some degree influenced by Sullivan—went a step further, eventually 
proposing the idea of the “schizophrenogenic mother”, a kind of mother whose 
domineering influence and maternal rejection could cause schizophrenia:  
[T]he schizophrenic is painfully distrustful and resentful of other people, due 
to the severe early warp and rejection he encountered in important people of 
his infancy and childhood, as a rule, mainly in a schizophrenogenic mother. 
During his early flight for emotional survival, he begins to develop the great 
interpersonal sensitivity which remains for the rest of his life (Fromm-
Reichmann, 1948, 265; see, also, ibid., 1940).   
 As Hartwell (1996) argues, the idea of the schizophrenogenic mother was picked 
up in one way or another by researchers of diverse theoretical backgrounds, including 
psychodynamic theorists, learning theorists, field theorists, communication theorists. Not 
 Already in the seventeenth century Burton implicated environmental and psychological factors in the 18
genesis of melancholy. In the nineteenth century Esquirol (1845)—along with many others—emphasized 
the psychosocial causation of insanity. Freud, of course, conceptualized a whole range of neuroses 
psychologically, though he was always ambivalent about whether or not such explanations could be 
extended to psychosis.  
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all of these theorists pointed the finger exclusively at the mother , though the idea that 19
psychosis was the consequence of faulty child rearing, environmental stress, or 
maladaptive communication patterns between family members (so-called 
“communication deviance”) was widely held in American psychiatry until at least the 
1970s.   20
 The insistence that schizophrenia—which some have called the “sacred symbol of 
psychiatry” or “madness par excellence” of our time —was more a “problem in living” 21
than a medical disease in any traditional sense paved the way for widespread criticism of 
the discipline of psychiatry itself.  After all, if mental disorders were not medical 22
diseases, what were psychiatrists—who fashioned themselves as medical doctors—
treating?  
 Based on his observations of psychiatrists screening patients for involuntary 
commitment, sociologist Thomas Scheff (1966/1999) concluded that psychiatrists were in 
the business of labelling and managing deviance, rather than diagnosing and treating 
disease. Another sociologist, Erving Goffman (1961), did observational research at St. 
Elizabeths Hospital in Washington and concluded that mental hospitals were more like 
 For instance, Gregory Bateson and his colleagues (1956) proposed the “double-bind” theory of 19
schizophrenia, arguing that schizophrenia was a consequence of a failure by children to integrate 
contradictory meanings in parental communications. This idea was later picked up by Laing and Esterson, 
who, in their influential book Sanity, Madness, and the Family (1964/1990), present extensive analysis of 
interviews with the families of eleven women diagnosed with schizophrenia. They argue that the families of 
these schizophrenics presented them with confused and impossible commands (e.g., encouraging them to 
become independent but consistently undermining their attempts to do so), giving credence to the idea of a 
“schizophrenogenic parent” or “schizophrenogenic family”.   
 See Shorter (1997, chapter 2 & chapter 7), Hartwell (1996), Neil (1990), and Harrington (2012, 2019) for 20
a history of the rise and fall of the ‘schizophrenogenic mother’ concept in psychiatry.
 See Szasz (1976) and Foucault (1973, 374), respectively. 21
 Cf. Harrington (2019, chapter 4).22
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prisons or concentration camps than medical facilities. Perhaps the most influential 
sociological critique of psychiatry came from Michel Foucault. In Madness and 
Civilization (1961/1988) Foucault argues that the history of psychiatry is not a story about 
the progressive scientific discovery of “mental illness”, but rather a moral and political 
story about how we have managed to discipline those who were believed to be mad and 
socially deviant.  
 Criticism also came from within the psychiatry’s ranks. In 1961 the Hungarian 
psychiatrist Thomas Szasz published The Myth of Mental Illness, arguing that real 
medicine dealt with disease, and there was simply no proof that mental illness involved 
any kind of organic pathological disease process. The project of identifying real kinds of 
mental disease by way of postmortem observations of anatomical abnormalities is the 
brain—the so-called “brain localization” project, which began in the mid-nineteenth 
century—had failed.  For Szasz, it was high time to give up on the idea that mental 23
illness is an illness like any other.  
 Schizophrenia was a popular target for criticism at this time. In The Divided Self  
(1960/1990) Scottish psychiatrist R.D. Laing theorizes that, due to dysfunctional family 
relationships,  schizophrenics develop ontological insecurity (i.e. insecurity about one’s 
existence), which prompts a defensive reaction in which the self splits into separate 
components, thus generating the psychotic symptoms characteristic of schizophrenia. He 
later accused families of colluding with bad-faith doctors by turning their children into 
 To qualify Szasz’ position, it’s not that the brain localization project was a complete failure. There were 23
many successes (to cite just one well-known example: the localization of speech production and 
comprehension—Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area, respectively). It’s just that this project did not pan out 
for mental illnesses like schizophrenia, manic-depression, hysteria, neurasthenia, etc. Cf. Szasz 
(1961/1974).     
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patients, which—to his estimation—they were not.   24
 As the historian Anne Harrington (2019, 124-126) details, a watershed moment in 
the history of psychiatry (and, I would argue, the history of the ‘schizophrenia’ concept) 
was when “On Being Sane in Insane Places” (1973), written by the psychologist David 
Rosenhan, was published in one of the most influential scientific journals in the world: 
Science. In the article Rosenhan describes a natural experiment he conducted in which 
eight pseudopatients (including himself) gained admission into twelve different mental 
hospitals by pretending they were mentally ill. Upon arriving at the institutions the 
pseudopatients told admissions staff that they had been hearing voices which said 
“empty”, “hollow”, and “thud”.  All of the pseudopatients were admitted, given 25
diagnoses of schizophrenia (and, in one case, manic-depressive illness). Despite ceasing 
to simulate any symptoms of abnormality upon admission (as was instructed), telling staff 
that their symptoms had abated, and generally being very amicable and cooperative, the 
average length of hospitalization was 19 days, with one pseudopatient being discharged 
after 52 days. All patients were released with a diagnosis of “schizophrenia in remission”, 
the presumption being that the patients were symptom-free but still “schizophrenic”.    
 The natural experiment continued when a research and teaching hospital heard of 
Rosenhan’s results and challenged him to send pseudopatients their way. Rosenhan 
obliged, telling the hospital staff that within three months one or more pseudopatients 
 Cf. Laing and Esterson (1964/1990) and Laing (1967). 24
 The pseudopatients reported no other symptoms, and, according to Rosenhan, the symptoms were chosen 25
because they were similar to “existential symptoms…which are alleged to arise from painful concerns about 
the perceived meaningless of one’s life…as if the hallucinating person were saying, ‘My life is empty and 
hollow’”—and, further, that existential psychosis had never been recorded in the literature before (Cf. ibid., 
251)
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would try to gain admission to the hospital. In the end, forty-one patients were 
confidently identified as pseudopatients by at least one member of the hospital staff. In 
fact, Rosenhan hadn’t sent any. It is clear, Rosenhan concludes, that “we cannot 
distinguish the sane from the insane in psychiatric hospitals” (ibid., 257); “psychiatric 
diagnoses…are in the minds of the observers” (ibid., 251).  
 The reaction was vitriolic. Robert Spitzer—who had recently been appointed chair 
of the American Psychiatric Association's task force of the third edition of the DSM, 
DSM-III—published a two-part criticism of Rosenhan’s study, saying: 
“On Being Sane in Insane Places” is pseudoscience presented as science. Just 
as his pseudopatients were diagnosed at discharge as “schizophrenia, in 
remission”, so a careful examination of this study's methods, results, and 
conclusions leads me to a diagnosis of “logic, in remission” (Spitzer, 1975, 
442).  26
In the article Spitzer gives a point-by-point criticism of the study, but his main argument 
is that Rosenhan’s study is not ecologically valid. The fact that hospital staff incorrectly 
diagnosed pseudopatients does not entail that they incorrectly diagnose real patients. After 
all, the hospital staff had never diagnosed pseudopatients before—and, under the 
circumstances, their diagnosis of schizophrenia was reasonable.  
 In his concluding remarks Spitzer defends the utility of psychiatric classification
—particularly in that it allows for effective communication between mental health 
professionals—but concedes that at present psychiatric diagnoses are woefully 
inadequate, and that he is working with a group out of Washington University in St. Louis 
to develop an entirely new diagnostic system.  
 See also: Spitzer (1976).26
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4.3.2 The Making of DSM-III     
 There is widespread agreement that the DSM-III was formulated as a response to 
a professional crisis (Cooper, 2004, 2005; Harrington, 2019, 126-136; Shorter, 1999, 
295-305; Tsou, 2016; Whooley, 2010, 2014). This crisis, as Whooley (2010, 2014) has 
argued, was initiated by a confluence of factors: dissatisfaction with psychoanalysis; the 
contention that psychiatric diagnoses were arbitrary and inconsistent; and increasing 
pressure from third-party medical insurance companies for more clarity in psychiatric 
diagnosis and treatment. The straw that broke the camels back, however, was the assertion 
that mental illness was a myth, and that psychiatry was not a branch of medicine at all. 
 In collaboration with a small group of research-orientated psychiatrists based 
primarily at Washington University in St. Louis and the New York State Psychiatric 
Institute, Spitzer chartered a new course, determined to place psychiatry back on a firm 
scientific footing. In 1972 members of the St. Louis group, led by John Feighner, 
published the first set of rigorous criteria to be used for psychiatric diagnosis (Feighner, 
Robins & Guze, 1972). No longer was diagnosis to be based merely on clinical 
judgement, but, rather, on predetermined sets of inclusion and exclusion criteria, which 
could be used consistently from clinician-to-clinician, country-to-country. The Feighner 
criteria were later refined into the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC), which would 
serve as the basis for DSM-III (Cf. Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, 1978).   
 One common misconception amongst philosophers is the belief that DSM-III was 
a purely atheoretical, descriptive approach to classification, a modest attempt to make 
diagnoses more reliable. On this reading, the DSM architects were neo-positivists who 
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decided to renounce speculative theory altogether in the interest of descriptive adequacy, 
and this is the reason that (for the most part) real kinds of mental disorder have not been 
unearthed (Cf. Murphy, 2006, chapter 1 & chapter 9; Tsou, 2011, 2016).  
 From a historical perspective, this is plainly false. It is true that the DSM-III 
document itself states that it is “atheoretical with regard to etiology” (APA, 1980, 7). But 
the drafters of DSM-III were being disingenuous.  The publication of DSM-III was a 27
remarkable turning point in the history of psychiatry not only because it introduced 
objective, operationalized diagnostic criteria, but because it effectively marked the end of 
psychoanalysis, and once again established psychiatry as a medical discipline which dealt 
with real illnesses, not problems in living or myths. As both Shorter (1997, 300-301) and 
Harrington (2019, 134) note, the hope was that the new DSM diagnoses would 
correspond to natural disease entities, and the belief was that biological—not 
psychosocial—causes would eventually be discovered for all mental disorders.  28
 Note long before the publication of DSM-III Gerald Klerman fashioned the DSM 
architects as “neo-Kraepelinians” who were bringing psychiatry back into the fold of 
medicine, much as Kraepelin did at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1978 he provided 
a summary of everything that the DSM architects stood for: psychiatry is a branch of 
 As Spitzer would later admit: “With its intellectual roots in St. Louis instead of Vienna, and with its 27
intellectual inspiration derived from Kraepelin, not Freud, the task force was viewed from the outset as 
unsympathetic to the interests of those whose theory and practice derived from the psychoanalytic tradition” 
(Bayer & Spitzer, 1985, 188). This attitude was evident early on. In a highly influential article, Robins and 
Guze (1970), members of the St. Louis group, argued that a valid scientific classification in psychiatry is 
one which comprised of classes of “real illnesses”, much like the rest of medicine. The architects of DSM-
III originally planned to include a statement in the manual indicating that the mental disorders are medical 
conditions (Cf. Spitzer and Endicott, 1978), but were met with opposition from psychologists, social 
workers, and counsellors who believed this statement to be a declaration that only psychiatrists with 
medical training were qualified to treat mental disorders (Mayes and Horwitz, 2005). 
 As Shorter (2013, 8) says, “Robert Spitzer…couldn’t wait to get rid of hysteria, neurasthenia, and the rest 28
of the psychoanalytic baggage”. 
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medicine; mental illnesses are not myths, but real illnesses that require treatment; there is 
a natural boundary between the normal and the sick; there are many illnesses and natural 
boundaries between them; and classification ought to be based on investigation into the 
causes of mental illness, particularly biological causes (Klerman, 1978).   
4.3.3 Schizophrenia Resurrected  
 Out of the foregoing crisis came the concept of ‘schizophrenia’ as we know it 
today. ‘Schizophrenia’, in particular, was used wildly inconsistently in the decades prior 
to the publication of DSM-III. For instance, psychiatrists in America diagnosed people 
with schizophrenia much more frequently than those in Britain, even when 
symptomatology appeared to diverge widely from what we now consider “schizophrenia” 
(Cf. Kendall et al., 1971). There was some rationale for this, however. 
Psychoanalytically-oriented psychiatrists, as we have seen, believed schizophrenic-like 
symptoms to be particularly morbid psychological reactions to the social world—on the 
extreme end of a continuum ranging from mild neuroses to severe psychoses—and so 
never had much interest in nosology. After all, if psychotic symptoms were a consequence 
of how one adjusted to the world, and each individual’s world and reaction to it were 
different, why pigeonhole individuals into broad, abstract categories?  
 It goes without saying that neo-Kraepelineans did not share this perspective, and, 
as historian Edward Shorter has nicely detailed, they would make certain that the idea of a 
non-chronic, etiologically psychogenic kind of schizophrenia was expunged from the 
record:  
Yet once the disease-designers were at the negotiating table, their approach 
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more resembled horse-trading than admiration for science. Take 
“schizophrenia,” which emerged from the published DSM-III as seemingly 
rock-solid a diagnosis as mumps. As psychologist Theodore Millon, member 
of the DSM-III Task Force, pointed out to Spitzer in 1978, this label—for 
what is essentially chronic psychosis—had begun life in DSM-I as 
“schizophrenic reaction” and was simplified to “schizophrenia” in DSM-II in 
1968. Then, as the DSM-III Task Force began to meet, they converted it in 
1974 into “schizophrenic disorders” in recognition, said Millon, that the term 
represented “a spectrum, if you will, that is, a heterogeneous syndrome, 
etiologically biogenic in some cases, psychogenic in others, and most likely 
interactive in the majority.” Then, to Millon’s irritation, in 1978 Spitzer 
unilaterally reconverted the label to “schizophrenia,” as it remained in the 
published version…So, schizophrenia, was it one disease or a haphazard 
catchall? The DSM system was all over the map (Shorter, 2013, 11).  
As was the case with Kraepelin’s ‘dementia praecox’, our contemporary concept of 
‘schizophrenia’ was based on the assumption that schizophrenia is a chronic, 
neurodegenerative disease which is affected little, if at all, by the environment. 
 Initially, DSM-III was hailed as a crowning achievement of psychiatry. Klerman 
(1984, 542) called it “a victory” for science. In her widely read book, The Broken Brain: 
The Biological Revolution in Psychiatry (1984), Nancy Andreason said that the biological 
revolution in psychiatry would finally put an end to mental illness stigma and 
psychoanalytic speculation. In 1989 the psychiatrist Samuel Guze wrote an essay entitled: 
“Biological Psychiatry: Is There Any Other Kind?”, effectively marking the end of 
psychiatry’s historical, and quite rapid transition from psychoanalysis to biological 
psychiatry.   
 Fast forward a decade and the leaks in the dam were already beginning to show. In 
1991 clinical psychologist Mary Boyle wrote Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion?, 
arguing that the putative illness is far less coherent than it has long been taken to be. 
151
Nancy Andreason herself, who had been involved in DSM-III working group, started 
questioning the category, contending that we seem to have fallen prey to the ahistorical 
fallacy (Andreason, 1994), and that DSM-III led to many unintended but negative 
consequences, such as the loss of “careful clinical evaluation that is targeted to the 
individual person’s problems and social context and that is enriched by a good general 
knowledge of psychopathology” (Andreason, 2007, 108). 
 Perhaps the most damning statement concerning the current state of psychiatric 
classification came from Thomas Insel, who at the time was director of the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). In anticipation of the release of the most recent 
version of the DSM, the DSM-5, Insel released his own scathing report of the so-called 
“Bible” of Psychiatry (Insel, 2013). According to Insel, the final version of the DSM-5 
“involves mostly modest alterations of the previous edition”, and that, more than thirty 
years after the neo-Kraepelineans thought they had put psychiatry back on solid scientific 
foundations, not one of the DSM’s diagnostic categories were based on “objective 
laboratory measures”. Of schizophrenia Insel says: “[W]e still do not have a basic 
understanding of the pathophysiology of the disorder and therefore lack the tools for 
curative treatment or prevention needed” (Insel, 2010, 187). Translation: we can’t even 
say that schizophrenia is indeed a real kind, let alone a real kind of neurodegenerative 
disease.    
4.3.4 Conclusion 
  The history of the ‘schizophrenia’ concept in particular, and psychiatric concepts 
in general, has not been kind to philosophers and scientists who would fashion themselves 
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as realists about kinds of mental disorder. If it is true, as Hilary Putnam argues, that 
scientific realism “is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a 
miracle” (Putnam, 1975c, 73), then it is equally true that the failure of psychiatry to 
meaningfully prevent, cure, and explain mental disorder makes scientific realism about 
mental disorders incomprehensible. 
 What is more, realists about natural kinds claim that our theories about the world 
are our best guide to the existence of real kinds, and that, given the success of our 
scientific theories, it would be utterly miraculous if they did not pick out real kinds. The 
case of schizophrenia turns this argument on its head. The theoretical assumption that 
schizophrenia is in fact a real kind of disease has led to some successful discoveries. To 
cite one well-known example, we know that increased dopamine levels are particularly 
associated with the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and, on this basis, we can 
successfully treat at least some individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia with 
antipsychotic medication. Yet, given that the category of ‘schizophrenia’ was formulated 
on the basis of shaky theoretical foundations, and not knowledge of its causal structure, it 
would be utterly miraculous if schizophrenia turned out to be a real kind.  
 As Kornblith (1993, 51) has noted, there was a time in the early classification of 
both chemical and biological kinds when color played an important role in distinguishing 
between different kinds of thing. In light of theoretical developments in chemistry and 
biology, however, color proved to be an unreliable indicator of real kinds.  
 Psychiatry, in many ways, is still awaiting its own theoretical revolution. While I 
have repeatedly said that what is true of concepts such as ‘depression’ and ‘schizophrenia’ 
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does not necessarily apply to the whole psychopathological domain, there is a general 
consensus that most of our psychiatric concepts have been constructed similarly. As I 
contended in the previous chapter, psychiatric concepts are best interpreted as “useful 
heuristics” in the sense that they provide us stable “objects” to observe and study, and in 
some instances might even be both construct valid or predictively valid. Be that as it may, 
they remain “hypothetical constructs” in the sense that they do not (so far as we know) 
have unobservable causal structure which explains why the observable properties appear 
to co-occur. 
4.4 Diagnosing the Problem of Psychiatric Classification 
 As we have seen, in psychiatry our best theories are not necessarily reliable guides 
to which kinds do or do not exist. The question that presents itself to us now is whether or 
not we should expect that our current psychiatric categories will eventually come to 
reflect natural kinds. Is this normative ideal an appropriate or useful goal for psychiatry, 
or should we abandon it altogether?  
 The historical record should make us skeptical. Why is it that, more-or-less two 
centuries since psychiatry emerged as a distinct discipline, real kinds of mental disorder 
have not been unearthed, despite our best efforts? Some philosophers have argued that 
psychiatry has not progressed because, since DSM-III, psychiatric classification has been 
based on atheoretical observational criteria, and this has discouraged etiological 
explanations of mental disorders (Cf. Murphy, 2006, chapter 1 & chapter 9; Kendler et 
al., 2011; Tsou, 2008, 2015, 2016).  
 The problem with this explanation is that it’s historically false. First, as we have 
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seen, at least some DSM mental disorders were based on theoretical speculation 
concerning their nature. Second, while it is true that psychiatric classification has been 
based in large part on observable signs and symptoms, scientists did not abruptly stop 
formulating and testing theories of mental disorders once DSM-III was published. In fact, 
the DSM architects fully believed and hoped that future scientific investigation would sort 
out which kinds of mental disorder were real and which were not, and that psychiatric 
classification would be revised accordingly.    
 A more plausible explanation is that the way in which the DSM is employed in 
research makes the discovery of the true causes of mental disorder difficult, thereby 
frustrating our attempts at identifying real kinds of mental disorder. As Tabb (2014) has 
argued, owing to its widespread use in the framing of scientific hypotheses about mental 
disorder, the DSM has largely determined the objects of inquiry (in particular, DSM 
diagnostic criteria are widely used to gather test populations for studying mental 
disorders).    29
 While there is some truth to this, this explanation is too simplistic. For example, 
as Jablensky (2010) has detailed, since DSM-III many attempts have been made to revise 
the ‘schizophrenia’ concept. Shortly after the publication of DSM-III, “Type I (or 
positive)” and “Type II (or negative)” schizophrenia were proposed based on the 
predominance of either positive or negative symptomatology (Cf. Crow, 1980, 1985; 
Andreason & Olsen, 1982). The rationale for this was that positive symptoms 
(hallucinations, delusions, and formal thought disorder) were presumed to be related to 
 This is essentially the same argument made by Hyman (2010) and Insel (2013), and has served as 29
motivation for the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project. 
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dopaminergic dysfunction, while negative symptoms (social withdrawal, loss of volition, 
affective flattening, and poverty of speech) were presumed to be associated with 
structural brain abnormalities.   
 Other attempts have been made: deficit-nondeficit schizophrenia, based on the 
presence or absence of enduring negative symptoms (Carpenter, Heinrichs & Wagman, 
1988; Kirkpatrick, Buchanan, Breier & Carpenter, 1993; Kirkpatrick, Buchanan, Ross & 
Carpenter, 2001; Buchanan et al., 1994); family-sporadic schizophrenia, based on the 
presence or absence of a family history of schizophrenia (Lewis et al., 1987); different 
subtyping based on factor and cluster analyses of which symptoms tend to co-occur 
(Farmer, McGuffin & Spitznagel, 1983; Johnstone & Frith, 1996; McGrath et al., 2004). 
All of these different methods have resulted in different possible ways of further refining 
“schizophrenia”, but thus far nothing has stuck. 
 The failure of psychiatry to identify natural kinds of mental disorder has not been 
for a lack of trying. This opens up a number of possibilities. First it is possible that we’re 
searching for a phantom, and there are no real kinds of mental disorder. Second, it is 
possible is that we just haven’t got there yet, and in due time improved investigative 
techniques and theoretical developments will reveal to us which kinds of mental disorder 
are real and which aren’t. And, finally, it is possible that psychopathological phenomena 
are in fact much more complex and chaotic than was once anticipated, and the project of 
classifying real kinds of mental disorder by formulating hypothetical constructs is not a 
useful one.  
 In the end, I take the latter hypothesis to be the most plausible, and will argue for 
156
it in the remainder of this chapter. It is true, of course, that science is full of surprises and 
it is impossible to know exactly where science is headed based on knowledge of science’s 
past. Be that as it may, over the past two centuries we have accumulated enough evidence 
to suggest that psychiatric categories are best conceptualized as convenient pigeonholes, 
attempts to impose order on a disorderly, chaotic nature.     
 As we have seen, many psychoanalysts once shared a similar intuition, and as a 
consequence were not much interested in psychiatric classification. While psychoanalysts 
were clearly wrong to suggest that psychopathological symptoms are merely morbid 
reactions to the social world, and do not involve biological factors , their insistence that 30
psychopathological phenomena could not be neatly cut up into natural kinds in virtue of 
clustering signs and symptoms appears to be borne out by close analysis of the empirical 
evidence—or so I will argue.   
4.5 From Order to Chaos    
 The project of classifying natural kinds of mental disorder has historically 
proceeded under the assumption that one kind of disorder can be distinguished from 
another on the basis of course and outcome, signs and symptoms, and causes. This 
research program was a gamble, one that bet that amongst the many diverse clinical 
presentations that psychiatrists encountered in practice could be found natural kinds of 
mental disorder. To date, this conceptual framework has failed. 
 In my mind, the principal reason why this conceptual framework has failed is that 
the psychopathological domain itself is much more complex and chaotic than was once 
 It should be noted that Freud himself did not think this, but many of his followers did. 30
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anticipated. First, as has long been recognized, there is significant overlap in 
symptomatology between individuals, which strongly suggests that the properties of 
mental disorders do not cluster together in useful ways. Second, the properties of mental 
disorders are unstable inasmuch as they both change over time and space, and from 
individual to individual. 
 Taken together, this evidence strongly suggests that the project of classifying real 
kinds of mental disorder by way of identifying clusters of properties, one aspect of what 
Gold and Gold (2014, 229-234) have called “aspirational psychiatry”, is an aspiration ill-
suited to the psychopathological phenomena.  
4.5.1 Clustering Signs and Symptoms 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, realists about mental disorder believe that at 
least some kinds of mental disorder are natural kinds because they are characterized by a 
cluster of properties that regularly co-occur, and the co-occurrence of these properties can 
be explained by the homeostatic mechanisms which bring them about. As I have already 
argued (see section 3.4), the claim that there are causal mechanisms which do in fact 
explain how the superficial properties of, e.g., schizophrenia and depression cluster 
together is based on a superficial understanding of the scientific literature. Be that as it 
may, there is an additional assumption that I did not address in chapter 3 and simply 
granted for the sake of argument—namely, that psychopathological phenomena can be 
characterized by clusters of naturally co-occurring properties.   
 There are both historical and empirical reasons for doubting this assumption. 
From a historical standpoint it would be entirely serendipitous if the properties which 
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characterize, e.g., psychotic disorders do in fact cluster together. As we have already seen, 
in 1899 Kraepelin combined the previously distinct dementia praecox, catatonia, and 
paranoid dementia based on longitudinal analysis, not cross-sectional or cluster analysis. 
Kraepelin fully recognized that these diverse clinical forms did not cluster together neatly, 
but made a bet that they were in fact diverse manifestations of the same disease.  
 Consider also manic-depressive illness, the other psychosis in Kraepelin’s 
bipartite distinction. According to Berrios (1988, 2004), for roughly two millennia the 
terms ‘mania’ and ‘melancholia’ were more-or-less synonymous with ‘madness’, and 
stood for a panoply of observed signs and symptoms, including fury, despondency, 
agitation, confusion, delusions, excitation, aggression, and decreased motility. By the 
early nineteenth century, however, the terms ‘mania’ and ‘melancholia’ were increasingly 
being used to refer to counterposing affective states such as fury/agitation/excitation and 
despondency/listlessness/sadness, respectively. For example, in 1820 Esquirol—who was 
acutely aware of the fast-and-loose usage of ‘melancholia’ in the past—coined the term 
‘lypemania’, which he says is 
a disease of the brain characterised by delusions which are chronic and fixed 
on specific topics, absence of fever and sadness which is often debilitating 
and overwhelming. It must not be confused with mania which exhibits 
generalised delusions and excited emotions and intellect nor with monomania 
that exhibits specific delusions and expansive and gay emotions, nor with 
dementia characterised by incoherence and confusion of ideas (Esquirol, 
1820, 151-152; emphasis mine). 
According to Esquirol, mania, lypemania, and monomania were different kinds of mental 
disease which were distinguishable in part on the basis of polar opposite mood states.  
 The world of so-called affective illnesses was further complicated in the mid-
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nineteenth century. At that time French clinicians began describing patients who were 
neither exclusively manic nor exclusively melancholic, but appeared to go through 
periods of both mania and melancholia (see note 5). They proposed that mania and 
melancholia were not isolated symptoms, but often alternated over the course of a 
person’s life, which they variously called “circular insanity”, “intermittent insanity”, 
“periodic insanity”, and “insanity of double form” (Cf. Sedler, 1983). While French 
clinicians generally considered circular insanity to be a chronic mental illness which 
progressively weakened the mind, ultimately resulting in dementia, in 1882 the German 
physician Kahlbaum conjectured that at least one type of circular insanity affected only 
mood and did not lead to dementia.  He called this kind of circular insanity 31
“cyclothymia”, suggesting that the manic states of this disorder be called “hyperthymia” 
and the melancholic states “dysthymia”.  
 By the late nineteenth century diagnosing affective disorders was a complex affair. 
Some clinicians adopted the French understanding of circular insanity, in which chronic 
mental impairment (including delusions) was a central feature. Others adopted 
Kahlbaum’s understanding of circular insanity, in which mood was central and not 
intellectual degeneration. In addition to circular insanity were the concepts of ‘mental 
depression’ and ‘melancholia’— which increasingly came to replace ‘lypemania’ (Cf. 
Berrios, 1988)—as well as ‘simple mania’ and ‘simple melancholia’, which referred to 
conditions uncomplicated by delusions or incoherence, and did not necessarily terminate 
in profound dementia (Cf. Hare, 1981).  
 See Kahlbaum (1882). 31
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 In 1899 Kraepelin took stock of all this—much as he did with the so-called 
intellectual disorders hebephrenia, catatonia, and paranoid dementia—and concluded that 
these different clinical forms were but different manifestations of one and the same 
disease, which he termed ‘manic-depressive illness’:  
[M]anic depressive insanity as it is to be described in this section, includes on 
the one hand the whole domain of so called periodic and circular insanity, on 
the other hand simple mania, the greater part of the morbid states termed 
melancholia and also a not inconsiderable number of cases of amentia…I 
have become more and more convinced that all of the above-mentioned states 
only represent manifestations of a single morbid process (Kraepelin, 1921, 2).  
In the end, Kraepelin sided with Kahlbaum in thinking that circular insanity, melancholia, 
and the like, primarily affected mood and had a similar course and outcome which did not 
terminate in dementia. On this basis he also proposed that dementia praecox and manic-
depressive illness were separate diseases, even though he recognized that there was 
significant overlap in symptomatology between these putatively distinct diseases (see 
section 4.2.2 above).    
 Manic-depressive illness, like dementia praecox, was decidedly not constructed on 
the basis of an observed cluster of regularly co-occurring properties, and this fact was not 
lost on critics of Kraepelin’s classificatory system.  While Kraepelin originally subsumed 32
melancholias (unipolar depressions) under the category of ‘manic-depressive illness’, 
depressive disorders have since survived as separate kinds of mental disorder in each 
successive version of the DSM . Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that many 33
individuals presented with symptoms of both schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness, 
 Cf. Chaslin (1912), who argues that melancholias should be kept in a separate group from manic-32
depressive illness.  
 See APA (1952, 83; 1967, 35-37; 1980, 205-224; 1994, 317-391; 2013, 155-188).33
161
in 1933 Kasanin introduced the ad hoc category of ‘schizoaffective disorder’ to account 
for these “in-between” patients.   34
 Given that significant heterogeneity was built into the constructs ‘schizophrenia’ 
and ‘bipolar disorder’ from the start, it would be entirely fortuitous if the properties which 
characterize both of these putative kinds do indeed cluster together. 
 As a matter of fact, there are good empirical reasons for thinking that they don’t. 
For instance, factor analyses suggest that the symptoms of schizophrenia load on three 
latent factors: “psychomotor poverty” (i.e. negative symptoms, such as poverty of 
speech), “reality distortion” (i.e. positive symptoms, such delusions and hallucinations), 
and “disorganization” (i.e. thought and speech disorder) (Liddle, 1987) . Other statistical 35
techniques (e.g., cluster analysis and latent factor analysis) have revealed anywhere from 
two to six latent classes (Dollfus et al., 1996; Farmer et al., 1983; Johnstone & Frith, 
1996; Kendler, Karkowski & Walsh, 1998 McGrath et al., 2004).  
 Interestingly, grade of membership (GoM) analysis—a kind of latent structure 
analysis which allows individuals to be members of more than one disease class and 
 Cf. Kasanin (1933). In DSM-IV and DSM-5 schizoaffective disorder is distinguished from schizophrenia 34
on the basis of the presence of a mood episode during the active-phase symptoms of schizophrenia, and is 
distinguished from a depressive or bipolar disorder with psychotic features based on the presence of 
prominent delusions and/or hallucinations for at least two weeks in the absence of a major mood episode. 
The assumption here is that the psychotic features of depressive or bipolar disorder primarily occur during 
mood episodes. See APA (1994, 292-296; 2013, 89, 105-110). Schizoaffective disorder is also listed in the 
first three editions of the DSM, but is not given clear operational criteria. See APA (1952, 83; 1967, 35; 
1980, 202).  
 This result has been replicated in both European and non-European populations (Cf. Arndt, Andreasen, 35
Flaum, Miller & Nopoulos, 1995; Emsley et al., 2001; Gureje, Aderibigbe & Obikoya, 1995; Johnstone & 
Frith, 1996; Smith, Mar & Turoff, 1998). More recently, McGrath et al. (2004) have identified five factors 
(positive, negative, disorganized, affective, and early onset/developmental) and Cuesta and Peralta (2001) 
proposed a hierarchical 10-dimensional model. 
162
represents the latent groups as “fuzzy sets” —was applied to the symptom profiles of 36
1065 individuals in a WHO International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia, and revealed eight 
classes, five of which were related to schizophrenia, and two of which were related to 
affective disorders (Murray et al., 2005). 
 The GoM technique is perhaps most congruent with the definition of natural kinds 
that I’ve been working with in this dissertation, and this evidence, while not conclusive , 37
suggests that, in addition to not having a known causal structure, schizophrenia is not a 
natural kind because in all likelihood the properties of schizophrenia don’t even cluster in 
the way that one would expect if it was a natural kind. 
 Compare this with both natural kinds of species and natural kinds of disease. 
Members of the same species tiger undoubtedly differ in many of their properties (see 
section 1.4.2) , but there is a sort of “internal coherence” whereby members share most 38
of their important properties in common and hence “cluster together”. Similarly, 
individuals diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer do not share all of their properties in 
common, but nevertheless display a similar range of causes and effects (see section 1.4.3). 
 “Schizophrenia” is not internally coherent in this sense. As we have seen, not only 
is there no coherent unobservable causal structure (e.g., a network of causal mechanisms) 
 The GoM model simultaneously extracts from the data matrix a number of latent “pure types” and assigns 36
to each individual a set of numerical weights quantifying the degree to which that individual resembles each 
one of the identified pure types.
 It should be noted that the results of factor analyses, cluster analyses, and latent factor analyses are highly 37
sensitive to the initial selection of symptoms and measurement methods. For instance, studies using 
different rating scales for schizophrenia end up “finding” different factors or clusters (Cf. Jablensky, 2006). 
Given this, statistically-derived symptom dimensions or clusters ought to be viewed with some caution. 
That being said, the overall body of evidence from factor, cluster, and latent factor analyses at the very least 
suggests that the property-cluster which currently characterizes “schizophrenia” can come apart. 
 For example, intraspecific differences such as body size, pelage coloration, striping patterns, skull 38
dimensions, craniological details, genetic, and molecular structures. 
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which explains how the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia arise, factor, cluster, and 
latent structure analyses suggest that the observable signs and symptoms of 
“schizophrenia” come apart.       
 Although schizophrenia might not be a kind unto itself, it is of course possible that 
further causal investigation might substantiate one of the aforementioned latent class 
models. This conclusion, however, is complicated by the fact that there is not only 
significant overlap in symptomatology within diagnostic boundaries, but also across 
diagnostic boundaries.  
 In practice, it is quite common to find individuals who meets the diagnostic 
criteria for two or more disorders , which is referred to in the literature as “comorbidity”. 39
For instance, a prospective cohort study of more than 2.5 million persons born in 
Denmark after 1954 found significant overlap between schizophrenia, schizoaffective 
disorder, and bipolar disorder (Laursen, Agerbo & Pedersen, 2009). Schizophrenia is also 
comorbid with depression, anxiety, suicidality (Cassidy, Yang, Kapczinski & Cavalcante 
Passos, 2018), obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Sharma & Reddy, 2019; Won-Gyo Shin 
et al., 2018), social phobia (Vrbova, 2017), panic symptoms (Ulas et al., 2007), adult 
ADHD (Donev et al., 2011), and substance-use disorder (Regier et al., 1990). In addition, 
bipolar disorder is comorbid with panic disorder (Mackinnon et al., 2002), obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) (Amerio et al., 2015, 2019), borderline personality disorder 
(Parker et al., 2016), and anxiety disorders (Amerio et al., 2016). 
 For example, Kessler et al. (2012) report that 27.9% of adolescents 13 to 17 years of age met the 39
diagnostic criteria for two or more disorders. Other community surveys have estimated that 45-54% of 
individuals who meet the criteria for one mental disorder will have one or more additional lifetime 
diagnoses (Cf. Andrews, Slade & Issakidis, 2002; Bijl, Ravelli & van Zessen, 1998).   
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 In many instances the overlap between two putatively distinct disorders is 
considerable. For example, it is estimated that as many as 57% of people with 
schizophrenia have comorbid depression, 10–15% have comorbid panic disorder, 12–29% 
have comorbid posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 12–23% have comorbid OCD 
(Buckley et al., 2009). Moreover, an average of 18% of individuals diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder will also meet the criteria for obsessive compulsive disorder at some time 
in their life (Amerio et al., 2015). Perhaps the highest rate of comorbidity reported in the 
literature is that between anxiety disorders and mood disorders. Brown and Barlow 
(2002) found that 55% of people concurrently met the diagnostic criteria for both an 
anxiety and mood disorder. This rate skyrocketed to 76% when lifetime diagnoses were 
taken into consideration. 
 Historically, studies of comorbidity have restricted analyses to a subset of 
disorders. Recently, however, Plana-Ripoll et al. (2019) undertook one of the most 
comprehensive epidemiological studies on comorbidity to date, examining all major 
mental disorders  recorded for individuals born in Denmark from 1900 to 2015. They 40
found that all mental disorders were associated with an increased risk of all other mental 
disorders.  
 The accumulated evidence from comorbidity studies indicates that the so-called 
“comorbidity problem” in psychiatric diagnosis is pervasive. What are we to make of 
this? Sometimes it is suggested that comorbidity is not really a problem. After all, there is 
 These included organic disorders, substance use disorders, personality disorders, schizophrenia, mood 40
disorders, neurotic disorders, eating disorders, intellectual disabilities, developmental disorders, and 
behaviour disorders.
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nothing contradictory about one person developing two separate disorders. Some people 
(a lot, it turns out) are just unlucky. The problems with this line of argumentation is that it  
implicitly assumes that current psychiatric categories are natural kinds, a claim which is 
unwarranted given the evidence adduced in this dissertation. 
 Another explanation is that comorbidity is a function of a poor classificatory 
system. Once we further refine our categories, or introduce new categories, comorbidity 
should all but vanish. For example, it might be the case that some kinds of disorders—
e.g., depression and anxiety disorder—have a similar underlying causal structure, which 
would explain why they often co-occur in one individual. It might also be the case that 
anxiety is produced by the negative appraisal of some life event, and thereby gives rise to 
the symptoms characteristic of depression (see section 2.3.2). In theory, further 
investigation should be able to sort out whether depression and anxiety should be lumped 
into one kind, or whether anxiety should be thought of as part of the causal pathway 
leading to depression.     
 Be that as it may, revising psychiatric classification in this way doesn’t really 
solve the comorbidity problem writ large. For instance, even if we lump anxiety and 
depression together, what are we to make of the fact that depression and numerous 
anxiety disorders are also comorbid with schizophrenia, and that schizophrenia itself is 
comorbid with OCD, ADHD, and substance use disorder? Do all of these conditions have 
similar underlying causes, or do some mental states, such as delusional states, tend to 
cause other mental states, such as depressive and obsessive-compulsive states? Does 
being schizophrenic often lead to depression because schizophrenics have trouble getting 
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on in the world?  
 Of course, we may very well introduce new kinds such as “schizo-obsessive 
disorder” , “schizo-depressive disorder”, “schizo-panic disorder”, and “schizo-PTSD 41
disorder”, but this is bound to be an arbitrary, ad hoc solution. After all, if it is true that 
having one disorder increases the risk of developing any other disorder, then there is 
clearly a relationship of some kind between all kinds of mental disorder. This, however, 
opens up the possibility that the clusters of symptoms characteristic of current psychiatric 
kinds can be recombined in endless ways. For example, given that there is significant 
overlap between schizophrenia, depression, and various anxiety disorders, “schizo-
depressive-anxiety disorder” would not be an unreasonable suggestion.  
 But how likely is it that “schizo-depressive-anxiety disorder”, which collects 
together diverse array of signs and symptoms, will have a common causal structure? In 
my mind, comorbidity does reflect a problem in psychiatric classification. The problem, 
however, is not that we’ve happened to pick out the wrong clusters. The problem is that 
psychiatric classification has proceeded under the assumption that psychopathological 
phenomena do in fact cluster together in such a way that reflects the true causal structure 
of the world. 
  This approach has not only been unsuccessful in unearthing natural kinds of 
mental disorder, but it is unlikely to be successful. Consider just one symptom of 
schizophrenia: hallucinations. As Oliver Sacks (2012) has convincingly argued, both 
auditory and visual hallucinations arise for a whole host of causal reasons. For example, 
 This is a serious consideration. Cf. Poyurovsky et al. (2003), Bottas et al. (2005), and Buckley et al. 41
(2009).
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both simple and complex hallucinations can arise from loss of sight (Charles Bonnet 
Syndrome), hearing loss, sensory deprivation, Parkinsonism, intoxication, migraines, 
epilepsy, narcolepsy, and PTSD. If hallucinations—which are just one symptom of 
schizophrenia—do not have a common causal explanation, should we really expect 
schizophrenia and similar hypothetical constructs to have one?  
 It must be said that comorbidity does not strictly imply that kinds of mental 
disorder cannot be natural kinds. It is well know, for instance, that species significantly 
overlap either because they are part of the same evolutionary line, because of 
interbreeding (e.g., tigrons and ligers), or because of evolutionary pressures. Be that as it 
may, given the likelihood that different kinds of signs and symptoms are likely to involve 
difference causal processes, the project of classifying real kinds of mental disorder by 
way of identifying clusters of properties is bound to be unhelpful.  
4.5.2 Looping Effects, Placebo Effects, and Nocebo Effects 
 In chapter 2 I considered three arguments for the conclusion that mental disorders 
cannot in principle be natural kinds. As you might recall, one common thread in each and 
every one of those arguments was the presupposition that the “instability” of (at least 
some) mental disorders precludes them from being natural kinds. For example, multiple 
personality disorder is assumed by Tsou and Hacking not to be a natural kind because it is 
a “moving target” in the sense that the properties associated with the kind rapidly change 
over time as a consequence of looping effects. Natural kinds, so the argument goes, are 
“relatively stable objects of study across time” (Tsou, 2008, 66), and multiple personality 
disorder is not.   
168
 Other philosophers of psychiatry also appear to treat stability as a precondition of 
natural kinds. For instance, Kendler et al. contend that mental disorders are natural kinds 
in virtue of being produced by “stable patterns of complex interaction between behavior, 
environment and physiology that have arisen through development, evolution and 
interaction with the environment” (Kendler et al., 2011, 1147; emphasis mine). And, 
further, they claim: “the identity of [a psychiatric] disease across time and across cultures 
is grounded in the similarity of the complex, mutually reinforcing network of causal 
mechanisms in each case” (ibid., 1148; emphasis mine).   
 The preoccupation with stability on the part of philosophers of psychiatry 
demands further exploration. As I mentioned in several places in chapter 2, while the fact 
that the properties of mental disorders are continually changing does not entail that they 
cannot possibly be natural kinds, such a fact, if true, would imply that the project of 
classifying real kinds of mental disorder by way of identifying clusters of properties will 
inevitably be confounded. 
 Suppose for a moment that it is true that being labelled with ‘multiple personality 
disorder’ can initiate a feedback process whereby individuals so labelled continually 
change their properties, and at a relatively rapid rate. The project of classifying real kinds 
of mental disorder by way of identifying clusters of properties is unlikely to be very 
useful if these cluster keep coming apart.  
 Hysteria is another plausible example. In the history of psychiatry the putative 
kind hysteria has been one of the most intractable. In the fin de siècle of the nineteenth 
century, when hysteria was at its height, somatic symptoms in the absence of a 
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demonstrable organic basis—such as paralysis, tremors, dystonia, tremors, choking, 
amnesia, etc— were fairly common. Today, however, such complaints are few and far 
between.  As I mentioned in chapter 2, because hysteria is no longer with us 42
philosophers often dismiss it as a mythical construct. But there is another explanation: 
namely, that the signs and symptoms of hysteria keep changing. For example, Scull 
(2009) has suggested that hysteria has not necessarily disappeared, but may be 
manifesting in different ways. Although dramatic displays of paralysis, tremors, dystonia, 
tremors, choking, amnesia, etc., are no longer the norm, somatic symptoms in the absence 
of a demonstrable organic basis still are: e.g., chronic fatigue syndrome, conversion 
disorder. 
 Of course, none of this implies that there is no kind—namely, multiple personality 
disorder or hysteria—to have knowledge about. It does imply, however, that there is no 
stable kind to have knowledge about (Cf. Hacking, 1995a, 61), which clearly has 
implications for the project of classifying real kinds of mental disorder by way of 
identifying clusters of properties. 
 As I outlined in both chapter 2 and chapter 3, some philosophers have tried to 
avoid this consequence by insisting that looping only alters the superficial or stereotypical 
properties of a psychiatric kind, leaving the important properties unchanged. For instance, 
Hacking posits that schizophrenia, though subject to looping effects, might be a natural 
kind in the sense that it is ultimately produced by some underlying “biological pathology 
P” (see section 2.2.3), which itself is not subject to looping effects. Tsou makes a similar 
 See both Scull (2009) and Goldstein (2001) [1987] for a historical account of the rise and fall of hysteria 42
in the nineteenth and twentieth century, respectively. 
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claim about schizophrenia, maintaining that schizophrenia has a “stable biological causal 
structure” (see section 3.4.1), which remains stable in spite of looping effects.  
 One must question, however, whether the distinction between properties which are 
subject to looping effects and properties which are not is too neat. After all, if there is a 
significant change in an individual’s experience and behaviour as a consequence of 
looping effects, how could it be that there is no corresponding change at the level of 
biology? If looping effects were not driving real changes in the biology of an organism
—“all the way down”, so to speak—then, insofar as biological change (e.g., a change in 
brain activity) is necessary for psychological or behavioural change, we should not even 
expect looping effects to alter the superficial or stereotypical properties of a kind.   
 Although no research to date has specifically examined how being labelled or 
classified as, e.g., “schizophrenic” or “depressed” might result in biological changes in an 
individual, the well-known placebo effect phenomenon (the ameliorative effect of taking 
an inert substance or undergoing a sham procedure) provides evidence for the view that 
one’s beliefs can affect both their symptomatology and biology. Consider the case of 
depression. Individuals with depression are particularly susceptible to strong placebo 
responses. According to some estimates, up to 82 percent of the improvement in mood, as 
measured by the Hamilton Depression Scale, can be duplicated by patients taking a 
placebo pill instead of an antidepressant (Kirsch, Moore, Scoboria, & Nicholl, 2002; 
Kirsch et al., 2008).  While most research on the neurobiological underpinnings of the 43
 Although these results were initially controversial, they have since been replicated repeatedly (Cf. 43
Fountoulakis & Möller, 2011; Fournier et al., 2010; NICE, 2004; Turner et al., 2008). Even the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) found similar results in its own meta-analysis of all of the antidepressants that 
they have approved (Khin et al., 2011). 
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placebo effect have been done with analgesia (to reduce pain), recent evidence suggests 
that the belief that one is taking an active antidepressant increases mu-opioid receptor 
activity in areas of the brain that have previously been linked to depression, such as the 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex, nucleus accumbens, and amygdala (Pecina et al., 
2015).   44
 Although the concept of a placebo effect is more narrow than the concept of a 
looping effect, the strong placebo response found amongst depressed patients arguably 
would not be present if these individuals were not at some level interacting with ideas 
about themselves. As Wager and Atlas (2015) note, placebo responses are elicited by an 
individual’s expectations that they will get better. These expectations, in turn, depend on 
the complex context in which the treatment is delivered.  Part of this context are ideas 45
about what depression is and whether or not it is treatable. If it were not the case that an 
individual came to believe that depression is the kind of thing (e.g., a chemical 
imbalance) that is amenable to treatment with pills, then it is highly unlikely that the mere 
belief that one is taking an active antidepressant would result in expectations of 
improvement.  
 In fact, recent evidence suggests that the interaction between an individual and 
 In fact, individuals who are able to release more endogenous opioids in response to placebo showed more 44
improvement, suggesting that the capacity for an individual to release endogenous opioids when they 
receive a substance is related to their improved state. Although Pecina et al. do not test this hypothesis, 
there is evidence from research on the analgesic effects of placebos indicating that the regulation of 
endogenous opioids via placebo is a top-down process, whereby the expectation of relief first activates the 
prefrontal cortex which thereby “tells” the midbrain to release opioids. Cf. Wager et al., (2004, 2011, 2013). 
 That is to say, one’s expectations of treatment will depend on how they interpret a vast array of contextual 45
information, both external and internal: being in a doctor’s office, verbal cues (e.g., the suggestion that one 
will feel better after treatment), social cues (e.g., a physician’s body language, tone of voice, eye contact), 
treatment cues (e.g., a needle puncture, syringe, a pill, or a prescription), emotions (e.g., “I feel less 
anxious”), and previous memories (e.g., past positive and negative experiences regarding treatment).   
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their very own classification can also lead to the expectation that one will not get better, 
resulting in nocebo responses.  For instance, the increasing public belief that illnesses 46
such as depression and schizophrenia are genetic in origin or “diseases of the brain”  is 47
strongly associated with the belief that mental illness is “hard wired” and that people with 
mental illness are dangerous, incompetent, and will not recover (Phelan, Cruz-Rojas & 
Rieff, 2002; Read & Harré, 2001). The internalization of this public belief or stigma  can 48
have deleterious effects on people suffering from mental illness, including a decrease in 
self-efficacy and self-esteem (Corrigan, Kerr & Knudsen, 2005; Corrigan, 2007; Corrigan 
et al., 2016), a decrease in well-being (Cruwys and Gunaseelan, 2016), an exacerbation of 
symptoms of mental disorder (Schrank, Amering, Hay, Weber & Sibitz, 2014), and worse 
prognoses (Corrigan, 2016; Phelan, Cruz-rojas & Reiff, 2002).   49
 Beliefs about oneself and one’s condition might also be able to explain (at least in 
part) one of the most puzzling findings in schizophrenia research—namely, that people 
with schizophrenia in developing nations do better than those living in industrialized 
 A “nocebo response” is defined as new and worsening symptoms that are caused only by negative 46
expectations on the part of an individual. A “nocebo effect”, on the other hand, is defined as new or 
worsening symptoms that occur during sham treatment (e.g., in a clinical trial patients develop “side 
effects” of a drug as a consequence of the deliberate or unintended suggestion and/or expectation that these 
side effects will occur). Cf. Häuser, Hansen, and Enck (2012) for a comprehensive review of the nocebo 
phenomenon in medicine. 
 For instance, in their review of sixteen population studies between 1990 and 2006, Schomerus et al. 47
(2011) found a significant increase in the belief that schizophrenia and depression are brain disorders (e.g., 
55% of respondents in 1990 agreed that schizophrenia was a brain disorder, compared to 75% of 
respondents in 2006). Despite this change, stigma (public prejudice and discrimination) surrounding 
depression did not change, and actually got worse in the case of schizophrenia. 
 In the literature public stigma is defined as public prejudice and discrimination directed at those suffering 48
from mental illness, whereas as self-stigma is the internalization of public prejudice and discrimination.  
 Indeed, studies show that over the last half century or so the world (especially in the United States and 49
Europe) has steadily adopted the medical model of mental illness, believing that the causes of mental illness 
to be “chemical imbalances”, “brain diseases”, or “genetics”. In this same time period stigma surrounding 
the mentally ill has actually increased. 
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nations (Cf. Sartorius, Gulbinat, Harrison, Laska & Siegel, 1996; Craig, 
Siegel, Hopper, Lin, & Sartorius, 1997; Hopper, Harrison, Janca & Sartorius, 2007). 
While many different explanations have been offered for this phenomenon (e.g, religious 
differences/attitudes toward life, less demanding and stressful conditions, more 
opportunity to feel productive, less highly charged attention and criticism or “expressed 
emotion”), some ethnographic research reveals that the belief that schizophrenia is a 
chronic, debilitating disease of the brain is notably absent in developing nations such as 
Zanzibar and Tanzania (Cf. Watters, 2010, chapter 3). It would seem that, when the label 
‘schizophrenia’ carries with it the connotation the one has a chronic illness and will not 
get better, they often don’t. 
 The hypothesis that being labelled or classified as, e.g., “schizophrenic” or 
“depressed” changes the very nature of an illness itself undoubtedly demands further 
investigation. Even so, the existence of placebo and nocebo responses is enough to cast 
doubt on the assumption that looping effects only alter the superficial or stereotypical 
properties of a kind.  At the very least, the interaction between an individual and their 50
very own classification can change the course and progression of their illness as well as 
their biology. If this is right, then looping effects are not merely superfluous, causally 
inert aspects of a mental disorder. Rather, they are part of the causal story of a mental 
disorder—a part of the story that happens to make psychiatric kinds in some respects 
unpredictable and unstable clusters of properties. After all, inasmuch as individuals’ 
beliefs about themselves and their classification can differ in myriad ways, and inasmuch 
 In fact, according to Häuser, Hansen, and Enck (2012, 461), the same neurobiological mechanisms seem 50
to be implicated in both placebo and nocebo responses. 
174
as these beliefs are causally efficacious, one should not expect that psychiatric kinds will 
be identical across time and across cultures.     51
4.5.3 Unstable Patterns of Complex Interaction 
 Although it is plausible to suppose that psychiatric kinds are in some ways 
unstable and unpredictable as a consequence of looping effects, some philosophers and 
scientists still maintain that the fact that schizophrenia presents similarly across cultures 
(Cf. Jablensky et al., 1992) implies—or at least strongly suggests—that individual 
members of the putative kind share a stable causal structure (Kendler et al., 2011, 1145).   
 But is it true, or even likely, that schizophrenia has a stable causal structure? 
Consider the evidence from genetics research over the past half century or so. It is 
undoubtedly clear that genes play an important role in schizophrenia, the overall 
heritability being between 65-80% (Lichtenstein et al., 2009; Sullivan, Kendler & Neale, 
2003).  Yet, even when one identical twin has schizophrenia, the chances of the other 52
twin also having the illness are only around 40-50% (Onstad, Skyre, Torgersen & 
Kringlen, 1991). The risk also diminishes quite dramatically when one considers non-
identical twins, siblings, and children of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia. In 
fact, as Gottesman (1991, 99) notes, most parents of individuals diagnosed with 
 Hacking appears to make a similar suggestion when he contends that feedback in natural kinds is 51
different because “it works not at the level of individuals but through a great many generations, be it for 
microbes or mammals” (Hacking, 1992, 190). While I do think that this prevents mental disorders from 
being natural kinds (as I argue in chapter 2), if it is true that the properties of human kinds shift 
unpredictably as a result of feedback operating on an individual level, then this would imply that human 
kinds are not particularly useful natural kinds. 
 Compare this with depression, in which the overall heritability is between 30-40%. See section 2.3.2. 52
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schizophrenia do not have schizophrenia (~6%), or are even conspicuously abnormal.  53
What is more, recent estimates suggest that there are upwards of 600 genes involved in 
schizophrenia, each conferring a small genetic risk (Schizophrenia Working Group of the 
Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2014). Schizophrenia, in other words, is not a “genetic 
disorder” in the sense that Down’s Syndrome and Huntington’s Disease are genetic 
disorders. At best, schizophrenia exhibits a non-Mendelian pattern of inheritance in which 
there are no rare mutations with deterministic causal effects, but, rather, many single 
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and copy number variants (CNVs) which each have a 
very small effect on the total risk of developing schizophrenia (Cf. Harrison, 2015).   
 What is more, recent evidence suggests that the genetic factors associated with 
schizophrenia might not even be specific to schizophrenia. In a population-based study 
examining more than two million families in Sweden between 1973 and 2004, 
Lichtenstein et al. (2009) found that first-degree relatives of individuals with either 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder were at increased risk of developing any one of these 
disorders. They estimate the comorbidity between the disorders due to additive genetic 
effects to be around 63%.     
 The massively polygenic and genetically comorbid  nature of schizophrenia (at 54
least as “schizophrenia” is currently conceived), coupled with the complex neurochemical 
 In his review of family and twin studies from 1920-1987, Gottesman (1991) places the risk for an 53
individual developing schizophrenia when their identical twin has schizophrenia at 48%. For non-identical 
twins it’s 17%; 9% for siblings of a schizophrenic; 13% for children of a schizophrenic parent; and 6% for 
parents of a schizophrenic child.
 Although I do not have the space to review the literature here, evidence is emerging that there is “causal 54
comorbidity” between kinds of mental disorder. For instance, in chapter 2 (section 2.3.2) I suggested that 
the hippocampus (responsible for both emotional memory and spatial navigation) was implicated in 
depression. Recent evidence suggestions that it is also implicated in schizophrenia. Cf. Allen, Fung & 
Weickert (2015).
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processes and variable anatomical findings discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.4.1), do not 
paint a picture of a kind which has a “stable biological structure”. Furthermore, once we 
expand our search to include known environmental risk factors of schizophrenia—
maternal infections; maternal stressors, obstetrical complications; childhood trauma; 
social isolation; living in a city; and belonging to a minority ethnic group—we open up 
the possibility that the symptoms of schizophrenia are not predictable epiphenomenal 
effects of genes which alter neurodevelopment which thereby alters brain chemistry and 
circuitry. It is quite possible that there are complex gene-environment interactions (so-
called “epigenetic factors”) in which the environment itself exerts its causal influence via 
epigenetic mechanisms (Cf. Gavin & Sharma, 2010; Roth et al., 2009; Rutten & Mill, 
2009; van Os, Rutten & Poulten, 2009).  
 For instance, during neuronal migration cortical neurons begin their life near the 
ventricles and must make their way through the white matter to the outer regions of the 
neural tube. The first cortical neurons that migrate start forming the cortex, while neurons 
that migrate later must “crawl through” the existing layers of cortical neurons until they 
reach their final destination. This is a complex and delicate process which, in theory, 
could be disrupted by any number of factors: abnormalities in genes that sustain neural 
migration or help neurons grow and form connections, activity of neurotransmitters 
responsible for guiding migration and synapse formation, and even exposure to stressors 
(e.g., maternal infection). While the epigenetics of mental disorders are thus far poorly 
understood, the hypothesis that brain circuitry might be affected at different critical stages 
in brain development would explain why it is that both genetic and pre- and post-natal 
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environmental factors are strongly associated with schizophrenia. 
 Kendler et al. concede that these complex, dynamic processes may be at work in 
schizophrenia when they say that “risk genes work in cells that are parts of physiological 
systems that shape behaviors and environments…which, at all of these levels, feed back 
to influence genetic regulation and protein expression” (2011, 1145). Yet, if this is indeed 
the case, then it unclear in what sense schizophrenia is defined by “stable patterns of 
complex interaction between behavior, environment, and physiology”. After all, if it is 
true that many different, dynamic causal processes are at work in producing the 
symptoms of schizophrenia, and these causal processes might differ on an individual basis 
depending on when brain development is affected and depending on what kind of genes, 
stressors, and neural mechanisms are involved in particular cases, then it would seem that 
schizophrenia is not at all a stable entity or process in nature, but something that is 
continually morphing or shape-shifting in step with an ever-changing and adaptable 
human organism, from the level of genes to behavior.       
4.5.4 Conclusion 
 It has long been thought that, if any kind of mental disorder were to be found to be 
a stable entity or process in nature, it would be schizophrenia. More than a century of 
research on schizophrenia has not borne out this conclusion. Indeed, as I have argued 
here, there are reasons to think that the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia in fact 
change across time and space and from individual to individual because of complex 
causal processes—including looping effects—that could have scarcely been imagined 
when the term ‘schizophrenia’ was first coined by Eugen Bleuler in 1908.  
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 The hypothesis that psychopathological phenomena do not cluster together neatly 
should not be taken to imply that there are no natural kinds of mental disorder. After all, 
real kinds of mental disorder might just be a lot more complex than we originally thought, 
as I suggested in chapter 2.   
 Be that as it may, it is unlikely that hypothetical constructs such as “depression” 
and “schizophrenia” are going to capture this complex reality. For one thing, the project 
of classifying natural kinds of mental disorder by way of identifying stable clusters of 
properties has proven unsuccessful. Furthermore, given that a diverse cluster of 
observable properties is unlikely to have a shared causal explanation—and given that the 
clusters characteristic of many kinds of mental disorder often “come apart”—it is 
doubtful that this strategy will generally prove useful in the future. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 Natural kind realists believe that the world is divided up into kinds—viz. naturally 
occurring clusters of observable properties undergirded by an unobservable causal base—
and that we can know which clusters are real and which are bogus by consulting our best 
theories about the world. In this chapter I argued that these twin pillars of natural kind 
realism are simply not congruent with what we know about mental disorders, both 
historically and empirically. Not only has the project of classifying natural kinds of 
mental disorder by way of identifying clusters of properties failed historically; it’s likely 
to fail as a general strategy for psychiatric classification given the nature of 
psychopathological phenomena. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Throughout this dissertation I have argued that psychiatric kinds are not natural 
kinds, since we cannot even explain causally how it is that the signs and symptoms that 
are characteristic of putatively distinct kinds of mental disorder are produced. Without 
knowing the true causal structure of a particular kind of mental disorder, it is impossible 
to know whether the properties definitive of a psychiatric kind do indeed cluster together, 
or whether these groupings are merely a reflection of our predilections to group certain 
properties together. 
 Indeed, this conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that many of our current 
psychiatric kinds, such as schizophrenia, were constructed not on the basis of well-formed 
theories about the mind/brain, or the nature of psychopathological phenomena, but on 
theoretical hunches made over a century ago.  
 Compare this situation with that of biology. While there are still deep 
disagreements in biology about how species ought to be classified—e.g. whether one 
should appeal to morphological similarities or genetic similarities (Cf. Khalidi, 2013, 75; 
Kornblith, 1993, 51)—biology has an overarching theory from which to work. Outside of 
psychoanalysis, psychiatry does not have an overarching theory—and, as we have seen, 
theories of particular kinds of mental disorder that have been proposed over the years 
have presupposed the existence of the very thing they are attempting to theorize about.  
 While most philosophers have argued that psychiatry has not progressed because 
psychiatric classification has for the most part been based on atheoretical observational 
criteria, this diagnosis does not get things quite right. There is a sense in which the failure 
180
of psychiatry to meaningfully progress was built in from the start. First, the discipline of 
psychiatry has historically proceeded in accordance with the motto: classify first, ask 
questions later. Second, nosologists have traditionally assumed that identifying clusters of 
co-occurring properties would carve up nature in such a way that natural kinds of mental 
disorder would be forthcoming.      
 There are ample reasons to believe that this “top-down” approach to the 
psychopathological domain is wrongheaded. For one thing, it hasn’t worked historically. 
Second, evidence for the complex and chaotic nature of psychopathological phenomena 
(i.e. comorbidity, instability, and causal complexity) suggests that, as a general strategy, 
it will likely not work in the future. In his late-life reflections on the status of psychiatric 
classification Kraepelin expressed similar doubts about the way in which he and his 
contemporaries were going about trying to identify natural kinds of mental disorder: 
It has been repeatedly stated that research in clinical psychiatry has almost 
reached a dead end. It has been the practice for some time now to separate one 
disease from another with respect to causes, clinical findings, course, outcome 
and pathological findings. This practice has now outgrown its use. We must 
explore new avenues (Kraepelin, 1920, 509).  
 Today, we are faced with the very same question that Kraepelin pondered almost a 
century ago: which avenues should we explore? As far as classification is concerned, 
there are many different approaches one could take. The fact that a variety of 
psychopathological phenomena do not cluster together neatly would seem to suggest that 
dimensional, rather than categorical, approaches to classification are most appropriate. 
But mixed categorical/dimensional models are also plausible. Consider depression, for 
instance. It might be the case that most instances of clinical depression fall on a 
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continuum with normal unhappiness, but that the most severe form of clinical depression
—which has variously been called melancholia, endogenous depression, or nuclear 
depression—is a kind unto itself (Cf. Haslam, 2002, 211; Horowitz & Wakefield, 2007).  
 There is also the question of utility. Even if categorical approaches to psychiatric 
classification do a poor job of capturing the complex reality of psychopathological 
phenomena, they might still be useful. For example, the category of ‘hypertension’ is 
arbitrary in the sense that it falls on a continuum with normal blood pressure variation 
within the general population. Nevertheless, given the serious health risks associated with 
high blood pressure, there are pragmatic reasons for drawing a categorical distinction 
between normal blood pressure and hypertension. A similar case can be made for 
psychopathological phenomena which are dimensional in nature. Although clinical 
depression might very well exist on a continuum with normal sadness, surely not all 
varieties of sadness require treatment.    
 As has been argued at length elsewhere (Kendler & Jablensky, 2003; Zachar, 
2000, 2002, 2014a, 2014b), psychiatry is as much an applied science as a theoretical one, 
and an enduring problem in psychiatric classification is to strike a delicate balance 
between the needs of researchers, clinicians, patients, and third-party insurance 
companies. Although one might suggest that, for far too long, psychiatric classification 
has been in the service of too many masters, this is unlikely to change in the near future 
given the indispensability of current psychiatric categories to both clinicians and patients. 
After all, even if paradigmatic psychiatric kinds such as schizophrenia and depression do 
not reflect real kinds in nature, patients still need a diagnosis in order to receive treatment 
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and disability, and clinicians still need to make treatment decisions while they wait for the 
science to catch up.    
 In my mind, it is high time to do something that, outside of psychoanalysis, the 
discipline of psychiatry has historically been reluctant to do: table the question of 
psychiatric classification for the moment and instead direct our attention back to the 
phenomena that are still in dire need of explanation. In particular, a more tractable 
approach for psychiatric research would be to first explain how particular kinds of 
experiences and behaviours—e.g, hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking, mania, 
low mood, etc.—are produced. Once we have figured this out there may be no 
“schizophrenia” or “bipolar disorder” left to explain.  
 This approach is “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” in the sense that it suspends 
judgment concerning whether or not certain psychopathological properties (e.g., delusions 
and hallucinations) cluster together, and instead focuses on explaining one thing at a time. 
The advantages of this approach are clear. For one thing, explaining, e.g., delusions—or 
even a particular type of delusion—is much more manageable than explaining all of 
delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking, catatonic behaviour, and comorbid states 
of depression, anxiety, and personality. This line of attack not only sidesteps the problem 
of heterogeneity and comorbidity—at least at the level of symptomatology—but is also 
much more likely to yield promising causal explanations given that, on the face of it, 
delusional states are distinguishable from hallucinatory states, as well as abnormal 
behaviours such as disorganized speech and catatonic behaviour.        
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 Perhaps the greatest advantage of this approach, however, is that it is not 
predicated on the specious assumption that differences between psychopathological 
phenomena and non-psychopathological phenomena are differences in kind, not degree. 
This opens up new theoretical avenues in which explanations of psychopathological 
phenomena can proceed from more general theories about how the mind/brain operates, a 
conceptual framework which has been perspicaciously lacking in psychiatric research.  
 Although a complete illustration of this kind of explanatory approach is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, an example will suffice as a bookend to this essay. In The 
Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Delusional 
Thought (2014) Phillip Gerrans offers a novel explanation of delusion. Gerrans’ principal 
thesis is that delusions arise when “default cognitive processing, unsupervised by 
decontextualized processing, is monopolized by hypersalient information” (ibid., 38; 
emphasis in original).  
 According to Gerrans, delusions are “default thoughts” which represent the 
operation of the Default Mode Network (DMN). The DMN is a cognitive system which 
allows all human beings the ability to simulate/imagine experiences (both past and future) 
in the absence of stimuli. It evolved in order to allow an organism to simulate/imagine 
scenarios in response to “salient information”—namely, that which is relevant to an 
organism at any given time—for the purpose of planing, deliberation, and reflection. In 
particular, default circuitry enables human beings to make salient information intelligible 
by providing a subjectively adequate autobiographical narrative for experience. 
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 Under normal waking conditions default cognitive processing is supervised by 
higher cognitive processes, which makes possible “decontexualized processing”—i.e. the 
capacity to treat one’s beliefs as hypotheses open to falsification. In cases of delusion, 
however, decontextualized processing is inoperative either because the neural 
mechanisms responsible for decontextualized processing (e.g., the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex) are damaged or hypoactive, or because decontextualized processing is 
overridden by a hyperactive default network. The default network can become 
hyperactive when the salience system, which is underwritten by dopaminergic activity, 
makes some kinds of information “hypersalient”—i.e. extremely relevant or significant to 
an organism, dominating attention, working memory, and executive function. 
 For example, Gerrans argues that Capgras delusion (the delusion that a familiar 
person has been replaced by an imposter or lookalike) is the consequence of the default 
network incorporating an anomalous experience (in this case, the experience of seeing a 
familiar person in the absence of an autonomic affective response) by producing the 
delusion: “My wife has been replaced by a lookalike”. Conversely, Fregoli delusion (the 
delusion that one is being followed by a familiar person in disguise) is the consequence of 
the default network incorporating the anomalous experience of seeing a stranger and 
having a strong affective response characteristic of seeing a familiar person.  Both of 1
these strange delusions begin as default thoughts meant to make an anomalous experience 
 According to Gerrans (ibid., 103-104), in the former case the anomalous experience is caused by a lesion 1
to pathways connecting face recognition circuitry (the fusiform gyrus) and affectivity (the amygdala), and 
in the latter case the anomalous experience is causes by hyperactivity in the pathways that typically trigger 
an autonomic affective response to a familiar person.    
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intelligible to an individual, and, due to compromised decontextualized processing, are 
further entrenched in an agent’s psychology.          
 Gerrans also suggests that his account can be extended to delusions which are 
common in “schizophrenia”, such as paranoid delusions (the delusion that others are out 
to harm you), referential delusions (the delusion that external events or objects hold a 
special significance), and grandiose delusions (the delusion that one is exceptional or 
powerful). In these instances default thoughts are triggered by experiences which have 
been intensified by the salience system, effectively hijacking cognitive, behavioural, and 
metabolic resources, and thereby preventing decontextualized processing. 
 One question that arises from Gerrans’ account of delusion is why it is that 
delusions have the content that they do. In delusions of misidentification (e.g., Capgras 
delusion and Fregoli delusion) it is fairly obvious that the experience which triggered a 
default thought, though elaborated upon, is more or less reflected in the delusional 
content. In schizophrenic-like delusions, however, what kinds of anomalous experience or 
hypersalient information could lead one to produce the default thought that they are being 
followed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)?  
 Interestingly, in Suspicious Minds: How Culture Shapes Madness (2014) Joel 
Gold and Ian Gold postulate that human beings possess a “suspicion system” which 
evolved over time for the purpose of enabling adaptive responses to environmental 
threats, such as others’ malign intentions. In the case of delusions—which they argue are 
invariably about others or oneself in relation to others—the suspicion system is in 
overdrive, causing one to see malign intent where there is none (e.g., believing that one is 
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being followed by the CIA). To put this hypothesis in the language of Gerrans’ account, a 
hyperactive suspicion system can make certain kinds of information (e.g., body language, 
facial expressions, speech, others’ behaviour) hypersalient. As a result, default thoughts 
related thematically to oneself vis à vis others are produced, and, if unsupervised by 
decontextualized processing, eventually become part of an agent’s psychology.   
 While the claim that delusions are default thoughts might turn out to be false, the 
attractiveness of this approach to psychiatric explanation is that it seeks to explain a 
known phenomenon (delusions) rather than an unknown, hypothetical disease 
(schizophrenia). For reasons already mentioned, we are much more likely to make 
theoretical progress this way. 
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